470^ 





Class 
Book. 






THE TRIBUNE WAR TRACTS. 

JVo. 1. / 



EEPOET 






CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE 



OW THE 0PESATI0N3 OF THE 



kSm OF THE POTOMAC. 



CAUSES OF ITS INACTIOI^ AND EL SUCCESS. 



[TS SEVEIIA.L Oi^MPAJCGN'a.' 



WHY M'CLELLM WAS REMOVED. 



THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 



REMOVAL OF BURNSIDE./ 



^ ««♦■«« " 



l^W YORK: 

PUBLISHED BY THE 'iRIBUNE ASSOCIATION. 

186,1. 



LI 






.IC 5 S S 

EEPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE 



THE OOIiTDUCT OF THE WAR/ 



Mr. Wade, from the Joint Committeo on the 
Conduct of the War, Butniittod the following ro- 
fort, with the accompanying testimony: 

CONDUCT OP THE WAR. 

■ In December, 1S61, a joint committeo of the two 
nonses of Congress, consisting of three members of 
^^- Senate and foar members of the Honae of Kep- 
.V: 3ntativcs, was appointed, with instrnctions to in- 
j re into tae conduct of tbe present war. 

our Committee proceeded to the discharge of the 
-n 7 devolved upon them, and Lave labored zaal- 

■ ly, nnd they trust, faithf ally, for that purpose. 

^Icncoof that, they would refer to the large 
t testimo:iy taken by them, upon many Bub- 
uid herewith reported. 
.0 mbj2ct of inquiry referred to them was one 
of tiie utmost importance r.nd magnitude. Upon 
" the conduct of tlie present war" dspended the 
issue of il:e cspennent inaugurated by our fatbcrs. 
Biter Eornuch expenditure of blood End treasure— 
thejEstabhshmenii of n, naion founded upon the ca- 
pacity ot man for Edf-government. 1'be ration waa 
engaged la a contest for iis very existence: a rebel- 
lion, UDpara'.ldeiiu history, tbreatened the over- 
throw 01 our free m- titations, and tbe moso prompt 
and vigorous measarLS were demanded by everv 
consideration of honor, patriotism, and a duo re<^.ird 
for the prosperity and tappicess of the people. 

iOMT Committee could perceive no r.eocs'itv for 
recommending rny particulir legishUion to Con- 
grees. its previous course ehowe J that ro such ra- 
commendatioa was required. When Congress met 
the pixjcedmg July, Ireeh from the psopia-called 
npon to provide for the safety of the Govemtnent 
and the maiLtejance of the national honor and ex- 
istence-the re-^resentatives of tae people gave full 
■evideDce that t Ley comprehended tlie duty devolved 
npon tVem, and had tlie courage and will tcfaUv 
discharge It. Thaadtnidstration caUsd by the S 
pie to tue bead of the Government, in this the most 
cntical period of the nation's history, was mofe 
prompt y md faJly supported man that of any 
ether Government of wbieb history has pre- 
^^Zlt "°-'7"'^>-^ The calJ of the Tresident^for 
money aad men had been more than c-.mp]icd 
with; nc lagiaiation which he Jiad deemed 
necessary t.aJ been denied by Congress, and the 
l^^l ■ r 't-^^f "''H^ ^^^ generously Fupported and 
intwi"^^^' rf" representative/ hue' promised 
io.«t1 n^ t ^- 7^^ ?^^^ Congress, fresh from their 
doubt that, ae tUey had before acted, ec would they 
continur tc act. If needf but tc re'ei tc the history 
ol the Congresf just dosed, itf prompt and thorou^L 
ectiouT Ciothinp tlir Executive with the fuK 
^«r«;?'"°'""'"i,*^^'^'''^^'^ «" t^f^ resouroet o 
jrove that youi Committee jadged rightly thai Con- 



gresB needed no prompting from them to do its en» 
tire duty. . 

Not upon those whoso duty it was to provide the 
means necessary to put down the Eebellioa, Lot 
upon those whose duty it was to ligbtfully jipply 
those means, and the agents they employed for thrt 
purpose, rested the biame if any, ihiit the hopes of 
the nation have not been realized, and its expecta- 
tions have Eo long been disapooiated. 
Your CoiJtLUteo therei'oie concluded (bat they 
■ ■ would best perlorm their duty by eudeavoriag fo\ _ 
obtain such ialormatiou in respect to the conduct of 4 
•the war as would best enable them to advise what 
mistakes bad been made in the past, and tbe proper 
course to be pursued in tbe future; to obtain such 
information as the many raid laborious duoiea of the 
President, atid laa Cabinet lu'eveuted faem from ac- 
quiring, &r.d to Liv^ It before tiem with euch recom- 
mendadons and euggestioua as seemed to bo most 
imperatively demanded; and tbejjurnalof tbe pro- 
ceedings ot your Comn-ittee ehows that, for a long 
time, they were in cons'ant coaimunicaiion with tbe 
President and his Cabinet, and negL-cttd no oppor- 
tunity of at once laying before them tbe information 
acqmred by them in the course of their investi- 
gations. 

Many Epecific Bubjects of iavestigation presented 
themselves lor the consideration of your Committee, 
any one of which might well require the actron of a 
comm-itteo for iieelf; end all ot which, if fully in- 
vestigated, would demand the attention of all tbe 
representative s i j Coigress. It was apparent from 
the hfst that your Committee would be compelled to 
confine their attention to a few of the more prom- 
inent Eubjacts of iuquu-v; to those the invest itjatfcn 
of which woulJ best enable them tc comprehend 
the caus28 and necessity, if any. for the delay and 
inaction characterizing "the operations of oui armiej 
in the Held. 

And while each of those subjects has received 
from them tbe attention which i%e importance 
merited, 60 far as they were able tc give it, the at- 
tention of your Committee ha? been turned more, 
particularly to tbe history of the Army of the Poto- 
mac. In tlie history of that army h tc be found nil 
that is necessary to enable your Committee tc report 
upon "the conduct of the war. ' Had that army 
ful ailed all that a generouy and confiding people 
were justified io expecting from it. this rebellion 
had long since been crushed, and tbe IJessingPof 
peace restored tc thif nation. The failureoi that 
army tc fulfill those expectations haf prolonged thir 
contest tc the present time, with al.' iie expenditure 
of life and treasure; for h hat tc e great extent neu- 
trahzed, it not entirely destroyed, tht. legitimate, 
fruit? which would otherwise hove been reaped 
from oui gloriouf victories in the Wept. 

Trerefore, while ycui Committee: have not failed 
tc take the testimony ol witnessee in relation to mil- 
^jrary operation? in other partr of the country, and 
disc upon variouf eubjectt; to which tbeii- attention 
bar. been sj^ecialiy directed bv Congress and the 
Wai Dep3rtment since the Committee was first ap- 
pointed, the principal part ol the testimony takea 



V ^> 



f 



%^ 



bjrthem relates to the Army of the Poiomao end 
tfioooeubjecNmore imniediately connects d with its 
operatiooe. Tuey tjave tiiken the testimony of nearly 
200'witnes8C'fi, almost entirely men iu tito military 
service of the Government, inciudinjj abouo 100 
generals. 

The disaster at Ball Enn in July. 1S61, was fully 
invest ic^ated l>y your Committee, us being the firet 
conflict of the national troops with armed treason 
upon tbe field of battle; and also because tlio troops 
there enj^a^ed formed the nucleus aroond vpldch has 
ainco been ci'llected the vast and magnificent Array 
of the Potomac. The result of theii investigation 
yonr Commirfee submit in a separate report. 

Your Conimttee have also investigated the disaster 
at Ball's Bluff, that battle being the first conflict of 
any extent in which any of tlie troops of the army 
of the Potomac were engaged after its re-organiza- 
tion. A Be]^)arate report of thut disaster is also sub- 
mitted. 

Immediately upon the organization of your Com- 
mittee, and before proceeding to thetating of any 
testimony, they addressed to Gen. McCiellan, who, 
by the retirement of Gen. Scott, had become Gen- 
eral-in-Chief of the Army, the following commnni- 
cation : 

" Washington, D, C, Dee. 21, 1861. 
"Sir: Tou RroBWaro thht tt Joint Committee lias been ap- 
pointed by the t-enate ar.cl Ilousa of ItepreseDtatives to in- 
quire into tlio 'couUuct of the vrpT.' Our Committee, Bt a 
meeting hi"ld this mornirg, unanimously txpreteija desire, 
before proceeding in iheir official duties, to liave an interview 
with you Kt our room at the Capital, at tucb time as may Buit 
jour convtnitrci', iu view of your prefsing engagements. 

" Our place of rtieetirgl3 tUe room of the Committeo on 
Territories tftlie Senate. , 

•' I lemain, very respectfully, yours, 

•* P.. F. WADE, Chairman. 
" MeJ.-Oen. Geo. B. McClellan, General Commanding 
Army United States." 

While fi;lJy appreciating tbe dignity and power 
with wbich they were clothed by the concurrent 
action of both Louses of Coogress, they deemed it 
but just to award to his position the conaideration of 
asking him to confer with tliem in relation to the 
best me hod of fulfilling those expectations which 
the people had a ngh\ to hope for from an adminis- 
tration upon which they had, through their repre- 
sentatives, conferred such plenary poworp. A refer- 
ence to the journal of your committee w'Jlshow than 
iU health prevented Gen. McCiellan from imm.edi- 
ately complying with this invitation. Theneceeei- 
ties of the case, however, were eo pressing nnd 
urgent that; your committee concluded to proceed at 
t>iico to the lakiog of testimony. 

ARJIY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Soon after ihe battle of Bull Eun, in July, 1861, 
Gen. McDowell was superseded, and Gen. McCiel- 
lan was calltd by the President to the command of 
the army of the Potomac. The campaign in Western 
Virginia, the credit of which had beon generaUj 
BBcribed to Gen. McCiellan; the favor wit,h which it 
was understood he was regarded by Gen. Scott, then 
general-ia-chief of the ciniy of the United States; 
even Lis comparative youth, holtlin^ out the promise 
of active and iigorous measures; all these considera- 
tions tended to luluse Lopo into the public mind, nnd 
to remove the gloom end decpondency which bad 
followed the disastrous issue of tho campaign jost 
ended. 

Every energy of (he Government and all the re- 
aonrcesof ugeuerous cndjatnolic peoplo were freely 
and lavishly viLctd at thodiipoEal of Cen. McClcllau 
toenableLim to gather together another army and 
put it in the most complete etato of eflicioncy, so that 
offensive operations might be resumed at tho earliest 
praciicablij moment. The Army of tho Potomac 
oecame t je object of special care to every depart- 
ment of the Government, and all olhor military 
movements und organizat.ons were mado r-ubordinato 
to tho one great purpose of colkcUng at Washington, 
and organizing there, an army which shouLl over- 
power the forces of the enemy, and forever 
crush ont any hope of bucccfs which tlie 
Sebelfl might ctieriah. Even when the army of 



the Potomac had attained di;oeu«i(m8 never before 
contemplated iu tho course ot' military oporationa 
upon this continent, and seldom, if ever, efiualedin 
modern times, no portion of its rapidly iucrtasiag 
numberswaa permitted to be diverted, evea for a 
brief period, to the accomplishment of other enter- 
prises. Tho generals ia charge of the variouT expe- 
ditions from time to time inaugurated, and from 
which so much benefit was anticipated — Gon. But- 
ler, Gen. Sherman, Gen. Burutide, and others — 
were compelled to look elsewhere for the troops to 
coraposo ineir commands, to rely upon tho canlinued 
patriotumoftha people, and tha zeal of tho Execu- 
tives of the various States for the raising of those 
regimrnta which wouid enable taeui to depart for 
tho fields of duty assigned to them. No considera- 
tion was for a niomeuc allowed to diminish or impair 
the efiiciency of the Army of tho Potomac, and tho 
unesamp'.ed'spectacla was presented to other nations, 
who were intently watching tho course of events in 
this country, of the 1 irprea t urruy of the present cen- 
tui-y being raised entirely by voluntary enhetmentB 
in the brief period of a few months. 

When Congress assembled in this city, in the be- 
ginning of December, 1861, 60 successful had been 
the exertions of tbe authorities, and so zealously had 
the people responded to their country's call, that th© 
consoliaated morning reports, furnished your Com- 
mittee by the Adjutant General of the army, show- 
ed that, exclusive of the command of Gen. Dis, at 
Baltimore, the Army of the Potomac confiialed of 
about 185,000 men. 

During the time this large army had been coUect- 
inar and organizing, nothing of importance had trans- 
pired in connection with it, excejit tho closing of the 
navigation of the Potomac by the Kebels, which 
your Committee treat of more at kngth in another 
part of this report, nnd the melancholy disaster of 
Ball's Bluff, which is made tho eulject of a separatd, 
report. 

The weather during the Fall season, and for Bam» 
weeks after tbe convening of Congress, continued 
unusually favorable for active miliary operations. 
As month after month pissed without anything 
being done by the Army of" tho Potomac, the people 
became more and more anxious for the anuoancement 
that the work of preparation Lad been completedL 
and active operations would soon be commenced. 

From the testimony before your Committee it ap- 
peared that the Army of the Potomao was well' 
armed and equipped, and bad reached u high state 
of discipline by tne last of September or tlio first of 
October. Tho men were ready and ca^er tooom-- 
mence active operations. Tho generals in command; 
of the various divisions were opposed to going into 
winter quarters, and the most of them declared they 
hud no expectation of doing eo. 

CORPS ORGANIZATION. | 

In reference to tho proper organization of eo larf^ 
an army as that about Washington, in order that it 
might be tho batter able to act most efi'eclively in 
. the field, the testimony of the witnesses examined 
upon that point it remarkably unanimous. The 
geuerald mo.5t familiar with the sabj.ct seemed to 
regard of the utmost importance tho division of the 
army into corps d'arm^e, and that, too, iu time for 
tho instruction of the troops in tbe movements 
necessary to rcnd^;r ench an organization the most 
effective. Your Committeo deemed it so vitaUy 
necessary that they repcaiedly brought the eubjcct 
to the attention of tiio euthoxiiies, and urged it» 
immediate adontion wi^h all tho arguments iu their 
power. The Prctideut and the Secretary of War. 
concurred with ti.cm in tho necessity of such a 
measure; but it did noteeeratobe legarJed with 
ninoh favor by Gon. McCiellan. Indeed, Gen. 
McCiellan stated to your Committeo, at tho timo of 
their conference with bim, that, although it might 
at some timo bo expedient to oivido tho army into 
army corps, the eu!)ject wcs ono of great difficulty. 
Ho said It was a delicate matter to appoint uiajor- 
generala before they had been tried by actnaH 
service, and had ehown thoir fiiaesa 19 



be Belected to command 30,COO or 40,000 
men. A major-general could not be e to wed 
away in a pigeou-JoIe, if lie should ))rove incompe- 
tent, bo easily as a bri^adier-geaeral. He proposed, 
therefore, lo himself luan-ige tliia entire army in 
some battle or campaign, and then select from the 
brigadier-geaeraU in 'id such as prove tbemselvoa 
competent for higher commands. Consaquemly, 
the division of the army into army corps vras not 
even begun until after I'he movemLnt ot'the army in 
March had commencsd, and then only in pursuance 
of the direct and rapeated orders oi the President. 
/^ Gen. ilcClellan, hoTfever, continued to oppose 
'ithe organization of the army iato army corp's, as 
.Iwill be Been from the following dispatch lo him 
from the Secretary of War, daiei May 9, 18C2: 

"The Fre^ideLtiaunvfilUngto have tlio army corpa organ- 
ization broKeaui), but also uuwilliag that tQe conimunaing 
general BiiaU botiammeled and embariassed ia actual ekir- 
miBhing, collision with thee aemy, andou the eva of an ex- 
pected great battle. You, thereiore, may temporarily saapeud 
thatorgauization ia the army under your immediate com- 
mand, and adopt any you see tit, until further orders. He also 
writes yon privateiy." . 

The provisional corps of Gen. Fitz-John Porter 
and Gen. Franklin wera thereupon formed by re- 
ducing the other corps from three to two divisiona. 

STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY. 
Your Committee endeavored to obtain aa accurate 
intormation as possible in relation to the strength 
and position of tiie enemy ia front of Washington. 
The testimony of the ohicers in our army here upon 
that point, however, was far from satisfactory. 
Early ia December an order had been issuecl from 
headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the 
firont irom examining any persons who should come 
into our lines from tne utreciioa cf the enemy, but 
all Bucii persons were to be sent, without examina- 
tion, to tae headquarters of the army, liestrictiona 
were also placed upon the movements of scouts. 
The result was, that the Generals examiued appeared 
to be almost entirely ignorant of the forco of the 
enemy opposed to them, liaviug only such informa- 
tion as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. 
The strength of the eneiuy was variously estimated 
at from 7U,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed 
the highest estimate based their opinion upon in- 
formation recaived at headijuarters. Aa to the 
strength of the enemy's position, the general im- 
pression seemed to be lounded upon information ob- 
tained from the same source, that it was exceedingly 
formidable. Subsequent events have proved that 
the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of 
these estimates, and the strength of their fortiUca- 
tions very greatly overestimated. 

' DEFENSES OP WASHINGTON. 

Tour Committee also Bought to ascertain what 
number of men could be spared from this army for 
offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the 
works of the enemy in front were of such a charac- 
ter that it would not bo advisable to move dii-cctly 
upon thsm. The estimate of the forcS necessary to 
be left in and around Washington to act entirely on 
the defensive, to render tae capital sectu-e against 
any attack of ihe enemy, as stat^^d by the witnessoB 
examined upon that point, was from 53,C0D to 80,000 
men, leaving 100,000 or upward that conld be used 
forfexpeditioas at other points. 

In conneotioa with the same subject, your Com- 
mittee inquired in reference to what had been done 
to render the tortifications here, which had been 
constructed at such expense and with so great labor, 
most effective for the a-jfense of Washint ton. Your 
Committee are constrained to say that adequate 
provision never was made to properly man those 
fortilicatioDs and exercLe msn ia the manarremeat of 
the gims. Several of the witnesECS testilied that 
they bad repeatedly called the attention of the 
authorities to the matter, but without success. And 
when the movement of the army commsnced in 
March, the few rcgimonta that had been placed in 
the fortfl and partially instructed in tho tibo of the 
gone, were almoet eaiirely withdrawn, leaving tho 



fortifications to be manned by raw and inexperienced 
troops. 

THE BLOCKADE OP THE POTOMAC. 

The subject of the obstruction of the navigation 
of tho Potomic naturally demanded the considera- 
tion of your Committee. Upon that point your 
Committee would call tbe attention of Congress to 
the testimony of Capt. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secre- 
tary of the Navy. Upon reference to bis testimony, 
it will appear that, in June, 1861, the Navy Depart- 
ment proposad to the War Department that meas- 
ures be adopted to take possession of Matthias 
Point, in order to secure the navigation of the Po- 
tomac from any danger of being interropted. From 
some cause, no steps were then taken for that pur- 
pose. The subject was again brought to tbe atten- 
tion of the War Department by the Navy Depart- 
ment in the month of August, shortly after the bat- 
tle of Bull liun. Nothiog, however, was done at 
that time in regard to it. 

In October, 1861, tho Navy Department again 
urged the matter upon the consideration of the War 
Department. The Port lioyal expedition was then 
in preparation, and would soou be ready to start. 
The Navy Department represented that it would be 
absolutely necessary to send with that expedition, 
in order to insure its success, the greater portion of 
the Potomac flotilla, because, being very powerful 
vessels, of light draught, with tlieif machinery pro- 
tected, they were better fitted for that service than 
any other vessels in the possession of the Navy 
Department; and if anything was to be done by 
them to secure the uninterrupted navigation of the 
Potomac, it must be done before they left. It waa 
proposed to the President and the War Department 
that tbe gunboats should take and destroy the Eebel 
batteries which had then begun to make their ap- 
pearance upon the river, and which even then en- 
dangered the safety of vessels passing up and down 
the Potomac. Wnen that bad been done, it was 
proposed that a sufficient number of troops should be 
landed at Matthias Point, &c., to intrench them- 
selves, under tbe protection of the gunboats, 
until they should be able, with the assistance of 
the smaller boats of the Potomac flotilla, to hold 
their position against any force the enemy would be 
likely to bring against them. It waa represented 
that unless some such steps were taken the departure 
of those vessels upon the Port Royal expedition 
would be the signal for the closing of the navigation 
of the Potomac, which representation the residt 
proved to be correct. As was well urged by the NaVy 
Department, the whole question amounted simply to 
this: Would the army cooperate with the n^vy in 
securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, 
or, bv withholding that cooperation at that time, 
permit so important a chauuel of commanication to 
be closed. i 

WHY IT WAS NOT RAISED. 

After repeated efforts. Gen. McClellan promised 
that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to 
proceed down the river. The Navy Department 
provided the necessary transports for the troops, and 
Capt. Craven, commanding the Potomac flotilla, 
upon being notified to that effect, collected at 
Matthias Point all the beats of his flotilli at the time 
named. The troops did not arrive, and the Navy 
Department wuo informed of the fact by Capt. 
Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring 
of Gen. McClellan why the troops had not been seat 
accoruing to agreement, waa informed by' him that 
bis engineers were of the opinion that so large a 
body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he 
had concluded not to send them. Capt. Pox replied 
that the landing of the troops was a matter of which 
the Ntivy Department had charge; that they had 
provideu the necessary means to accomplish the land- 
ing snccecsfully; that no inquiry bad been made of 
them in regard to that matter, and no notification 
that tho troops were not to be seat. 

It was then agreed that the troops should be sent 
the next night. Capt. Craven waa again notified, 



and again bad hia flotilla in readiness for the arrival 
of the troops. But no troops were sent down at 
that time, nor were any ever eent down for that 
parpose. 

Capt. Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the Com- 
mittee as to what reason was assigned for not send- 
ing the troops according to tbe second agreement, re- 
plied thai the only reason, so far as he could ascer- 
tain, was, that Gen. iVlcClellau feared it might brius: 
on a general engagement. 

The President, who had united with the Navy De- 
partment in urging their proposition, first upon Gen. 
Scott and then upon Gien. McClellan, manifested 
great disappointment when he learned that the plan 
had failed in consequence of the troops not beiugr 
sent. Aijd Capt. Craven threw up his command on 
the Potomac and applied to be sent to sea, saying 
that, by remaining here and doing nothing, he "was 
but losing his own reputation, as the blame for per- 
mitting the Potomac to be blockaded would be im- 
puted to him and the flotilla under his command. 

Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy De- 
partment the eiiective vessels of the Potomac flotilla 
left upon the Port Koyal expedition. The navi- 
gation of the river was almost immediately there- 
after closed, and remained closed until the Kebels 
voluntarily evacuated tbeir batteries in the March 
following, no steps having been taken, in tne mean- 
time, for reopening communication by that route. 

ORDERS TO MOVE. 

On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of 
the United States, as Commander-iu-Chief of the 
Army and Navy, issued orders for a general move- 
mtfUt of all the armies of the United States, one re- 
Buit of which was the series of victories at Fort 
Henry, Fort Donelson, &.c., which bo electrified the 
country and revived tue hopes of every loyal man 
in the land. 

LINE OF OPERATIONS. 

After this long period of inaction of tho Army of 
the Potomac the Presideut of the United States, on 
the 3l8t of January, 1862, issued tho following 
order: 

" ExECTJTiTK BIansion, WASHrKOTON, Jan. 31, 1862. 
" llfesident'B Special War Order IS o. 1. 

" Ordered, Tliat all tne disposable force of the Army of tha 
Potomac, alter providing Batc-ly for the defense of Washing- 
ton, be loimed into an eipediiion for the immediate object of 
seizing and occupying a poiat upoa the raiiroad southwest- 
ward of what is kuonu aa Manassas Junction; ell details to 
be iu the discretion of tlie Geiieral-iu-(Juief, and tho ex- 
pedition to move before or on the /iJd day of February next. 
•' AbRAHAM LliN'COLN." 

To this order Gen. McClellan wrote an elaborate 
reply of the same date, objecting to the plan thoitin 
indicated as involving " the error of dividing our 
army by a very difficult obstacle (the Occoquan) 
and by a distance too great to enable the two por- 
tions to support each other, should either be at- 
tacked by tlie masses of the enemy, while the other 
is held in check." He then proceeded to argue in 
favor of a movement by way of the Rappahannock 
or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to the 
Bappahannock route. He stated that 30 days would 
be required to provide the necessary means of trans- 
portation. He stated that he regarded "success as 
certain, by all the chances of war," by the route ho 
proposed, while it was " by no means certain that 
we can beat them [the enemy] at Manassas." 

To this the President made the following reply: 

"ExBCUTiVB Mansion, Washington, Feb. 3, 1862. 

"MtDeab tjiu: Yon and X have di.tinct aud different 
plana for a movement of tho Army of the Potomac — yours to 
be don-n the Chesapeake, up tUo Kappahaniioulc to Urbanna, 
and across land to the terminus of the railroad on V ork Uiver ; 
miue to move directly to a point ou ths lailroud southwest 
of Manassas. If yon will give me satisfactory answers to tha 
following questions I chall gladly yield my plan to yours: 

" 1. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger •xponditato 
of time and money than mL.et 

" 2. Wherein is a victory more certain by yooi plan than 
mine 7 

" 3. Wheroln Is a victory more valuable by your plan then 
minof 

" i. Infact, wonldit cot be leu yaluablo in this, that it 
would break no Kreat line of the ooomy's communication, 
whUo mine would? 



" 5. In ease of disaster, wonid not a safe retreat be mer< 
difficult by your plan than by mine t 

" Yours, truly, " A LINCOLN. 

" Msjor-Oen. MoClellan." 

Your Committee have no evidence, either oral or 
documentary, of the discugsions thai ensued or the 
arguments that were submitted to the consideration 
of the President tliat led him to relinquish hia own 
line of operatioua and consent to the one proposed 
by Gen. McClellan, except the result of a council of 
war, held iu February, 1862. That council— the 
first, 60 far as your Committee have been able to 
ascertain, ever called by Gen. McClellan, and then 
by the direction of the President — was composed of 
twelve generale, as lollows: McDowell, Sumner, 
Heinlzelm[.n, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Frankhn, 
W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, 
Barnard, and Naglee (from Gen. Hooker's Division). 

To them was submitted tho question whether they 
would indorse the line of optrations which Gen. 
McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the de- 
liberation was a vote of eight to four in favor 
of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence 
down the Cliesapeako Bay, up the Rappahannock, 
landing at Urbanna, and across the country to Rich- 
mond. The four Generals who voted against the 
proposed movement were Gens. McDowell, Sumner, 
Hemtzelman aud Barnard. Gen. Keyes voted for 
it with the qualification that no change should be 
made until the enemy were driven from their batte- 
ries on the Potomac. 

At this point it may be well to consider the prin- 
cipal arguments for and against the movement upon 
Richmond direct from Washington, and the move- 
ment by way of the Lower Chesapeake, including 
that first proposed by wajr of the' Rappahannock 
river, and tho one finally adopted by way of For* 
tress Monroe and the peninsula. 

In expressing opinions upon this and other sub- 
jects relating more immediately to military opera- 
tions in the field, your Committee do not undertake 
to form and exprees opinions of their own, but 
content _ themselves with sotting forth those ex«| 
pressed in their testimony by military men whose* 
education and experience entitle them to speak con- 
fidently upon those aabjects pertuniug to their pro- 
fession. 

WHY THE DHIECT ROUTE WAS BEST. 

The arguments in favor of the direct and against 
the lower route to Richmond were many and 
weighty. Some of them are most tersely expressed 
in the letter of tho President to Gen. McClellan, of 
February 3, 1862, before referred to. Lebide those, 
the direct movement enabled the largest amount of 
troops to operate actively in the field, as the army 
in its movement immediately covered Washington, 
and thereby rendered the presence of a large foice 
here unnecessary. By the adoption of the lower 
route a divieioa of the army was rendered impera- 
tive, in order to provide for the safety of the Capital 
against any attack from the enemy. Thus, to use 
the language of Gen. McClellan himself, in refer- 
ence to the movement proposed against the CLemy .. 
while at Manassas, " committing the error of divid- 
ing our army by a very difficult obstacle, aud by a 
distance too great to enable tho two portions to sap- 
port euch other, should either be attacked by tae 
masses of the enemy while the other is held in 
check." 

The army in moving direct from WasLingtou 
avoided all the delays and disorder consequoLt upon 
the embarkation and disemoiikation of so hr{>e a 
force with all its materitL And by investing li.ch- 
mond on the nortU and north-west, we cut tuem off 
from one of their great sources of supply, the Shen- 
andoah Valley, and at the same time prevented thei^ 
raida througli tUat region of country, which so par- 
alyzed all efforts to send the few troops left ia 
Washington to tho assistance of the army on tha 
peninsula. 

Gen. McClellan states in his testimony that by 
adopting the route by way of AnnapoUs aud tho 
Rappahannock, he hoped, if proper secresy was pre- 



served, to be able to reach the vicinity of Richmond 
';- before the Rebel armv at Manassas could be concen- 
' traled therefor ita defenge. Whatever probability 
there may have been for the realization of eucb a 
hope at tlie time the liippaljaiuock route was de- 
cided upon, it was entirely removed wbea the enemy 
evacufiteJ Maif&esau, before any actual movement 
was m.ide by our arrty. And Gen. McClellaa at 
ODCO rehnquiehed the U.ippabaunock route, and de- 
cided, wit!! the concurreuce of hia corps command- 
ero, 10 tri by way of Yorktown and the peninsula. 

One ffreut oOjeciioa to (.Lie peniusola route, as in- 
dicated by the testimony of all the witnesses who 
tebtKy upon that point, iuclu'iing Gen. McClellaa 
biuistrlf, was the to*aI want of iiiformaliou in refer- 
ence to ttia nature of the country there, the kind and 
couditioti of the roads, the preparations for defense, 
die. Tue dif5.culiies and embarrassments oar army 
labored under from the beginning of that campaign, 
from that want of iuibrniation, are very evident 
from the testimony. 

DECISION OF THE COUNCIL. 

The deciiiou of the council of twelve Generals ia 
February was to move by way of Annapolis ami 
thence to the Rappahannock. The question of 
reopening the navigatiou of the Potomac, 
by diiving tne enemy from their batteries 
npon the river, was disuussed. It was, however, 
finally decided that tbe eueniy should be left in pos- 
Beaeiou of their batteues, aod tbe movement should 
be made witbout disturbin;^ them. Thia is proven 
by the testimony, and also by the tecond paragraph 
of the order of the Pretsident, dated iVIarcu 8, 1862, 
as follows: 

"ExRCUTivB Mansion, March 8, 1862. 
" President's Central H- ar Order No, 3. 

" Ordered, Thai no cliango of tue base of ODeradons of tha 
Army « f the I'ocDinaosliiil bo maie wiiliout lodviui; in ouil 
about Wasiuii^loa buoU alorco as, in tha opiaioa of tha C/ene- 
ial-iu-Cljii.f aud the C.jriniiiiuderd of all tbe A:iny Coipi, shall 
leavrt the fc; Idcicy intirely Beciire. 

" Thdt no moie than tw j Ai uiy Corps (about fifty thousand 
troop^) of eaiJ Arujy of llie i ocum..o8jaU do luovod eu route 
foraiiiw b;..-rt of operitiooa uunl iho navigation of the Poto- 
*|8ofrJia \\'iis:un«'.on to the CheBu^ioalia Hay bhaJ ba freed 
Woia thoeneify'sbaiteriea tnJ othi-.roostiucti-us, or until tba 
Pre.-ideut ahall hsrealier give cxpre=a pcriiiiisi^n. 

"That any moveni' nt afor-^ajiJcu routs fjr anewbaM of 
operations, which maybe ordered by tlio OL-uerii-in-^iiief, 
and which maybe iu.enJed to luovo upou t^e Lhesupcako 
Bay, ihall be^iu to move upon t'jo Cay aa eaily ua tno 18th 
March iust., aiid tbe Genpral-in-CUief ahall bo respuUBiblo 
that it Ko inoTo aj eai ly as that day. 

" Ordered, 'Xnat tlio Army aud Navy co.opcrate in nn ira» 
/ mediate eifoit to ciptura the enemy'ii bitieriea upju the 
Fotouiao between Wasliiogtou aud tho Chesapoaiiu Lay. 

'• ABRAtLiUVX LUNCULN. 

" L. Tbomas, AdjU-Gen." 

Before the movement by way of Annapolis could 
be executed, the enemy abandoned their batterioa 
npon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at 
Centreville and Manassas, retiring to the lino of the 
Rappahannock. 

MOVEMENT OP THE ARMY. 

When Gen. McClellan, then ia the City of Wash- 
ington, beard tb*t the enemy had evacuated Manas- 
sas, he proceeded across the river aud ordered a 
general movement of tbe whola army in the direc- 
tion of the position lately occupied by the enemy. 
The army moved on tne morning of the 10th of 
March, tiie greater part of it proceeding no further 
than l^aifix Court-House. A email force of the 
army j)roceeiled to Manassas aud beyond to tho line 
of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the enemy 
had retired beyond that river and destroyed ttie rail- 
road bridge across it. 

On tho 11th of March Gen. McClellan ordered, by 
telegrajh, the transports from Annapolis to Wash- 
ington (Alexandria;), to embark the army from 
there, aud iuforuiei the Department that he pro- 
pobed to occupy M;inas:?a3 with a portion of Gen. 
lianka's coiamiind, aud throw all the force he could 
concentrate upon tbe line previously determicod 
upon. Subseouent events iu ibe valley of tho Shen- 
andoah, terminating, for a time, in the battle of 
Winchester, of March 23, prevented tho force under 
Gen. Banks from leaving that valley. 



ANOTHER COUNCIL. . 

On the 13th of March Gen. McClellan convened at> 
Fairfax Court-IIouse a coundl of war, coneisting of 
four o( the live commanders of army corps (Gen. 
Banks being absentK and Informed them that h© 
proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way 
of tbe Rappahannock, and submitted to tliem instead 
a plan of movement by way of York and James 
Rivers. The result of the deliberations of that coun- 
cil was as follows: 

Headquartbrs Army o» the Potomac, i 
Kaikfax Cockt-Housb, March 13, lu62. J 

" A council of tbe Generals comojaudiDg army corps at the 
headquarters of the Army of the Potomac weru of the 
opiuiou: 

"First: That the enemy, having retreated froai Manasiu 
to Gordonsville, behind the R^ppabannockand tha Kapidan, 
it is tha opiaion of the generalj coiumandia; arm/corps that 
the operati'i.a to be carried on will be best nudertaken from 
Old Point Comfort, bet ween tao York and JimesKivers, npou 
Richmond; inovided, first, that thj enemy's vessel, the Mer- 
rimac, can be neutralized; Becoud, the njciina of trainportatioii 
anflBcientfor an imicediuto transfer of tha force to its new 
basecanbe ready at Washington and Alexandria to mova 
down the Potomac ; third, that a naval auxiliary force can b« 
> hadtoBilenco or aid In tiloncing the enemy's batteries la 
York River ; fourth, that the force to bo left to cover Wash- 
ington shall be Euch as to give an entire foelinii of security foe 
iis safety fiom menace. Unanimous. 

" Seiohd: If tha foregoing cannot be, the army shoull then 
be moved against t!. a enemy behind tno Uappjlmnnoci at tha 
earliest possible moment, aud the meaoBfjr recoustructing 
bridges, repairing railroads, sad stocking them Wiih ma:erlaj 
sufficient for supplying tha army, should at once bo coUeote<i 
for boih the Uran^'e and Alexandria and the Acquia aud Riob> 
mond Railroads. Unanimous. 

" Note —That with the forts on the richtbank of the Fo- 
tomao fully garrisoned, and those on the Itft bank occu- 
pied, a covering foriia in front of the Virginia line of 2.3,000 
men would suffice, (Kcyea, Ueintzeiman and McDowell) A 
total of 41), OUO men for the defense of the city would suffioa, 
(Sumnei.)" 

The Bame day Gen. McClellan informed the War 
Department that " the _ Council of Commanders of 
Army Corps have unanimously agreed upon a plan 
of operations, and Gen. McDowell wiU at onca pro- 
ceed with it to Washington and lay it before you." 

To this the Secretary of War replied: "'What- 
ever plan has beenagreed upon proceed at once to 
execute, without losing an hour for my approval." 
THE PRE-SIDENT'S ORDERS. 

The plan of operations was submitted to the Presi- 
dent on the eawe day, and he approved the same j 
but gave the following directions as to its execution: 

"First: Leave such <orce at Monissas JancUon as shall 
make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not reposMia 
himself of that paiiiiou and line of communication. 

" aecond : Leave Washmgtou secure. 

" Third : Move the remainder of the force down tbe Polo* 
mac, choosing a new bass at Fortress Monroe, or auywher» 
between hero aud there; or, at all events, movo such re- 
main Jer of the army at once, in pursuit of the enemy, by soma - 
route." 

EMBARKATION OP THE ARhlY. 

The army was directed to return to Alexandria to 
bo embarked for the peninsulaj previous to their 
eiiharkation all the corps to be concentrated upon 
tho division nearest Alexandria. The transporta- 
tion not proving Bufficient fer immediate embarka-* 
li'jn, the troops were, for several days, exposed to ■ 
the rains which then set in, being deurived of their 
former camping accommodations, although, ia many 
instances, not far distant from thorn, having only 
shelter tents to protect them from the inclemency of 
tho weather. 

To Gen. McDowell was at first assigned the ad- 
vance of the expedition. Bat when it was found 
that there was not transportation enou!;ih to embark 
at onca hia entire corps, he consented, in ordur to 
util ze what waa there, to allow his troops to remain 
until such time as they could be moved together, 
with the understanding that the troops preceding 
him should not operate npon his proposed field of 
labor. 'I he result, however, wag, that the corps of 
Gen. McDowell was put olf till the last, which, io 
pursuance of subsequent orders, led to hiscorpe 
being retained hero lor tho defense of Washin^too. 

HOW WASHINGTON WAS LEFT UNDEFENDED^ 

By reference to the President's general war order. 

No .3 qf March 3, 1862, it will bo seen that no 



change of base of operations of tbe army of the Po- 
lomac was to be made witliout leaving in and about 
Waebing'on 8uch a force as in tbe opinion not only 
of Gen. McClellan, but of " ihe commaudera of all 
the arroy cori's," was EUillcienS to render the capital 
entirely t ecuie. And by re crence to the report of 
the council of war bold ;;t Fairfax Coart-House, on 
the 13th of March, 1S62, consistingof Gens. McDow- 
ell, Sumuer, lieintzelman, and Kcyes, it will bo 
eeeathit three members of that council deemed 
necessary for the ealetyof WaBhingtoa "that tbe 
forts on ibe rii^ht bauli of the Potomac Bhould be 
fully garrisoned; those on the left bank occupied, 
and a covering force of 2J,C00 men." The other 
General (Sumner) deemed 40,000 men in all eullicient. 
Kot-wiihstanding this order of the President, and 
the dc'cLioa of the council, when Gen. McClellan 
h;!n=elf leit Ak'xandiia for the peninriala, /ie sent 
': orders, V)itlc07it conference u\ik the command- 
(f corps, fur all the corps of the Army cftkc Po- 
ijiluc, but t'lat of Gen, Banks, to enibaric at once 
for t'ic peninsula. Just crevioua to Icavinpr, Gen. 
McClell.in cddrsssedthe following coraraimicaiion to 
the Adjutant- General of tiio army: 

" Heapquakters Armt op thb Potomac, ? 

,| "bTEAMEll C'lJMMOllUHK, April 1, IKUi. J 

" Oknehai,: I Imveloicqutt tijt.tjouwiil Jay tho follow- 
• Ids recoiiJme».(!;:tion before tiie Jlouotal/lo S-crectry of \'v'ar: 

•'The approxiui.te tumbers uud jositicns leciieai aud in 
, rearot'tho Armyof the i'otomao are aboutasfjllowa: 

'• Ge 1. Dix t.iii, alter Raardiug tho railroads under his 
charEe, EUlUcient troops to giva Liin 5 Cuii for tiie defeuse of 
Jbaltimoie. aad I.OGIJavailttblo fortlio Easiern Slioro, Aunapo- 
lia, &C. li ort Doiaware ij very well earrisoned byal>out400 
men. 

" The panisons of the forts around AVasliington amoniit to 
lO.DOU men ; oilier disposauld troops, witb Ueu. Wadswoitli, 
beii'g about 11. 4Ji'. 

"'i.ba troopi cinployeil iagnardii^g the railways In Mary- 
land Binnuutto soiue B,3;9 mm. TiiosB it 13 designed to re- 
lieve, b wng eld re^'itueiiis. by dismounted cavalry, aud to send 
tbeoi furwiird to Manassas. 

'■ Ovn, Aliercoiiibie occupies ^arrcnton with a force which, 
includii.gCol. (Jcary at White Plains, and tlio cavaL-y to be at 
kii dUpoSdl, will auiount to Eumo 7,78U men, with 12 pieces of 
artillery. . 

" I have tbe honor to request that a'.t the troops orginized 
for eervice ia Pi-iiusyivauia aud i;i New-York, and in many of 
the E.isteni States, may be ordered to AVasliiujiton. I loarn 
■from Gov. Cuttin tiiat there are f oiue 3,5ui) niun ii'ivr ready iu 
Peunsjlvauii. Thii force I 8!iouid be glaJ tohavorent at 
once to Mi'nasias. Four iliou-'aiid moa fioca Gen. Wada- 
■■•• rth I de^irelo bo ordered to M^-uassas. 'iui-ao troops, with 
rj.i!road guards atioyo a Uioed to, will make up a force, 
I r Gen. Aoercombio, to Bomething like'lJ.ijSJ. 

" Itia tuy design to posa Gen. tllcnker'a dlTision from 
Warroutoii upoa B:rasbuig. tie should remain at SUasburg, 
too, to aliovv mitterd to asiiirco a deouito form iu that region 
before piootedir.'g to l.'ia ultimate do»tiuatioo. 

" The troops ia t;ie Valley of tlieShvuindoah will thna be, 
Including 1.1 iil.er'a division, lO.tliJst.-on;;, with 24 piccea of 
artillery. Eaak-i'a lirth corps, which etubracea Gen. tJnields's, 
19,G87 B'.roni;, wllh 41 guna; eouio 3,(j5i disposable cavalry, 
and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men, amount to about 
33.157 men. 

" It 13 designed to relieve Oon. Hooker by Bome regiment 
— eay 8.^0 lucu, leaving, with &0U civaliy, \,iS>^ men on the 
Lower I'otomic. 

" To recapitulate: 

" At VVarreuton there ia to be 7,780 men. 

'* At Manassas liieru ia to be 10,859 men. 

" In the Valley nf the bhenaiidoah....a5.4(J7 men. 
" Un the Lower X'otomac 1,350 men. 

" In all 54,456 men. 

" There will Ihua be left for the garrisons and the front of 
WashiEgtou, under Gen. iv^aJswortli, 18,OUO men, exclusive 
.of the batteries under instruction. 

" The troops org.uiiziug, or ready for service In Now-Tork, 
I leara will prohauiy number more than 4,00). 'ihfse should 
be abseu.bled at Wo'ShLiigton, subject to dispositioa whoro 
moflt needed. I am,vi'rv resppctfinly, your obedient servant, 

•■GEORGE B. McCIiIILLaN, Mojor-Geii. Commanding 

" Brig-Gen. Tbojias, Adjutant-General U. S. Armv." 

This Btutcment, to nse the expraeslon of one of the 
witnesses, was "very indeliuite." Gen. Wads- 
worth, who had been ordered to tako charge of tbe 
defenses of Washington, upon learning the disposi- 
tions of troops proposed by Gen. McClellan, and 
feeling the great importance of the trust committed 
to bis char^^e, and the total inadequacy of tho means 
provided Jn.a for that purpose, addrensed to the Sec- 
retary of War the following commnnication: 



" l^^iDQUASTERB MrLITATlT DlSTElCT OP WAemiTCTOy, \ 
" Washington. D. C, April 2, i8«)2. 5 
"Sir: Ihavo the honor lo submit the following condemed 
statements of tiie forces left under my command for the de- 
fences of NVa^bington: 

Iuf.inty 15,335 

Artillery 4,294 

Cavalry, six companies only mounted, 848 

Total 20,477 

Deduct sick aud in arrest aud ounliuemeut 1 ,4.'>5 

Total present for duty 19,022 

" I h.iV6 uo iiiouutrd liglit artillery nndt-r my command. 

" Ocveral companies of the reserve krtiilcry rf the Army of 
the Potomac are still here, but Sot under my command or lit 
for service. 

'• From this force I am orderfld by Gen. McClellan to detail 
two rogimentj (giod oues) to join liiciiardsou's diyision • 
(Sumuer'a cori a) tis it passes thr. ugh Ah xaudda; cue regi- 
ment to repiaratlaaSTth New-'Vork Volunteers in lleintzel- 
man'a old division; me rtgiment to relievo<B regiment of 
Hooker's division at Eudd'Jleiry — 'otal, 4re!:innnt3. 

"1 uiufurtijrr ordered 11 iaiiiorning by telegrai'h to send 
4,C0O ineu to re.iove Gen. Kuuini-rat ilanassds and Warren- 
ton, ibutha may eu.bnkf jrthwith. 

" Iiiregird tot he cljirucer and efficiency of tho troops under 
my cooiuj lud, I have to»:aio ll.Atii-arly'iiU tuo force ii new 
andiuiptrfectly discipiiuid j thai tcverul of t'lerpyi'iieutsare 
Ina very disorgauize J f ouJitioa from vi:ioiisCdU-e3, which 
It is not necessary to e'a.D here; Pcverul legime.ts having 
been relieved from brig, il^s, which have gcii.ei. ao the field, 
ia coiisi-queuce of thtir iinfitnesaf-Ttervico— ttie best regl- 
me'Jtaremainiig having been selected to take thi-ir place. 

"Two l-'eifi-y ar illcry regiments, t.nd cue ial'autry regi- 
ment, which had bacn drilltdfor some nionthgin enillery 
eervice. liave been withdrawn from the forts on 1 lia south side 
of t.M Potomac, an J I Ii ive only been able to fill tlieir places 
with very new ial'intry rejiments, entirely unacquainted 
wit'i tliu duties of that arm, and of little or uo value in their 
pre cut position. 

" lain iiotlnformed as to the porition which Major-Gen. 
Banks is directed to tske; but i.t ihis tiuio heis, aj X luider- 
Bti'Ud, ou the ether tide of the RuU Una inountai. is, leaving 
riiy command to cover tho front, from the Maaassas Gap 
(about 20 miles boyond Manassa) ta AcquiaCreck. 

" I deem it my duty to Eia-:elhat, lacking at thernmerlcal 
ttreiigth Bndciiaracttr of thef :rce uiJer my cmnjand, it J» 
in my iudgmeut entirely inaCeqiiate to, andiujfit lor, the im- 
portant duty to which it la atfi^red. I resold it very im- 
probable tl'att.e enemy wiil Ei^ail us at toil point, but this 
belief is based ujion tlio hope *n<it tUsy iMi;y be promptly en- 
gaged elsewhere, biid may not learn the liuoiuer aud the char- 
acter of tie force left here. 

" I have the honor to be ■vonr obedient servant, 
" JAiJ. S. WADbWOR'lU, 

" Brii'.-Uea. and Military Governor. 

" Hon. Secretary op War," 

Those communications were brought to the con- 
6idera»ion of the Prccident by tlie Secretary of War. 
The subject was at once referred to tbe Adjutant- 
General of the Army, and Major-Gen. E. A. Hitch- 
cock, with instructions to report at once whether 
the orders of the President bad been complied with. 

Their report is^s follows: 

" ^VARHINGTON. D. €., April 2, 1862—7:40 o'clock. 

" In compliance Willi your iubtructions, I havj examined 
tho papers submitted to me, and Uuve the honor to make the 
loUowir.g report: 

"FiV»{: The rreaident's war order. No. 8, dated March 8, 
requires that on taking up any new base f<t operations, tbe 
Cisy of Washington shall bo left entirtly secure, 'ihe other 
poiEta of tte order it ia unutcess.iry to. consider, na the 
fcnemy, since ita date, have aliaudoued their positions and 
batteries on tlia Potomac, and retired beliind the Xlappa- 
bannock. 

" Second : The council cf general ofBcerj held at Fairfax 
Court-llouse, ilarclj 13, to.k place after the enemy had 
retired from Manassas ind destroyed ili^ roilroud iu their 
rear. The council decidi'dnnanlmously to take up a new 
base of operations from Fort Monroe, and three of the gen- 
erals— a m.'jority^leci Jed that tbe foico necCBsary to be 
left shottid besutlicieutto fu.ly garrison 1 he foits on the right 
bank of the Potomac, aud 'to occupy' those on the left 
ba-k, with a covering fjrce of 2.'>,(n.t). It is, we think, tbe 
judgment of odicers, that some 30, 010 men would be necessary 
thus to man tbese forts, which, with the number of the cover- 
ing force, would rake a total ff &.'>.0'0. 

•' TUird: The President's directions of March 13 to Gen. 
McClellan direct, hrst, to leave Luch a force at Manassas 
Junction aa shall make it entirely cerlaia that the enemy 
may not repossess it; second, lnut\Vashington shall baletl 
entirely secure; third, that tue remaiuder of tlie army move 
down tbe Potomac, or move iu pursuit of the enemy. In 
regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have 
destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair (o assume 
that they have no iutontiou cf ruturning lor the rroccupatiou 
of their late i)OEition, and therefore no very large fuico would 
bo necessary to hold that position. 

"FourrA; Major-GeuerairilcClellan's report io the Adju- 
tant-General, of April 1, alter giving the several position!) of 
tbe troops proposed to be left for tbe delense of Waihiogtoa, 



gives a reprosentatlon as foUows: At Warrenton there is 
to be 7,780j at Manassas, Biy, 10,85^; la the valley of 
the Shenandoah, 33.467; on the Lower Potomac, 
1,350. Total ia all, E5.45S. And there would 
be left for the garrisons and the front of Washiagton, under 
Gen. Wadsworth, somo 13,000. lu ths ebovo enumeration, 
Gen. Banks's Army Corps is included; but whether this corps, 
operating in the Shfuandoah Vall.;y, ehould be regarded as a ■ 
part of tUH force available for the protection of the iramo-' 
dlate front of Washington, the undersigned ezprosa no 
opinion. 

"Fifth: Gen, Wadsworth's report of April 2d gives his 
force as follows: infantry^, 15,335; artillery, 4,494; cavalry, 
858 — six corapinies only being mounted. Total, 20,477. 

" Deduct sick, in arrest and coniinement, 1,455. Total for 
duty, 19,022. 
' "From this force Gen. Wadsworth is directed to detach 
two good regiments to Richardson's division, Sumner's corps, 
wiiich should be deducted from his command, one regimont 
tO'replaoe the 3Tth Kew-York, in Heintzelman's old division, 
and one to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at ijudd's 
Ferry — total, four regiments. 

" It is also oi derod to send 4,000 men t» relieve Sumner at 
Manassas and Waireuton. Gen. Wadsworth represents that 
ha has no mounted light artillery under his command ; states 
that tbeie wore several companies of reserve artillery still 
bere, but not under his command, or fit for service. 

•• Gen. Wadsworth further reports that nearly all the force 
is new andimperiectly disciplined ; that several of the regi- 
ments are in a very disorganized condition, some of them haV" 
iuR been relieveU from brisadcs which have gone into the 
field, in cousequence of their unfitness for service, the best 
regiments remaining having been selected to take their place ; 
two heavy artillery regiments and one infantry regiment, 
which had been drilled for months in artillery service, having 
been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Poto- 
mac, and their .places supplied with newinfantry regiments, 
entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of lit- 
tle or no value iu their present position. If there was need 
of a military force for the safety of the City of Wasliingtoa 
within its own limits, tbat referred to in the report of Oen. 
Wadsworth would seem to bo entirely inadequate. 

"In view of the opinion expressed by tho council of the 
commanders of army corps of the force Becessary for the de- 
fense of the capital, though not namerically stated, and of the 
force represented by Gen. MeClellau a^ left for that purpose, 
we are of the opinion that tho requirements of tho President, 
that the city shall be left 'entirely secure.' not onlyiu the 
opinion of the general-iu-chief, but that of the ' commander* 
or tho army corps ' also, has not been fully complied with. 

" All of which is respectfully submitted. 
■' li. THOMAS, Adjt.-Gen. 
'• E. A. HITCHCOCK, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A." 

THE PRESIDENT PROTECTS THE CAPITAL. 

The day after thia report was written, the Proti- 
dent directed the Secretary of War to order one corps 
oJ thi_ Army of the Potomac to remain ia front of 
Washington until further orders. The corps of Gen. 
McDowell, being the only corps remaining intact 
here, was Belected to remain, without tlio knowledge 
of Gen. McDowell, he being engaged, at tho time of 
receiving this order, in making preparationis to im- 
mediately follow the rest of the army to the penin- 
Boia. 

THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN. 

Gen. Heintzelman, who commanded the first 
troops of tbe army of the Potomac that landed on tho 
peninsula, arrived at Portress Monroa on the 23d of 
March, two weeks after the evacuation of Manassas. 
Hehadorders to encamp as near Fortress Monroe 
as possible, ia order that tbe enemy should have no 
idea of tho direction in which the army was to 
move, whether toward Yorktown or Norfolk. Gen. 
Heintzelmaa states that shortly after landing he ob- 
taiaed in'ormation tbat the enemy bad not more 
than 10,000 troops at Yorktown and on the Peninsu- 
la, and ia satisfied that he could have advanced and 
isolated Yorktown, in which case there would have 
been uo serious obstacle in tho way of proceeding di- 
rectly to Richmond. On the 27th of March ha cent 
out reconnoiteriag parties as far as Big Bethel and 
Watt'8Creek,aud went near the Halfway House, 
where about 40a of the enemy, and a littlo artillery 
were seen. He telegraphed to Gen. MeClellau what 
he was doing, and received a dispatch, in reply, that 
he (Gen. McClellac) hoped that nothing had been 
done to give the enemy information of the lino of 
operations of the army. The reconnoiBsance waa 
then withdrawn. 

Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Monroe, 
and on the 2d of April Gen. MeClellau himself ar- 
rived. On the 4th of April tho army commenced its 
movement ia the direction of Yorktown, and on the 



5th appeared before the enemy's lines. Gen. ' Mo- 
Clellan states that he moved from Fortress Monroa i 
sooner than he otherwise would have done, upon i 
hearing that the enemy were sending down, ro-ea- 
forccmoDts. 

DELAY BEFORE YORKTOWN. 
All the testimony goes to prove that when onr 
troops first landed on the Peninsula the force of the 
enemy there consisted of Magruder's command, vari- 
ously estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except 
by Gen. McClellan, who estimates it from 15,000 to 
20,000. The Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, United States 
Senator from Virginia — then living within the Eebel 
lines, near Williamsburg — testifies that the Rebels 
did 7iot determine to re-enforce Magruder until it 
was apparent that our forces intended to stop be- 
fore Yorktown and commence a regular siege of the 
place. _ It is now evident, whatever may have been 
the opinion of our officers at the time, that our forces, 
when they first appeared before Yorktown, could 
have pierced the line of works across the Peninsula 
there without much difficulty, isolating Yorktown, 
and cutting off re-enforcements, when theplace must 
have fallen in a very short time. Some of our Gene- 
rals expected and desired that that should be done. 
Gen. Heintzelman forwarded to Gen. MeClellau the 
application of Gen. Hamilton, commanding a divi- 
sion, for permission to force tlie enemy's lines. No 
answer waa received to the application. 

HOW MANY TROOPS M'CLELLAN HAD. 
Instead of that, however, a siege was determined 
upon, contrary to the desire of the President, who, 
as early as tho 9th of April, wrote to Gen. McClel- 
lan as follows: 

" Thnro ia a curious mystery about the number of troops 
now with you. I te'egraphedyououtbe tith, urging that yoa 
had over 100,000 with you. I had ju.«t obtained from the Sec- 
retary of War a statement, taken, as be said, from your own 
returns, making lOS, COO then with you eind en route to you. 
Younoir say tnat you will have not 05,000, when all ea route 
to yoa shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 
25,000be accounted for? As to Gen. Wool's command, I un- 
derstand it is doing for yoa precisely what a like cumber of 
your own would have to do if that command waa away. 

" I suppose tbo wnole force wliich has gone forward to yoa 
ia with yoa by this time, and if so, I tliius it ia the precise 
time for you to Btrike a blow. By delay the enemy will 
steadily gain on you — that is, he wlJ gain faster by fortifica- 
tions and re-enforcemsnts than you oaQ by lo-euforcemeuU 
alone. 

" And, once more, let me tsU you it is indispensable to you 
that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. 
You will do me the justice to remember I always wished not 
going down tfie bay in search of afield, instead of fighting at 
or near Manassas, as only shifting and not surmounting a dif- 
ficulty ; that we should find the same enemy and the eamo or 
equal intrenclmienta at either place. The country wiUnotfaii 
to note — i$ noting now — that the present heaication to move 
upon an intrene/ied position i* but the itory cf Manattai re- 
peated." 

And the repetition was made complete nearly a 
month later, when the enemy, in tbe face of a su- 
perior force, evacuated their works without loss and 
without the knowledge of tho general commanding 
our army. I 

M'CLELLAN WANTS MORE TROOPS. 

Gen. McClellan, however, did not deem his forcee 
Buflicient, and objected very strongly to the order of 
the President detaclung McDoweU's corps for th» 
defense of Washington, aa "imperiling the success 
of our cause." He called ag^n and again for re- 
enforcements, asking for Franklin's and McCall'a 
Divisions of McDowell's corps, to be under com- 
mand of Franklin; insisting that Franklin's Divis- 
ion, at least, should be sent to him. On the llth 
of April Franklin's Division was ordered to Alex- 
andria to embark for Fort Monroe. On the 14th, 
Gen. Franklin reported to Gen. McClellan near 
Yorktown, but his troops remained on board th» 
transports until after the enemy evacuated the place, 
whenthey were ordered to West Point. . 

HE WANTS TRANSPORTATION. | 

On the 6th of April Gen. McClellan telegraphed 
to the President, "I have by no means the trans- 
portation I must have to move my aimy even a tovr 
miles;" and asks that all his orders for w»gon trains 



&c., may at once be complied -with. All was sent 
to bim as desired, until even Gen. McOowell found 
himself so stripped of the transportation designed 
for bis corps, tbat when he moved to Fredericksburg 
it w;is with the prreatest difficulty he could move 
Bupplies for Iiis small force from Acquia to Falmouth 
until the railroad was completed. 

A montliwas spent before Yorktown, our army, 
in the opinion of eome of our ablest officers, becom- 
ing more demoralized by the labors of a long siege 
tnan it would have been even by an unsuccessful 
assault. 

The returns in the Adjutant-General's office, 
Bigned by Gen. McClellan and his Adjutant- General, 
ehow that on the 30th of Apiil, 1862, the forces on 
the Peninsnla under Gen. McClellan amounted to 
112,392 present for duty. 

HE WANTS GUNS. 
On the 1st of May the President telegraphs to 
Gen. McClellan: '"Your call for Parrott guns from 
Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues in- 
definite procrastination. Is anything to be done?" 
YORKTOWN EVACUATED— M'CLELLAN CHA- 
GRINED. 
On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th 
of May, the enemy evacuated Yorktown without 
loss. One of the witnesses testifies that 'Gen. Mc- 
Clellan was very much chagrined and mortified at 
the evacuation, as lie bad made hia preparations to 
open from Lis batteries on Monday, the 5th of May. 
I PURSUIT OF THE REBELS. 

The evacuation was discovered by daylight on the 
momingof the 4th. Between 10 and' 11 o'clock. 
Gen. Stoneman, with the cavalry and Boire light 
horse artillery, started in pursuit. About 1 o'clock. 
Gen. Hooker, with his division, left Yorktown, with 
orders to support Gen. Stoneman. Gens. Sumner, 
Heintzelman and Keyes also moved out during the 
day, with the whole or portions of their corps. 
About five miles from Yorktown the division of Gen. 
Hooker was delayed for some time in consequence of 
other troops, coming from another direction, getting 
into the road before him. 

In the meantime Gen. Stoneman had overtaken 
the rear of the enemy with his cavalry, and followed 
them up closely, keeping up a running fire all the 
time, until the enemy reacnea their works in the 
neighborhood of Williamsburg, when the pursuit was 
checked. Gov. Sprague was sent back to hurry up 
the infantry support under Gen. Hooker. After con- 
eiderable delay, finding it impossible to pass the 
troops ahead of bim. Gen. Hooker turned ofi" and 
proceeded by another road, of which he had obtained 
information from some of the inhabitants; marched 
till 11 o'clock that night, renewed the march at day- 
light, and came up to the advanced works of the 
enemy a little after 7 o'clock, about half a mile from 
Fort Magruder, and at once engaged the enemy. 
BATTLE OP AVILLIAMSBURG. 
There seems to have been great misapprehension 
and confusion in relation to the management of the 
troops at Williamsburg. When the pursuit first 
commenced on Sunday, Gen. Heintzelman was in» 
Btructed by Gen. McClellan to take charge of oper- 
ations in front. On the morning of Monday orders 
were sent to Gen. Sumner to take the command; 
Gen. McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to 
superintend the sending' of two divisions up the 
York River to West Point. A heavy rain set in on 
Sunday, rendering the roads almost impracticable 
for the passage of troops. The troops of the differ- 
ent commands became mingled — divisions and brig- 
ades, to some extent, were separated from each 
other — and it seems to have been difficult to get the 
troops up in time. 

During Monday forenoon Gen. Hooker, finding 
himself hard pressed by the enemy, and understand- 
ing that Gen. Sumner had 30,000 troops with him, 
Beut repeatedly for reenforcements. So did Gen, 
Stoneman and Gen. Heintzelman, but no reenforce- 
menta arrived. Gen. Sumner states that, having 
■ent Gen. Hancock to the right, he had ac the center 



only about 3,000 infantry— the cavalry there'not b*« 
iuff fitted for operations^ against the enemy, on ac- 
count of the country being so wooded. Upon re- 
ceiving the call for reenforcements to be sent to the 
left to Gen. Hooker, he sent stafi" officers to hurrv 
up troops from the rear, his own corps being some 
ten miles off, and ordered Kearney to re-enforce 
Hooker. Ee-enforcements not coming up to Gen. 
Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expected, the 
Prince de Joinville and Gov. Sprague went to York- 
town to urge Gen. McClellan to come up to the 
front, and take charge of matters there. Gov. 
Sprague arrived at Yorktown about 1 o'clock, hav- 
ing been about an hour in going down. Ho testifies _ 
that ichen Gen. McClellan was told the condition of 
affairs at the front, he remarked that he had sup- ' 
posed '^ those in front could attend to that Utile mat- 
ter." After some time Gen. McClellan started from 
Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of WiUiamBborg 
about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 

HOOKER DOES THE FIGHTING. 

By that time Gen. Kearney had reached the 
field and re-enforced G«n. Hooker, taking command, 
being the senior in rank to Gen. Hooker. Gen. 
Hancock had been engaged on the right, but, upon 
being re-enforced, had succeeded in repulsing the en- 
emy, losing about forty men. The princinal fighting 
was done by the troops under Gen. Hooker, his di- 
vision sustaining a loss of about 1,700 men. Before 
he was re-enforced, his troops were obbged to hold 
their position with the bayonet and such ammuni- 
tion as the men could obtain from the bodies of those 
who had fallen, the roads being so muddy that it 
was impossible to bring up fresh ammunition. 

RETREAT AND PURSUIT. ' 

That night the enemy evacuated their position at 
Williamsburg. Gen. McClellan states that after he 
arrived on the field he was so satisfied that the ene- 
my had been beaten and would be compelled to evac- 
uate their position thai night or be taken at a great 
disadvantage, that he countermanded orders to the 
divisions of Eichardsou and Sedgwick and sent them 
back to Yorktown. 

The next day the pursuit was continued for a 
short distance by Gen. Stoneman and the cavalry, 
with a small body of infantry. Several of the Gen- 
erals testify that, had the enemy been promptly fol- 
lowed up after the battle of Williamsburg, they . 
could have been followed right into Richmond— one 
of tkcm says withoutfiring a gun. Gen. McClel" 
Ian says that the roads were so bad, in consequeno* 
of the rains, that it was impracticable to make K 
vigorous pursuit. 

The battle of Williamsburg appears to have been 
fought under many and serious disadvantages. • 
NOihing was known of the natm'e of tho country or 
the defensive works of the enemy until our troops 
arrived before them; there was no controlling 
mind in charge of the movements; there was uncer- 
tainty in regard to who was in command; each Gen- 
eral fought as he considered best; and, by the time 
the General Commanding appeared on thejield, the 
principal part of the fighting was over. i 

FURTIIEa DELAY. 
Some three or four days were spent at Williams- 
burg for the purpose of bringing up supplies, &.c, 
and then the line of march was taken ud for the 
Chickahominy. It was about the time "that the ■ 
army left Williamsburg that Norfolk was taken 
and the Merrimac destroyed. But preparations had 
been made before those events occurred to have sup- 
plies sent up York Eiver instead of the James, and 
the line afterwards followed was adopted. The 
consequence was tbat the gunboats were of little or 
no service in the operations against Richmond, and 
remained entirely iaactive, except in some opera- 
tions against Fort Darling, until they were called 
upon to protect the army when, in July, it fell back 
to the James River. \ 

The diitance between Williamsburg and the line 
of operations on tho Chickahominy was from forty 
to fitty mileis, and tho army was most two weeka 



10 



in moving tbat diotaBce. Tto fiptt troops that 
crossed the (Jhickabominy were the corps of General 
Kevea, which crossed on t'jo 24' h of May, followed 
by 'the ctrpa of Geu. Ileinfztlman on tbo 25th. 
The re^t of our army remuiueJ ou tha left bank of 
the Cbickahomiiiy until the battb of Fair Oaks, 
whentbacji'psof Gen. Sumuer crossed to the aa- 
rietance of Gens. Heintzelman and Keyes. 
M'CLELLAN STILL CALLING FOPv WORE TROOPS. 

Gen. McClellan contiuueJ callinpr for re-eai'crce- 
ments, representing tbat the forte of tbe enemy in 
his frOLt WES Bupericr to Lis own, and tbat the 
force unJer Gen. McDowell would do more for the 
protection of Washingtoii, if sent to his army, than 
many other po;itioa i« which it could bo placed. 
In a letter written on the 21st of May he asks tbat 
Gen. McDowell's corps Lo Bent tohiniby water 
rather than by land, as the more expeditioua mode, 
and that he and bis forces bo expliciify pLsced und?r 
his orders, "in the ordinary way." He closes his 
letter by saying: 

" I believa thero is a great Btroirgle before thii army, but I 
amneither dismaye.lucr discouiagei. 1 wis i to stcenjtlien 
Its force as much 68 I can ; but, in any evei t, I tbu I fi^ibt it 
withalltha Bkill, anl camion, aud determiuatioa that I poa- 
1689. And I trust that the result may either o'Jtaiii for mo the 
Dermaneijt confidence of my GoTernment. or tbat it may close 
my career." 

In reply to the request of General McClellan that 
General McDowell should j'-ia nis forces by water, 
the President states, on tha 21bt of May : 

" McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get 
■board of beats if the boa's were ready tt Fredericksburg, 
UBlega his mare'a shail be resisted, in which case t!;e f^rca re- 
slstuighim wi 1 net be cintronticg yen at KichmcnJ. By land 
he will reach yea in five days afttr Btartmg; whereaa, by 
water, he wouli not reach you in two weeks, judgingby past 
experience. Frankliu'a Bingle dlyision did not reach you ia 
ten days after I ordered it." 

JACKSON IN THE SHENANDOAH. 

Preparations were accordingly made for General 
' McDowell to leave Fredericksbarg on the 25th of 
May to join Gen. McClellan. Juit at that time, 
however, Jackson commenced his expedition down 
tha Shenandoa'a Valley, aud Gen. McDowell,^ to- 
gether with Gen. Fremont, from Westera Virginia, 
was sent to the assistance of Gen. Banks, and to in* 
tercept Jackson in his retreat. Upon being informed 
of this, Gen. McClellan replied tbat the movement 
of Jackson was probably intended to prevent re- 
enforcementa bein;< sent to him. The President re- 
plied, giving him full information as to tho condition 
of affairs in tho valley, and closed by saying: 

" If McDoTioeU'aJorceuasnoioleyond our reach tee thould 
betitterly helpless, Apprihex-sionn of something like this, 
and no uuwiliiugness to Bustuin you, has always been my rea- 
son for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please nn< 
deratand tlus, and do the best yon can with the forces y oa noir 
l^ave" 
j BATTLE OP SEVEN PINES. 

On the 3l8t of Jlay and the 1st of Jane the bat- 
tles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks were fought. As 
there has been so much confroversy iu regard to the 
conduct of some of the troops engaged ia that bat 
tie, your Committeo will refer more particularly to 
the testimony of Geu. Casey, who commanded tha 
advanctd division, upon which tha attack was first 
made. Gen. Casey states tba^, when the campaign 
of the Peninsula commenced, h.'s division consisted 
principally of raw and inexperienced troops. They 
had suffered greatly Irom tbo labors and exposures 
incident upoa the eiego of Yor:jtown and tbead- 
, vanco of the troops up the Peninsida. Some of them 
, had been for weeks without shelter, beinc: com- 
pelled to leave their camp equipago behind when 
ordered on the pursuit of the enemy after tho evacu- 
ation of Yorktown. That division took the lead 
across the Chickahominy, taking up a position 
at Seven Pines, where it established itself by throw- 
ing up intrencbments and cutting abatis. 

A tew days before tlto battle" of Seven Pines, con- 
trary to tho advice tmd opinion of Gen. Kejes and 
Gen. Casey, the division was ordered tbrec-quarters 
of a mile to the front, withm six miles of fiichmond, 
hia pickets extending within fivo miles. They had 
no support on their right or their left, the remainder 
^«f tiji^ corps to which they belonged (Keyes'e) being 



in their rear. They at occe commenced disging rifld* 
pits and^cuttiyg abatis, the pickets at nigh't being at- 
tacked by the enemy, who were repnUed. Aboufe 
11 o'clock on the morning of th^ 31st tho i icketa re» 
portel tho enemy approaciing, and aa ai 1 of Gen. 
Johaston was captured and lirocght in with import* 
ant papers upon him. Gen. Casey, with this aid 
andhisteneril officer of tho day, went to Gen. 
Keyes i.ud reported the circaaiEtances tt him. Gen. 
Keyes tesliiua that for some days before tho attack 
bo sen!; to Gen. McClellaa recorts of hia condition, 
tho threatening attitude of tbo enemy ia hia imme- 
diate vicinity, an! urged that Gen. Sumner be sent 
across to his support. Tina was not done, however, 
until alter tlio attack commenced. Ilepurts continued 
tocjmeiaof thoapproacu of the enemy. Tho di- 
viiion was called out and form'?d, the working men 
Cidled in, and preparations made to meet tbo coaling 
attack. Two lines of battla were formed — one in 
tho rifle-pits, aud another about one-third of a mile 
in advance — composed of fivo or six regiments and 
four pieces of artillery. A regiment had previously 
beea sent out to support tbo pickets. About 23 min- 
utes to 1 o'clock tho enemy commenced the attack 
in force, supposed to amount to about 3J.0C0 men,, 
attackmg in fiont and on both flanks. After fight- 
ing for some time, the enemy continuing to come on- 
in force, tha forces iu front fell back to the rifle-pits,, 
aud fought thtro until nearly surrounded. Kc-en*' 
forcemeats bad been promised, and Gen. Casey bad 
selected tbe position to which theyweroto bo aa- 
signed; _ but no re-enforcements came up to hia poai- 
tioa uniil just before he waa forced to Tall back from 
his second lino, when a single reKimeat arrived. Af- 
ter about throe hours' ligbiing the division fell back, 
from ita second line with a loss of 1,433 ia killed, , 
wounded, and_ mioeing. In tho course of an hour 
after Casey's division bad been driven back, the re«i 
maiuder of our forces were swept back from a milof 
and a half to two miles from Casey's tir^t line, whea- 
tbe enemy wore cheeked, and tho fighting ceased for, 
tho day. 

During the battle Gen. Sumner, whoso corps Wft8- 
on the left bank of tbo Chijkahomiuy, waa ordered' 
by Gen. McClellan to hold his forces ia roadinesa to' 
cros?. Gen. Sumner not only did tbat, bat at once 
called out hia forces and moved tliem uut.l the heada> 
of the columns were at the bndges ready to cross, , 
thereby saving between ono and two hours. When 
tbo order cama to cross ha immediately moved his 
forces in tha directioa of tho field of battle, cama up , 
with and engaged the enemy, aud relieved tbo pres-r 
sure upon tho troopa engaged upon hia left. 
BATTLE OP FAIR OAKS. 

The next day, the 1st of June, the enemy attacked | 
Gen. Sumner at Fair Oaks. Gea. llooka;-, 7hohad 
been ordere 1 forward tho day before by Gen. Heint-. 
zelman with one-half of bis division, hearing the 
firing of tho enemy upon Gea. Sumner's forces, pro-, 
ceded at onca ia that direction aud engaged tho. 
enemy. Ia a short tune tho enemy wero repulsed, 
and fell back ia confusion. There waa no communi-, 
cation between tbo forcea under Gen. Sumner and{ 
those under Gen. Ileintzelmaa (llooker'sj, but each, 
fought aa he deemed best under the circumstances. ( 
GcTi. McCltUan was with the main part ojft'ic army{ 
on the left bank of the Chickahominy. After the; 
fighting was over he came across to tne right bank^ 
of the river, 

HOOKER'S RECONNOISSANCE. 

On the morning of Monday Gen. Heintzelman: 
ordered Gen. Ilooker to make a reconncissance in 
force, which he did, advancing to withia lour mile* 
of Richmond, meeting with no resistance except ^ 
littlo from the enemy's pickets. Upon being in- 
formed by Gen. Heintzelman of what ho had done. 
Gea. McCleUan ordered tbo troops to ba recalled and 
occupy the position that had been held by Casey'*, 
division. 

The oflicers engaged ia that battle, who have been 
examined, testiiy tljat tbo army could have pushei 
ri^ht on to the City of Richmond with Lttle resist- 
ance; that tho enemy were very much broken and. 
demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &o.>. 



11 



'that irii;>bt impede their flight. God. McClellan 
vseeaiB to Iiave coutemplated an imoiedi.ite luovo- 
nient upon Riybniond, for, the dav after tlie buttle, 
Juno 2, he writes to the Secretary of War: 

" Thu enemy nttickedi a force and with preat epirlt yesfer- 
dayujorDiiiir. but iiro every wliere iixi t hi^'nlly repulsed with 
greatloei. O.ir Iroo^^s ch.trgud f-egueiitiy uu bath dayo nud 
unifirujly brokslba t'lmmy. Tiio leealt U, that our left 13 
within fjur ujilea of Ilichrnond. I only wait fr the liver to 
fuU to ciOBd with thereat cf the force and ma e a general at- 
tach. Should I (ind iherii holdiog b,m iu a very ttuug posi- 
tion, I may w.iit/or what liooiis I cju bring up from Fort 
Monroe. L!ut the 7Hjra:e of my troops is now Biiuh that I can 
■TPlf.urB imirh. 1 do not fear lor odds agiiiust me. Thn vic- 
tory is Cumuli te, and all credit iB due to the gallantry of our 
officeisaud liiou." 

The movement was not made, Lowever, as Gon. 
.McCJel an ptatei<, because ol tiie bigU stage of water 
and the bad roads. 

MORE RE-ENFORCrMENTS, 
On tbe 6th of Jane McCaH's dividon of Gen. 
McDowell's corps was ordered to j.>in thearmy on 
the jieuiusula. On tlio Sth cf Juno Gen. Mc'Clellan 
tele-^rapLis: " I shall bo in perfect readiness to move 
forwaidr.hd take liichruond the luoment that Mc- 
CallieitLes here anU the ground will admit the 
passae of artillery." Ou the 10th or lltb of June 
McCall's troops commenced anivingat the Wnite 
House. 

Prepirations continued to be made in WashinRton 
to Eeiul down by hind from Fredericksburg the re- 
ma nder of Gen. McDowell's cor];s, l:o being direct- 
ed to co-operate fully with Gen, McCkllan, tut re- 
taiuing an iiidjrendent command. Tula does not 
appear to have been in accordance with General 
McCJellan'B wishes; for, on the 16th of June, he 
telegitiphs to the Becretaiy of \Var: 

"Itouaht to be distirctly underetood that McDowell and 
his trooi 8 ere completely uuder li.y control. I received a 
telegram from liiiii r.que.ung that I.lcCail'B divisiou i„ic^t be 
placed 1-0 ts I J j jin lini iuioieuia'.ely upon hia arrival. That 
request does Hit IrtaUie iIjg pioper fcpitit; whatever trooi5» 
«oujetoiiieuiu.tbedi,p.e.d cf to cj t) do Iho mostpood 
1 Uo tot leil that luBuchci'Cumstances e.3 thoae iawhichl 
amuort'iilacedt^oii. McDowe.Uljould wish tUo general in- 
terest to be tacdhmd lor the puipcto of ino:ea>iEg Ua cotn- 
inand. If I cannot faliy co.itr.,1 all his tr jopj 1 waiit none of 
them, but would prefer to li.ht the batUo with wnatl liave 
andlet ctherabeietpousiblelor the rusulcs." ' 

On the 18th of June, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to 
the Secretary of War that,be Las received informa- 
tion from deserters to the effect that troops Lave left 
Eichmoud to re-cnlorce Jackson; that the movement 
commenced on the Sth; and that if re-enforccmeutB 
Lave f,oiie to Jackson, tliey are probably not 
less than 10,000 men; that l>e cannot vouch for the 
truth of tbo Etatcment, but that it Eeem3 pretty cer- 
tain that it is believel in Ivicliniond anduuio-ig the 
Eebel troops. To this the Preddent replies, on the 
£ame day, that the information is corroborated by a 
dispatch from Gen. King at riedericksburg. andre- 
marks: "If tbia is true, it is as good as a re- 
enlurcement to you of aa cquul force." 

On the tame day Geu.McCkllan telegraphs to the 
President: 

" A general engap»ment may take place at any hour. An 
eavaucehyus ijvolvcs a baulo more cr less decisive The 
*nemy(j:biuitet every point a readiness to njcet us. " Thev 
certamly luvo great numbcra end cvieusive works. If ten or 
hlteen ihousini men liavo l-.ft EicJmoiiU tJ re-euforce Jack- 
eon, itiliustia^esllicir (.tr( nith aod canfidtnce. After to-uior- 
*ow wa tlmll fight the Rebel a-my e3 soon as rrovidenco wUl 
permit. Wo Eha.l awuit only a favorable condition cf the 
UmiS ''.°'',"y'^'"' "^8 completion of eome necoBsary pre- 

STKENGTII OF THE ARMY. 
The returns of Gen. McCk-llan to the Adjutant- 
Ueucral s olhce give the following as the strength of 
theaimy on the peninsula on the 20th cf Jane: 
Present for duty 115,102; special duty, tick and in 
arreet, 12,22o; absent, 29,511-total, 150,838. 

STUART'S Raid; 
.About this time the Rebel General, Stuart, with 
: ha cavalry, made bis celebrated raid, making the en- 
tire circuit of our r.rmy unharmed, and dlscoverinff 
the nature of our communications with the York 
fiiver. 



JACKSOX THREATEXS AN ATTACK. 
On the 24th and 2oth of Jane, Gen. McClellan 
telegraphs the Secretary of War that Lo is informed 
by deserters and contrabands that Jackson is con- 
tempLaiiig an attack upon Lis right and rear. Aj 
this dispatch of Gen. McClellan, and the one of the 
Preddent in reply, ar.i dated immediately previoua 
to the «' esven djys' battle," they are given here in 
full. 

" KHooived 8.50 p. in. 

,,., . , JIcCr,p.i,tAN's,June25— 6.15 p.m. 

1 have jnst returned from the field, and Cud your dispatch 
in roKaril to J icksou. Several contrabands, j ist iu,give io- 
Jormation couhrajing the eupposition that JacKsoL'siidvanc* 
18 at or near Hauover Cour-.-IloJBe, aud that iieauregard ar- 
uved, with strong re-cnfjrcciueiita, in Uichoioad yesterday. 
1 lucliQH It Unnli that Jackson will nttaek luy ripht B'ldrear. 
IheKebel lorcjis ttitedtt 200,nCO, iuclndicg Jackson end 
f^'^^?:, ^ "''"'^ ,''-''° '° contend Bgaiust vastly superior 

odds It these report J betrne; butihisarnay wiUdo allin the 
power of man lo hold their T'ositicn find repulao en attack. 1 
regret my great inleriorily < f ruuibers, butfeel that I am In 
uowsyiesponsiblafurit, ailhivejiotfuled t j represent re- 
rea|ecilytheiieces=ity of to eulorcementa; thit tins was the 
decisive i-oiut ; uud that dl the avaUable means rf the Govern- 
ment tbould be coucentr.iteai.cro. 1 wlUdo all tnat QEone- 
lalciud) withthe rpl -ndidiiruiy I have the LoDor to com- 
mand jond if it IB destroyed by overwlielmluBiiumherB, can 
at lea,tdio with it, and share its fa-e. Eut if t!i8 result of the 
ectiju wiiica will occur to-morrow-, or wirhin a sho:t time. Is 
ndisas'.er, the responsibility camol be thrown on my shoul- 
ders ; it must rest vhereit I elongs. 

"SiiiCB leorunienctdthis, Il.avo received ndditional intel- 
ligence C^nfiriiimg the supposition in resard to Jackson's 
movements end Ueaureg .lu's. I shall probably bo ntacked 
to-moirow, and now g j to the o'her tide cfthe C:hicl:ahomUiT 
t)airange for the Uefeusjoutlidt tide. I feel that there is no 
nse m my again uski.g lor re-eiifo-oementa. 
..TT T- HT "'-'EO. U. Mct;LKLLA!N,Mcjor-GeneraL 

rion. E. M. faT.o-TON, .Secretary cf War." 
The answer of tho PredJeut ia as follows: 
...o .-u J. . , •• WAsni.vGTON, Jiine2f;, I8S2. 

lour three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, 
cnJingwi'.hlhestdtement thit you completely succeeded in 
i:;afciiig your point, are verv gratify injt. 

" Til e later one of Ci p.m., fu-sesting the probaTjility of 
your bein- overwhelmed by 2,10,CUJ men. and taUiin;; of whom 
the responsibility will belong to, l aina mo very much. I give 
\ ou all I can. f.iid act on tlio p eouuipti ^n that you will do the 
best you can with what j ou have ; whilo you continue, unzen- 
eroasly 1 think, to assume t:iat 1 could give you morolf I 
would. I have omittsd, I shall emit, no opportunity to Bend 
you ra-euforcements whenever I possibly cau. 

.. « • o , „ „ "-^ LINCOLN. 

M^jor-General McClellan." 

BATTLE OF MECIIAKICSVILLE. 

On the eftcrnoon of tho CGth cf June, between 2 
and 3 o'clock, the enemy, in considerable fotco, made 
a vigorous attack upon tiie troops of Gen. McCall'e 
Division, stationed at Mechanicsville, coDsisting of 
1he_ two brigades of Seymour nud Ileyuolds. The 
action lasted until nightfall, when the enemy were 
repulsed. Troops were sent up by Gen. Porter to 
the assistanca of those engaged; but they were not ' 
in the battle, though some of them were in position • 
to support the right of tho line. 

About 12 o'clock that night (he trooi/s were 
ordered to fall back to Gaines's Mill, which was ac- 
complished without loss. 

^ BATTLE OF G.UNES'S AHLL. 

On the. 27th tho battle of Gaines's Mill was 
fought, principally by tho troops under Gen. Porter. 
Our forces there ong.-aged were from 27,000 to 3J,000; 
the force of t'jo tueaiy being from two to three 
times that number. Tho cnexiy w>3re in such su- 
perior force that, although our troons fought with 
exceeding bravery, Ihey were driven back with 
a less cf about 9,000 men, in killed, wounded and 
imssing. 

Gen. McClellan was questioned as to tho policy 
Sw-?,A^'"'S*''°"SW -w/Dg, consisting of only about 
6J,{jQ0 men, to meet the i.ttack of the superior force 
of tho enemy, instead cf Withdrawing it to the 
n.^bt bank of tbo Chickahominy before tho battle 
of Gaiues'B MiiL Ilia testimony on that point is a« 
follows: 

" Question. Whatever might I:are been the Intentions of 
tho enemy, ai the attack was to have been made by him, 
would It not have been bet'er to iiave placed both wines of 
ourcrmy on the s.'.mo dde of the Chickahominy prior to the 
battle of Oaine«'s Mil? 

'-Answer. 1 do not think they ought to have been brought 
to tho saiuo £ide of the rivor before they actoally were. 



12 



" Question. What advantage was gaineJ by lenving the 
right wing of our army to be attacked by a gteatly superior 
force! 

" Answer. It prevented the enemy from getting on our flank 
and rear, and, in my opioion, enablad us to witUdraw the 
army and its material. 

"Queatioa. Will yon explain -what was done by the nglit 
wingof oar army at or about the time the left waa engaged 
which saved our flank from attack and enabled the army and 
ItB material to be withdrawn? 

"Answer. By desperate fighting they inflicted bo great a 
loss on the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank 
of the river, and gave us time to get our material out of the 
way." 

RETREAT OP THE WHOLE ARMY DECIDED OX. 
Duricg the night after the battle of Gaines's Mill 
all our forceswere concentrated on the I'ight bank of 
the ChickahoniLny, and the next day the movement 
"to the James River was determined upon. Gen. 
Heintzelman testifies that the night after that battle 
he was sent for by Gen. McClellan; that ha found 
everytbinar packed, ready to leave; that Gen. Mc- 
Clellan said there were two things to be done — to 
concentrate Ilia forces and risk all on a battle, or to 
withdraw to the James Eiver; that it be risked a 
battle there, aad was beaten, the army was destroyed. 
Gen. Heintzelman advised laim not to risk a battle 
■under such circumstances, for if that army was lost 
the cause would be lost ; that it were better to go to 
the James Eiver and await re-enforcements. Gen. 
McClellaa replied that be was of that opinion him- 
self, and that was determined upon. That night, at 
12:20 a. m., Gen. McClellan telegraohs the Secre- 
tary of War that he (Gen. McClellan [is not responsi- 
ble for the result, but feels that the Government has 
not sustained his army. 
To this the President replies, on the 28ih: 
" If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the 
piico we pay for the enemy not being in Wathington. We 
protected Vvashingtoa end the enemy concentrated on yoa. 
Had wo Btripped Washincton he would have been upon us 
before the troops eent could"have got to you. 

" Save your aimy at all events. Will Bend re-enforcements 
as fast aa we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, 
to-morrow, or neit dsy." 

The 28th of June passed without any serious 
fighting. Col. B. S. Alexander testifies that on the 
afternoon of that day be was sent for by Gen. Mc- 
Clellan, and went to bis headquarters, at Savage's 
Station, arriving there about daik. He received in- 
structions to proceed with an escort to the James 
Eiver, send back a sufficient number of men to act 
aa goidea for the difl'erent columns of the army, 
communicate with the gunboat-', and order supplies 
to be brought up the river; to examine both shores of 
the Jamea to the mouth of the Chickahominy, and 
ascertain the landing places; proceed up the Chick- 
ahominy to the head of navigation and ascertain 
the places where the army could cross, in case of 
necessity, and then return to headquarters and re- 
port. He left Savage's Station that night, and 
reached the Jamea Eiver the next afternoon. By 
the time he bad completed his examination the army 
bad reached the James Eiver at Malvern, 
M'CLELLAN PROPOSES TO DESTROY HIS "BAG- 
GAGE. 
While at headquarters, receiving his instructions, 
he was shown, as lie testifies, a printed order, not 
then issued, directing the destruction of the bag- 
gage of officers and men, and the tents, camps, 
equipage, and things of that kind; appealing to the 
army to submit to this privation, as it would be only 
temporary-r-' ' only for a few days." He remon- 
'Btrated with Gen. McClellan against issuing such 
an order; that it would have a bad effect, would de- 
moralize the army, as it would be telling them more 
plainly than they could be told in any other way 
that they were defeated and running for their lives. 
The order was not issued, and Gen. McClellan tes- 
tifies "that he has no recollection of any such order. 
THE RETREAT TO JAMES RIVER. 
The retreat to the James Eiver having been de- 
dded upon, the army took up its march, being at- 
tacked by the enemy iu the day time, and however 
BuccesefuJ in repehinsr those attacks, evacuating 
their poBitiona daring the night. The actions oi 



Savage s Station, Gleudale and Malvern were fonghi 
during the movement of the army to the James, the 
enemy being repulsed in each day's fighting, and 
our army falling back, tmder orders, during the | 
night. 

It would appear, from all the information your 
Committee can obtain, that the battles werejou^ht, ' 
the troops handled, new dispositions made and old \ 
ones changed, entirely by the corps commanders, j 
without directions from the Commanding General, 
He would pi ace the troops in the morning, then leave 
the yield and seek the position for the next day, giv- 
ing no directions until the close of the day's fight- 
ing, when the troops would be ordered to fall back 
during the night to the new position selected by 
him.. In that manner the army reached the Jamei 
Eiver. 

BATTLE OP M.\LVERN HILL. 

The battle of Malvern Hill, of the 1st of July, 
was the most fiercely contested of any upon the 
peninsula. The troops were placed m the morning, 
under direction of Gen. McClellan, who then left tha 
field, returning to it again in the afternoon. Tha 
first action of the day commenced about 10 o'clock 
inthe forenoon, but did not continue long. The 
principal action, when the enemy attacked most 
vigorously and persistently, commenced late in the 
afternoon, and continued till after dark, the enemy 
being repul3ed and beaten at every point. Many of 
the officers examined by your Committee are of the 
opinion that the enemy were bo severely punished 
on that day that they could have been fallowed into 
Eichmond had our army followed them up vigor- 
ously. 

It is tru9 that our army had been severely tried 
during the preceding week, fighting, as they did, 
nearly every day, and retreating every night. The 
corps commanders and the tro )p8 under them fought 
most bravely — no troops better. Ho wever disheart- 
ened they may Lave become by what all must have 
regarded as a precipitate retreat during the night, 
they still fought with the most obstinate bravery 
when attacked in the day time by an exultant ana 
Buccesaful enemy. 

M'CLELLAN STILL RETREATS. 

The commanding general, however, determined to 
fall back from Malvern to Harrison's Bar, notwith- 
standing the victory won there by our army. He 
seema to have regarded bia army as entirely unfitted 
to meet the enemy, for on the day of the battle at 
Malvern, evidently before that battle took place, he 
writes to the Adjutant-General of the army &oia 
Haxall'a plantation. 

AND STILL WANTS TROOPS. 

" My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the resolt 
if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall 
retire to-night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can ren- 
der more aid in covering our position. Permit me to urge 
that not au hour Bhould be lost in sending me fresh troops. 
More gunboats are much needed." 

On the 2d of July the President telegraphs to G«n. 
McCleUan: 

" Your dispatch ofyesterday morning induces me to hope 
your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to 
reason with you for a moment. When you ask for 50.000 men 
to be promptly sent you, ycu must surely labor under some 
gross mistike cf fact. Recently joa sent papers ehowing 
your disposal of forces made last Spring far the defease of 
Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find in- 
cluded in and about Washiagtou 75,000 rnen. Now please bo 
assured that I have not men euougli to fill that very plan by 
15,000. AU of Gen. FremonPa in the taUey; all cf G(7t. 
Banka's; all of Gen, McDowell's nottcith you; and all in 
Washington, taken tiyethe/ do not exceed, if Ihey reach, 60,000, 
with Gen. IVodand Gen. Dix added to those vientiiTved. I 
have not outside cfy-'^ur army 'iofiM men caste f themountains. 
Tbustkeideaof sending you £0,000 men, or any other con- 
siderable force, prompily.js «mi;/y cbnard. If, in y cur fre- 
quent mention of responsibility, you had the impression that 
I blame you for nctdoing more tuan you can, please be re- 
lieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner 
jou will not ask impossibilities of me. 

•' If you tM.ik you aie not strocg enough to take Riehmond 
just uotv, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, 
material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the ofien- 
sive again as fist I can." 

On the 3d of July, after the army had reacted 



13 



Harrison's Bar, Gen. McCIellan writes to tho Secre- 
tary ofWar: 

" I am in hopea that the enemy i3 ei completely worn ont 
83 we ate; he was cettaioly very severely puuished In the 
last battle. ****»*, 

It is, of coarse, impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but I 
doubt wliether there are to-day more than 50,000 men with 
their colors. 

"To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond, and 
puttiDganeud to this rebellion, re-euforcemtnts should be 
lent me rather much over than less than lOU.OUO men." 

THE ARMY HELPLESS. 
The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harri- 
son's Bar -was very precipitate. The troops, upon 
their arrival there, were huddled together in great 
confusion, the entire army being collected within a 
space of aboat three miles along the river. No or- 
ders were given the first day for occwpying the 
hights wliicli commanded the position, nor were the 
troops Si) placed as to be able to resist an attack 
in force by the enemy, and nothing but a heavy 
rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing 
up their artillery, saved the army there from de- 
struction. The enemy did succeed in bringing up 
some of their artillery, and threw Bome shells into 
tho camp, before any preparations for defense had 
been made. On the 3d of July the bights were taken 
possession of by our troops and works of defense 
commenced, and then, and not until then, was our 
army secure in that position. 

NUMBER OP TROOPS. 
_ By reference to the testimonjr of Mr. Tucker, As- 
sistant-Secretary of War, It will be seen that prior 
to the 5th of April, 1862, 121,500 men had been 
landed on the peninsula. Shortly afterwai-d Gen. 
Franklin's division of Gen. McDowell s corps, num- 
bering about 12,000 men, was sent down. In the 
early part of June Gen. McCall'a division, of the 
same corps, of about 10,000 men, was sent down, 
together with about 11,000 men, from Baltimore 
and Fortress Monroe, and about the last of June, 
some 5,000 men of Gen. Shields's division were also 
sent down. Total, 159,500 men. 

On the 20th of July, 1862, according to the returns 
Bent to the Adjutant-General's office by Gen. Mc' 
Clellan, the Army of the Potomac, under his com' 
mand, was as follows: Present for duty, 101,691 
epecial duty, sick, and in arrest, 17,828; absent, 38, 
795; total, 158,314. . This included the corps of Gen 
Dix, amounting to 9,997, present for duty, or in all 
11,778 men. 

M'CLELLAN IDLE. 
The army remained at Harrison's Bar during the 
month of July and a part of August. It engaged 
in no active operations whatever, and was almost 
entirely unmolested by the enemy. The subject of 
the future operations of the army was a matter of 
much deliberation on the part of the Government. 
Gen. McClellan claimed that the James Eiver was 
the true line of approach to Eichmond, and that he 
should be re-enforced in order to renew the cam- 
paign against that place. The President visited 
the army about tho 8th of July, but nothing was 
then decided upon. 

HIS ARMY ENERVATED. 
On the 25th of July Gen. Halleck visited the army 
at Harrison' » Bar, accompanied by Gen. Burnside, 
who had come from North Carolina, with tho greater 
portion of his force, to Fortress Monroe. The gen- 
eral officers were called together, and the question 
of withdrawing tho army was submitted to them. 
Tho council was of rather an informal character. 
The majontj[ of the officers expressed themsclvoB in 
favor of a withdrawal of the army. Gen. Barnsido 
testifies that, as he understood from tho officers there, 
the army was not in a good condition, sickness waa 
increasing;, many of the regiments wero without 
Bhelter and cooking utensils, and many of the men 
were without arms. The general opinion expressed 
hy the leading officers waa that the men had become 
very mucli enervated. One of the leading officers 
taid that his command could not, in his opinion, 
march three miles andjight a battle. This condition 



of the troops was one of the rcaeong aesignod for the 
final withdrawal of the army from the peuinsula. 
m'clellah's demand for ue-enforcejients. 
Gen. McClellan applied for 50,000 re-enfoixements 
to enable Lim to resume active operations. Gen. 
Halleck, when he visited the army, informed Gen. 
McClellan that the Government could furnish him 
only 20,000 additional troops. Gen. McClellan con- 
sented to renew operations with that number of re- 
enforcements, and Gen. Ilaileck laft with that un- 
derstanding. Bat the day that ho left Gen. McClellan 
wrote'to him, askiug for 15,000 or 20,000 troops from 
the Western army, in addition to those promised to 
him, urging very strongly that they should be 
brought here temporarily, to be returned to tho West 
after Richmond Ehould have been taken. As this 
could not be dore, tho order waa given for the with- 
drawal of the ar.'uy as rapidly as possible, in order to 
co-operate with th^ forcea iinder Gen. Pope, then in 
the presence of a Buoerior force of tho enemy. 

m'clellan's testimony. 
In regard to the re-guforcemeutof the army while 
at Harrison's Landing, tho testimony of Gen. Mc- 
Clellan is as follows: 

" Question. How many available men did you estimate that . 
you had at Uarrisou's Bar. and liow many more would yon 
have required in order to undeiiate a movement succossfuily 
upon Richmond? 

"Answer. I ihink I had about 85,000 or 93.0D0 men at Har- ' 
rlson'g Bar, and would have undertaken another movement in i 
advance with about 20,000 more re-euforceuients. My viow 
was that pretty much everything that tho Goverameut could 
have controlled ought to have been massed ou the James ' 
River. I did not believe the enemy would trouble Washing- ' 
ton 60 Ion; as we hid a powocuil army in tlie vicinity of Rich- 
mond, and dill not share the apprehensions lor tho safety of ^ 
Washington that were entertained by a g eat many. 

"I asked for 50,000 men at first, on tho ground that I thought ' 
the army should be made as strong as prsaible, and as little &■ 
possible left tj chance. When Gen. Halleck came down to 
Harrison's Bar, my recollection is that he said that 20,000 
men, or something about tliat number, was all that could b9 
had, and I said that 1 would try it again with that number.- 
I have no recollection of having asked at a subsequent period 
for a greater number than 20,000 as a ueoessary preliminary to 
a movement. 

" Question. About how many men had heen lost from the 
25th of June until you reached Harrison's Bar, in killad, 
wounded, and missing? 

"Answer. I think the loss was about 14,000; but I could 
not tell positively without looking at the returns. 

" Question. Will you state in what your chances for succ«s« 
wotild have been greater, with the addition of 20,000 men to 
the number which you had at Harrison's Landing, than they 
were in front of Richmond, and before Jackson had formed a 
junction with the rest of the enemy's forces? 

" Answer. I should have counted upon the effect of tho[ 
battles, which had just taken place, upon the enemy. W* 
had thou strong reasons to believe that the enemy's losses ha4, 
been very much heavier than our own, and that portions of 
his army were very much demoralized, especially after that 
battle of Malvern Hill." ^ 

GEN. BARNARD'S REPORT. j 

In closing their report upon the campaign of tho? 
Peninsula, your Committee would refer to tho report 
of Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers of th»; 
Army of the Potomac during that campaign, mad» 
to Gen. McClellan. The conclusion of his roporfr,^ 
v^ch he terms "aretrosnect pointing out the mis- 
takes that were made, and thus tracing the caosea 
of its (the Peninsular campaign's) failure to their true' 
sources, " is as follows : > 

CAUSES OP M'CLELLAN'S FAILURE. 

" Ono of the prominent among the causes of nlti* ._^ 
mate failure w^as the inaction of eight months, from '" 
August, 18C1, to April, 1862. More than any otheii ' 
wais, rebellion demands rapid measures. In No* 
vember, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not f nil j 
supplied with all the 'materiel,' was yet_ about aa 
complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as 
it ever became. For four months, the great marino 
avenue to the canital of tho nation was blockaded, 
and that capital kei)t in a partial state of tiege by a 

freatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army ol 
50,000 mou. J 

'• In the Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk coulJ 
and should have been taken. The Navy demanded] 
it, tho country demanded it, and the means wero 
ample. By its capture the caxeer of the MerrimaOyj 



14 



which proved bo disastrous to oar subsequent opera- 
tions, ■would bave been preventeU. The preparation 
of this vessel was known, and the Xavy Department 
was not -without lorebodings of the mischief it 
; would do. 

* ' Though delay might manure more comprehensive 
plans and promise greater results, it is not the first 
case in whicb it has baen shown tuat enccessful war 
involves eomething more than abstract military prin- 
ciples. 1 i^e true question was to seize the first prac- 
ticaule moment to eatisfy the, perhaps, unreasonabla 
but natural longing of an ambidoua nation for re- 
Bults to justify its lavish confidence, and to take ad- 
vantage of au undiviiled command and untrammeled 
Uberty of action while they were po-sessed. 

"Wben the army did move, a plan wag adopted 
perfectly certain to invite, nay, compel, interference, 
And wben the army was to go by Annapois to the 
Tower Chesapeake, I felt confident that oue-balf 
would scarcely have been embarked before the other 
half would bave been ordered back to Washingion. 
The enemy was then at Manassas, and a ieiut, even 
if not reality, of an attack upon Washington was bo 
obvious, 80 certain to create a panic, which no Ex- 
j ecutive could resist, that interlerence with the re- 
1 Doval of the rest of the army was certain. 

" When the enemy fell back behind the Eappa- 
' bannock, and destroyed the railroad bridges, the cir- 
cumstances were greatly changed, and there wera 
strong arguments for the line aOopted. Yet, results 
have proved how many reasons there were to be con- 
eidered, besldj the purely military ones, which 
opposed themselves to toe adoptiou of such a line. 
' "The facta connected with the withholding ot JVTc- ", 
Dowell's corps bave been eo completely exhibited in 
the proceedings of the McDowell Court of I:2quiry, 
that every one who wisues can formbis own judg- 
ment. Whether it was wise or unwise, it was one 
of those things resnlting Irom the taking of a line of 
' operations which did not then cover Washington. 

"At the time the Array of the Poioiuac lauded on 
I the Peninsula the Rebel army was ai is lowest ebb. 
Its armies were demoralized by Cne defeats of Port 
Eoyal, Mill Spring, Fort Ilenry, Fort Donelson, 
Koanoke Island, and Pealiidge; and reduced by 
tickness, loss in battle, cxpiraiiona cf periods of 
' «ervice, &c. ; wh'le the Conscription law was not 
; yet even passed, It Beemsdas if it needed but one 
' vigorous gripe to cad forever this rebellion, so nearly 
i throttled. How, then, happened it; that the day of 
I the initiation of the campaign of tbismagnilicent 
Army of the Potomac waglha day of the r^suseita- 
I tion of the Rebel cause, wbicU Bsemed to grow pari 
passu wi;h the slow progress of its operations? 
I " However I may Le committed to any expression 
I of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly 
I did Bugges'-. it), my opinion row is that the lines of 
jYorktown thouid have been as-aultefl. There is 
jreasonto believe that they were i;ot held ia Etrong 
force when our army appeared before them ; and we 
1 know that they wei'e far 1 lom complete. The pres- 
|tige of power, tha morale, yxeve on our tide. IL 
' was due to ourselves to confirm f.nd Eusiaiu it. W" 
! should probably bave eacceadea. But if we had 
' failed, io tor.y well be doubted whsther the eaock of 
an unsuccessful assault v/ould be luoro demoralizing 
1 than the i ibors of a 6ie;^e. 

^ " Our troops tjihd a month in the trenches, or 
lay in the BWaOins of Warwick. We lost few men 
by the siege, but disease took a fsariulbold of the 
army, and toil and bardshio, u^rcueemed by the ex- 
citement of coriibat, impiiiied their morale. We tlid 
' not carry with us from Yorktowu to good en army 
'as wo took there. Of the bi:ter fruits of that munih 
gained by the cuemy wa Lave taoted to our hearts' 
content. They arenot yet exhausted. 

"The siege having been determined upon, we 
■hould have opened oar batteries on the place as fast 
as tbey were completed. Tue efiectou the troops 
would bave been inspiring. It would have light- 
ened the siege and Bhorte;.el our labors; and, bo- 
eides, we would have had the credit of driving the 
enemy from Yorktown by force of arma, whereas, 



as it was, we only induced faim to evacuate or pru- 
dential reasons. 

" Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it 
was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force. 
But the battle of Williamsburg, fought, as it was, 
without reconnoitering t Lie ])08ilion, without concert 
of action among the different corps and division 
commanders, and almost without orders, was a blun- 
der which ought not to have happened. 

" We knew of ibis position beforehand, and we 
knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if 
the enemy made a Btand there, that it would Le a 
s'.rong one, for he would be fighting for time to get 
hia trains out of our reach. We fought; we lost 
several thousand men, and we gained iiotbing. It" 
we bad not fought, the next day a battle would ia 
all probability bave been unnecessary. But if it had 
been necessary, we should bave bad time to bave 
brought lip our resources, reconnoitered the position, 
and delivered our attack in such a way that eome 
result would bave flowed from it. 

" We had every advantage. Franklin's division 
landed at West Point on the next day, and Sedg- 
wick's division on the day followiag. Those two 
divisions, had the enemy waited another day ut 
WiUiamsburg, coald bave cut his communication, 
and in that case we would have been superior lu bis 
front and have had two divisions ia his rear, llis 
hasty retreat, and perhaps bis capture, must inevit- 
ably have followed, and the great object of keeping 
Franklin eo long embarked, and finally sending him 
to West i'oint, would have been accomplished. 

' ■ On leaving Williamsburg we Bhouldbave« mossed 
the Chickahominy, and couLccted with the navy ia 
the James River. We should then have had a united 
army, and the cooperation of the navy, and proba- 
bly would have been in Richmond in two weeks. 
Tue fact that we did not know the character of the 
Ciiickahominy as an obstacle (as it lay across our di- 
rect road to Richmond), that our transports were on 
the York River, and that the railroad furnished a 
good means of supply to the army, that we wished 
to connect with McDowell coming from Fredciicks- 
burg, &c., determined our route. In taking it wo 
lost essential iy all that was worth going so far to 
gain, viz: the James River approach and the coop- 
eration of the navy. 

" The route chosen, two weeks ehould not have 
been cpeut in traversing the forty miles from Wil- 
liamsburg to Bottom's and New Bridges; and the 
barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at 
Bottom's Bridge, no time ehould bave been last ia 
makiug use ot ine circumstance to turn and seize the 
passage of New Bridge, which might have been 
done by the 28:h of May, and even earlier, had 
measures been pressed and prepared for it. 

" The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks ehould 
have been taken advantage cf. It was one of those 
occasions whish, if not seized, do not repeat them- 
eelves. We now know the state of disorganization 
and dismay ia which ih3 Rebel army re'a'cated. A^e 
now know that it could Lave been followed into 
Richmond. Had it been so, there would bave been 
noretibtance to overcome to biing over our right 
wing. Although wo di J not then kuow all that we 
now do, it was obvious at that lima that when the 
Rebels Etruck the blow i.t our Isft wing, they did no; 
leavo any means in their hands unused to eecnra suc- 
cess, lo was obvious enough that tbcy ctruck with 
their whole force, and yet we repulsed them ia dis- 
order wiJi thr^e-fiftbs cf ours. Wo ehould have 
followed them np at the easLe time that we brought 
over the other iwo-fifths. 

"After it was known that ITcDowtll was called 
ofi" to another quarter, there was no longer hope of 
an increase of lorce by the janctionof his corps. 
Taere were no other re-enforcements to look for be- 
yond what wo received by the middle of the month 
of June. The Rebel force was known or supposed 
to be constantly increasing by conscription, by t ho 
iaflax of trooiJS from other parts, and by the breaking 
np of Bsauregard'B army. 

" At last the moment came token action was im- 



15 



pcrative. The entmy assumed the initiative. We 
h.d warning if when ai.d wi'iere he was tj strike, 
Hal Porter dce'i isiliidrawn the night of the 26th cf 
June, our army lootild have teen concentrated on 
the right bank cf the Chiekakomiti]/ River, while 
two corps, at Icatt, (f the enemy's force were on 
the lejt bank. Whatever course we then took, 
whether t J strike ct Jiichmond and the portion of 
the enemy on the right bank, cr move at orice for 
t'e James, we would have had a concentrated army 
and a fair c'laiice (fa brilliant rcsu't in the first ; 
and in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we 
would have been in ike same case on the viorning of 
the 27 ill as we were on that of the 23th, minus a lost 
battle and a compulsory retreat. Or had the for- 
tijcd lines, thrown up expressly for that object, been 
held by 2J,C0D men, as they could liave been, we 
would have fought on the other side with 80,000 
men instead of 27,000. Or, finally, had the lines 
been abandoned, with our held on the right bank 
cf the Chickahominy, we might have fought and 
crufhcd the enemy on the left bank, reopened our 
communication, and then returned and taken Rick' 
mond. 

"As it was, the enemy fought with his whole 
force — except enough lift before our lines to keep up 
an appearance — and we fought with ^^7,000 *nen, 
losing a battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we 
were driven from our position, our advance for con- 
quest turned into a retreat for safety by a force prob- 
ably not greatly superior to our own. 

" III view of tha iengtii of time -wbich oar opera- 
tioiia beifora Eichmoid consumed, there is now no 
doubt that tho depot at tUo White House should 
have been fortified, cs well as one or two points on 
the railroad thence to the Chickabomioj; that the 
it7c-rff-/J0'if at Bottom's Bridge shouid have been 
completed, and likewise f4tes-de-pont,or strong posi- 
tions, prepared to cover the debouches from our 
br'dgea to the left bank of the Chickahominy. 
With these the army would have posseesed free- 
dom of motion to concentrate on either side, and the 
disastrous battle of the 27ih would scarcely have 
occurred. 

"When the army reached the James Kiver _ it 
needed no prophet to predict the disastera which 
have since buiullen our country's cause. If the 
army had sustaiued itself nobly it cannot be denied 
that so much friuilesa toil, and so much disaster, 
had deprived it of the Han which results from buc- 
cesaaloue. lo was, moreover, aa well as our forces 
elsewhere, sadly diminith-id in numbers. On the 
other hand, the whole army, froii ita first low state, 
had risen up an army most formidable in numbers, 
excellent in organization, and inspired by a great 
success. Had its number, indeed, approached to 
that attributed to it— 200,COO men— there is little 
doubt that a march upon Waehingtoa would have 
speedily followed our wi'.hdrawal to tho Jamee. 

»' From such contiderations, as well as those fol- 
lowing from the lesulta of tha past of,eration9, I 
couuEeled tho immediate withdrawal from the 
James to reunite with our forces coveiing Waah- 
ington." 

The report of Gen. Barnard is the only report of 
the oflicera engaged in tho campaign of tho Peninsula 
which your Committeo havo obtained. Tuo report 
by tho ccmmandicg geiicrr.l has not yet been made, 
and tho reports of Lis subordinates have not been 
sent by him to the Department. 

CO-OPEIl(\TION WITU GEII. POPE. 
Gen. BumEido, with his command, was tho first 
to leave tbe pcniuEula. Ho lauded at Acquia and 
proceeded to Frederickeburg, relieving Gen. King, 
who proceeded at onco to rejoin his corps (UcDow- 
ell's) then with Gen. Pope. Soon after. Gen. Burn- 
side was ordered to Bend all possiule acsistance to 
Gen. Pope, and at onco ordered two of his three 
divisions (Echo's and Stevcna'e) up tho Kappahan- 
nock. Shortly after that Ibe advance cf the array of 
the Potomac, Fitz John Porter's cor;:?, reached Ac- 
quia, and was sent forward by Gcr. Burcsido to 
Gen. Pope. Tho rest of the Army of tuo Potomac, 



except Keyes'j corps, left to garriaoa Torktowo^ 
nroceeded to Alexandria, and from tiisro joined Gen, 
Fope. Gov. Samner stopped at Acquis and debarked 
a pi;rliou oihis corps there; but hj received orders to 
rc-enibark them again and proceed to Alexandria^ 
which ho did. 

The troo)-3 sent to the assistance of Gen. Pope wer* 
sent by orders of Get. Uallack; for thoja fci.t from 
Acquia the orders wer3 given tUrong'a Geu. B.im- 
sidj; for thoeoseat out from AliX.miiiia, tlie orders 
weregiveiidirectly to tho corps conijianders, uutil 
Gcu. McClelUa ai-rived, on thiSotii of August; ax'ter 
which the orders were givdii throu^'h him. 

Tho circumstancejcoauected with tha campaign; 
of tho Armyof Vii'gini-ibava baeuso full/ investi- 
gated by tho lailitary courts iu tho cases of G'^u. Mc- 
Dowelland Gen. FiizJohu Porter, the proceedings 
of whic^ were public, that your Comm.tteo have not 
deemed it necessary to make so thorough aa iuvesU- 
gallon of that campaign as they would otherwia* 
have done. They refer, therefore, pr'ncip ally to th» 
orders and correspondence, in relation to iho delays 
in the forwarding of Gen. Sumner's and Gen. Franlc- 
lin's corps from Alexandr a to the assistance of Gen»| 
Pope. 

Jl'CLELLAN'S DELAYS IN SENDING ASSISTANCE, i 

At IJ a. m., Aug. 27, Gen. Halleck telegraphs 

Gen. McClellan that • , 

" Fiankliu'3 corps ehoald maxeliintliat dirocUon (SiIanaa»M> 

ai soon ad podbiblo." I 

At 10:40 a. m. Gen. McClellan replies: 

"I have Bent orderatoFrankliatoprepara to match with his 
corps at onca, au J to repair hero ( Alexaa Jria) iu person to in- 
form liiiuai tJ tis means of trausp jrtation. Kearney wa» 
yesierday atllappahaanock: i'oiver at Bealton, KoUy'B, Bur- , 
noti's, Sic. Somuer will coaimeuca reaoMna Falmoutli to- 
day." I 

At 12 m. on the same day Gen. Halleck tolegraj h»> 
to Gen. McClellan: j 

"Te'.egrama from Gen. Porter to Gen. Biirnaide, jostrft- 
ceiveJ, say tuatlia'^ksisBi Fajetteville. McDuwell, tJigeU 
au J Kickctt3, iieir Warrentoii : Ran o o i hij ti^Ut. Porter i» 
niarc'.-.iai oa Worreutou to re-enloic3 Pope. Kjthius said of 
Heintzelmau. Porter reports a general bitt a ImminenU 
Fraukliu'a corps eUouU ruova out by foiceJ luurclies, carrying 
tlirtocr four dava' provisions, to bd supplied, aa far aa poasl- 
ble, by railroad." 

From Gen. McClellan to Gen. Halleck, same day, 
sent 12:5 p. m., received 1:40 p. m.: 

" My aid has just returned from Gea. FranUia'a camp. R«- 
pyrtjtiiat GjU3. Fr.uiUu, Smilb, aid bi-^uni, ara all la 
\Vas!iii)st03- 1^9 e^''" "-''^ order to tha next ia rani to f lao» 
tlij corps ia readiness to move at ouoa." 

From same to aatue, sent 1:15 p.m., receivad 
1:50 p. m. 

•'FranKliQ'a artillery has no horses, except for ionr cnns 
■without caiJions. 1 can pici up no cavalry. In view- of 
thesdfactJ.wil ituotba well to pu^:i cjumuer's corpa her© 
by Witter aJ rapidly c»3 possible, to nia'.io iaaineJiata arrange- 
ments for placiu^' t-o w oiiii ia front of \VasaLn;^.on in an effi- 
cient cocditiojcf defense. IbivjEO msiiis 01 kaowiug tba 
eneujy'a force betweea I'opj anl ouraelva:'. Ca.i Irautan, 
■wltbSut hi3ii:tiUerycr cavalry, eJec; any us9''ul ijurposa la 
froiit? ShouUnotCuro=ii-aat oaco take stepi t,> evacaat* 
Falmontl) a:iJAc(iuia, atthosamatimj coverin' tho retreat 
of anycf PoDo'Jtrjopawi-omay fall bac'.ii a that dtreelionf 
I do uat EPO t!i-t v.a liave forco tnou^h oa hand to form scon- 
nectiouwitLiPcpe,whoiO exact position wo do not know. 
Aro we Bale iu tUo direcion of tbo valley 1" 

At 1:50 p. m. Gen. Halleck replies: 

"Ye3i ItbinkSumner'scorrsibouU come to Alex'-,dri«,.* 
i^ho ouemy b_3 appeared at Ljo;-bar;^', aui.tho commaadiog; 
officer etKdivard^' J Ferry atki fir tavalrjv ilave y>.u any 
to Bpiro lii.-uJ The enemy 6eo.:i i to bo tryingto tur i Pope'* 
rJsht. Ia tliara uo way of oomaiu-.iiciitinjwiihbiail" 

°0n iho mornin:; of tho 2'Sih of August, Gen- Hal- 
leck telegraphs to Gen. Franklin: 

" Oa palling wiib Gen. IlcClellan, about two o'clock tU» 
moruiu", it was uudersLood that you woieto move wi;U your | 
corps tj-diy toward Mauasbiis Junction, to drive tha cuemy| 
from thj railroad. I bavojuit loarueJ that the General baa, 
net returned to Alexandrix If you have not received bl» ofr-i 
der, act on tbia." 

At 1:05 P. m. of the same day, tlie 23th, Gen. Mo- 
Clclhm tclegrapas to Gen. HaUeck: I 

"Tour dbpatch to Franklin received. I have been doing' 
al poiBibla to burry artillery and cavJry. The mouient 
Franklin con be ttaited with a reasanoblj amount of artillarx 



16 



heehallffo. * * * * * * pieaso sob Bar- 
jiard, aud be sure the xrotki toward Chain Bridga are perfect- 
ly secure. llookupoQ those woiks, eBpecially Ethan AiRn 
•ad Marcy, aa of the first importance." 

At 3:39 p.m. Gen. Halleck telegraplia to Gen. 
McClellan: 

"Not a inomect mnsl be lost in pushing as large a force as 

Sossible toivard Ma-iLSsas, eo as to commnnicate with Pope 
6fOTe the oueiay U te-enforccd." 

At 4:45 p. m. Gen. McClellan replies: 
" Tour di- patch rcceivec!. Keither Franklin's nor Sumner's 
corps ij now in couaition to move and fight a battle. It 
would bo afiacrificotoneDd them cut now. 1 h veeant aides 
to ascertain the condition of tlio commauds of Cox and Tylor, 
out liilltliinlcthiit a premature movement in Email force 
will accomplish nothing' but the destruction of the troops sent 
out Irepuutthat I will lose uo time in preparing the troops 
now here fjr the field, and that whatever orders you may 
give, after heaiing what I have to say, wiU be cariicd out." 

At 8:40 p.m. Gen. Ilalleck telegraplia to Gen. 
McClellan: 

" There must be co further delay in moving Franliliu's 
corps toivard JMauassag; they must go to-morrow moruing, 
ready ornot ready. If we delay too long to get ready there 
will be no urcpssity to go at all, for Pope will either be de- 
feated or victoUous wituout our aid. If there is a want of 
wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till tho 
wagonB can come to their rulief." 

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 

" Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been or- 
dered td march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner hag 
•bout 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or arlill'ery here." 

At 10:30 a. m. of tbe 2Dth, Gen. McClellan tele- 
graphs 10 Gen. Halleck: 

_ " Franklin's corps is in motion ; started about 6 a. m. I can 
pve liim but two tqaaJrons of cavalry. ***** jf 
Sumnnr moves in support of Franliiin, it leaves ns without 
any tiustworthy troops ia and near Washinjton. YetFrank- 
limsloomiic'baluno. What shall be douo? Have but three 
BquadroDsbelonsm^rto the Army of the Potomac. Franklin 
hai but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move 
''"°'t' •<•"''"'' ■''''''""''''^""' condition to accomplish 
much if he meets etrong resistance. I should not have moved 
bim but for your pressing orders of last night." 

At 12 m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 

" Do you wiih tho movement of Franklin's corps to con- 

tmue? He i3 without reserve ammunition and without 

transportation." 

In another dispatch of same date he telegraphs: 
" Franklin has only botween 10,000 and 11,000 ready for 
duty. How far do you wish this force to advance V 

At 3 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Mc- 
Clellan: • 

"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out 
•omethu.g about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such in-, 
formation at Anaudale as to prevent his going further: 
other Wise he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get eome- 
thing from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or 
through t ranthn's scouts. Our people mml move more ac- 
tively, and find out where the enemy is. :^am tired of 
guesses." 

At 2:40 p. m. the President asks of Gen. Mc- 
Clellan: 

"WTiat news from direction of Manaosas Junction? What, 
generally?" ' 

At 2:45 p. m., received 3:30 p. in., Gen. McClel- 
lan reph'es: 

" Tho last new s 1 received from the direction of Manassas 
was from stragglers, to the etfect that the enemy were evacu- 
ating C entreviile and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. 
^ ihisis by lio moans reliable. I am clear that one of two 
courses should be adopted: First, To concentrate all our 
evaiUblo forces to open communication with Pope. Second 
■20 leave 1 ope to get out of hit scrape, and at once uso all 
meaoa to maso the capital perfectly safe. No middle course 
wi now answer, 'i'ell me what you wish me to do, and I 
willdoallianiy po%vcr to accompUsh it. I wish to know 
what my orders aud authority arc. I ask {\M Jiiag, but will 
obey whatever orders you give. I only a idm, jmpt decision, 
tuat I may at onc6 givo tho necessary c JHK It will not do 
to delay longer." ^^» 

At 4.10 p. m. the Preeident replico: 
T" Yours of to-day just received." I think your first alterna- 
toye.towit: 'toconcep.rato all cur avaUable forces to oocii 
communication with Pope,' is the right one. But I wish not 
W^reU" °°''' '''^'"' '" ^^^ Bjaileck, aidedTy your 

FRAMiLIN'S DISOBEDIENCE. 

nn^X- '^,\^^ P* ""• ^°°* Halleck telegraphs to Gen. 
AlcUleUau: 



f„,^" '}'°?°^i^*'^^y^®"^ coEstruction train andgnatdt 
to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in t"u! 
1 have J ist been told that Franklin's corps stopped at An^ 
dale, and that ho was tuis evening in AlezandriaT This is^l 
S? ^hfA'" ""y S-I'^l"' Investigate and report the fact o< this 
disobedience. That corpg must push forward, as I directed. 
Msu^o s" "'^°'''^ ^^ open our communicaUons with 

M'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. 
■ i^o^rn^*^"- McCleUan rephes, at 8 p. m., re- 
ceived 8.50 p. ra. : y > '■^ 

nn,iJ'fr""°* ^"S^ ^°' Fra^tlin to move beyond Anandale, 
nndor the circumstances until we knew what was at Vienna. 
Oen. Franklm remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring 
to wrange lor suppliea for his command. I am responsible fo? 
H,°..hl,J-^* circumstauces, and do not see that either was in 
rifpr„.o^fr'° ?r ","■ °'''^''"- ^'^"° eive distinct orders ta 
reference to Fr^klm'a movements of to-morrow. * * " * In 
reuard to to-morro vv's movements I desire dehnite instructions, 
as it 13 not agi;eeable to me to bo accused of disobeying orders 
when I have simply exercUed the discretion you conumtted to 

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 

t^'^w' bearing from yon, I have sent orders to Gen. Franklin 
to place himself in communication ivith Gen. Pope. bva£ 

7^^TAr%^°T ^' P?^«|i''«' ""i »' the same time coVerUie 
transit of Pope's supplies." vw.o» ua 

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan forwards to Gen. 
Halleck a dispatch received from Gen. Frankhn 
at Anandale, dated 7 : 15 p .m. , in which Gen. Frankhn 
gives rumors concerning the battle of that day. clos- 
ing thus: •" 

»,'ii^°^° " said to be very short of provisions, and tho country 
wiU not support him." vuuvuuuwj 

At 5 a. m. of the 30th of Angnst Gen. Pope sent a 
dispatch to Gen. Halleck, received at 3.20 p. m. 
from battle-field near Groveton. Virgmia, contaimnff 
an account of the battle of the dkj before, and closinl 
as follows: ° 

M'CLELLAN REFUSES SUPPLIES TO POPE. 

"I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's, and Stnreia'a 
regiments to Centreville. as also forage and subsistence 1 
^.AVJ^e?-''°*'%l^}AT'''^^ from Gen. Franklin, written by 

be loaded and sent to Fairfax Slation aa toon at I would »£»3 
a cavalry escort to Alexandria tj bring them cut. SucharZ 
guest, when Alexandria it fuU of troops and we fighting th, 
enemy, needs no comment. Will you havethese suppUes Sent! 
without the least delay, to CentrevlUe ?" ^ 

At 9.40 a. m., August 30, Gen. HaUeck telegraphs 
to Gen. McClellan: '^ 

•.i'JjT ^'^ "" •^'"^•"^ satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of 
yesterday, cousidermg the circumstances of the ca«e. He wa. 
^f2^Th7fl*"^'°PP"'S^''*■°^°'^^«• Moreover, I learned last 
night that the Quartermaster's Department coJid have dvea 
him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for It, any™ 
smceLu arrival at Alexandria. Ho knew the laiportMceof 
openmgcommumcationwith Gen. Pope's army, iid ihonli 
have acted more promptly." J' " "uouitt 

At 11 a. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 
J'r^^^^S^^r^^ Sumner to leave one brigade In the vicinitv ' 
of Cham Bndge. and to move the rest, ria Columbia JP^e on 
Anandale and Fairfax Court-Iiouse, if this is the roote Von 
wish them to take. He and Franklin are both i^strocted to 
i°hS\?riv^es°?S'P"^"^°'"'"«- ^'^'^ Couch^^S^ii" 

At 12:20 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs: 

Jlh 'f*",^^ ^1"'? ^^lo'il'l land at Alexandria, and be im- 
mediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops wh^ttht 
fighting vs. Let me know when Couch arrive^ as I may 
have other information by that time. * « * Send trSfi. 
L°i '° Acquia fro bring i up Buruside's command. Iiwe 
telegraphed to him, and am awaiting Lis answer." 

At 2:15 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs: 
"Fraukin's and all of Sumner's corps should be nushnd fn». 
ward with all possible dispatch. They must uso the'S legs wd 
make forced marches. Time now it everything." ^ 

H^eck-^* ™* ^^°' ^''^^^^^^ telegraphs to Gen. ' 

,. !' M^or Hammorstein of my staff reports, from two mile« 
this side of CetreviUe, at 1:30 p. m., that FranuSsS^M 
r,!,*^^r?,«'^^''?'='f2"P'J'y- Sum'^uet's' corps mo^ at 1 SI 
lif^ t^f''®Pw"i.y who brought the dispatch from Hamme" 
Btem states that ho learned that the fighting commencTdfiv^ 
w H beyond Centreville, and that our peoplo had been driv? 
Ing Uicm all day. Hammer.tein says sjl he learns was fafol- 

jj^jlg=10p-m. Gen HaUeck tolcgraphs to Gon. 
actuaUy required in the forts, should march to Pope's re^f 



ir 



iSpplaco them wltb new regiments. Frajiklin should olso bo 
jhnrried on to re-enforco Pope." 

; On the same day — Aug. 30, hoar not given — Gen. 
hMcClellan eent the following to Gen. Hallecb. 

1 "Ever Bince Gea. Franklin received notica that bo was to 
1 march from Alexandria, ho has been using every effort to get 
■transportaticu lor hi3 extra cmmunitioii. Cut ho was uni- 
formly told by tho Quartermasters herj that there was Eoae 
disposable, aud his comnund marched withoui wagons. After 
'the departure of his corps, at 6 a. m. yesterday, he procured 
20 wagons to cirry a portion of his ammunition, by uuloadiug 
I some of Gen. Bais's supply traia for that purpose. 
i " Gen. Sumuer wasoue cntiro dayia endeavoring, by ap- 
iplication upon Quartermasters end others, to get a sufiicient 
Inumberof wagons to transport hia reserve ammunition, but 
: without success, and was obliged to march without it. 

" I have this morning sent ell my headquarters train that is 
[landed to be at oijco loaded with ammunition for Sumner and 
'Franklin, but they v.ill not go far toward supplying tho defi- 
i ciency. 

I " Eighty-five wagons were got together by the Qnartermas- 
! tor last nisht, loaUed^r^th subsistence, and sent forward under 
an escort at 1 a. m., via Alexandria. 

I " Every effort has been made to carry oat your instructions 
promptly. The diiEculty seems to consist in the fact that 
the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria 
and VVashinc^ton ha? been needed for current supplies of the 
I garrisons. At all events, such is the state of tho caso as rep- 
iiesenteato me by the Quartermaster, and it appears to bo 
true. I tike it for granted that this has not been properly ex- 
plained to you." 

' At 10:45 a. m. of the 31st of August, Gen. Pope 
iBends the following to Gen. Halleck from Centreville : 
" Onr troops are all here, and in position, though mach 
fused up and v/jrn out, I think it would, perhaps, have been 
I greatly better if Summer and Franklin had been here three or 
j four days a^o. Entyou may rely upon our giving them (the 
i enemy) as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand 
I up to. 1 should like to know whether yon feel secure about 
Washington, should this army be destroyed. I shall figbt it 
BS long as a man will stand np to the work. Tou must judge 
twLatis to be done, having iu view the safety of tho capital. 
! 0?he enemy is already pushing a cavalry recouuoissauce in our 
[front at Cub Tiun, whether in advance of an attack to-day I 
j don't yet know. I send you this that you may know onr 
position and my ptirpose." 

On tho 2d of September Gen. Pope was ordered to 
fall back to llie vicinitv of Washington, •where his 
jarmy came under the command of Gen. McCl^Uan. 
tM'CLEELAN KESPGNSIBLE FOR POPE'S DEFEAT. 

The following ia froin the testimony of Gen. Hal- 
lleck: 

I •' Question. Had the Army of the Peninsula been bronght 
!to co-operate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost 
energy that circumstances would havo permitted, in your 
Judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in oor 
iTictory instead of onr defeat 1 
I , " Ansfver. I thought so at the time, and still think so." 

r In relation to the commaad of Gen. McClellan, be 

'bimself testiiies as follows: 

i "Question. What position did yon occupy after your 
eirival at Alexandria, aud you had forwarded the troops 
which had bean under your command to the Bssiitauce of 

I Gen. Popet 

I " Answer. I was for some little timfr— one or two days, two 
or three days, perhaps — without any position ; merely at my 
camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of Sep- 
tember, I received verbal Instmctions from Gen. Halleck to 
take command of the defenses of Washington. I was, how- 
ever, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming emy 
control over tue troops under Gen. Pope. I think it was on 
the next day after that 1 was instructed verbally by the 
President and Gen. Halleck to go cut and meet the army 
which was coming in, and to assume commando! it when it 
approached the position that I considered it ought to oecupy 

;for defensive purposes, and to post it properly." 

I The testimony of Gen. Halleck npon tho same 
I point is as follows : 

"Question. What was the position of Gen. McClellan In 
regard to the troops of the Army of tho Potomac as they 
landed et Acquia Creek and Alexandria? Were they under 
his command i and if so, bow long aid they remain under his 
command? 

'•Answer. Gen. McClellan retained the command of 
the Army of the Potomac as it landed at those 
: two points, except such portions of it as were sent 
1 into the Iseld under Gen. Pope. Those portions were consid- 
I ered as temporarily detached from his command, but Etid be- 
longing to his army, and he was directed that oU orders sent 
fromhim to tliotioops as detached, whilo under Gen. Pope's 
immediate command, must be sent throug'i tne headquarters 
at Washington. Ua retained command ot a'l the troops of 
bis army as they landed at those places until eent iuto tho 
field, and reported to Gen. Pope; and tliey continued to re- 
main under bis command, with the exception of his detach- 
BJcnts, until Gen. Pope's army fell back on Washington, 
when all came under Oen. McClellau's command. Ou Ms 



(Cen. McClellan's) arrival at Alexandria he was told totaks 
immediate command of all the troops in end about Washing* 
ton. In addition to those which properly belonced to the Army 
of the Potomac. Some days after he had been verbally direct- 
ed to take such command ha asked for a formal order, which 
was issued from tho Adjutant-General's office. The order 
issued from tho Adjutaut-Oeneral's office was after Gen. 
Pope's army commenced falling back, aud was dated Sept. 2 j 
but Gen. r.IcClellan had beea in command ever since bis arri- 
val in Alexandria. 
" Question, At what time did he arrive in Alezandriat 
" Answer. Ho arrived at Alexandria on the 26th of August. 
The formal order was issued that he mizht have no difficulty 
with Gen. Pope's forces ; that they might not question h£s 
authority." 

THE CAMPAIGN IN RIARYLAND. 

Very soon after Gen. Pope and his army fell back 
on Washington the Rebel army entered Maryland. 
Preparations -were immediately made by the author- 
ities in Washington to follo-w them. 

In relation to tho command of the army in Mary- 
land your Committee will quote from the testimony- ; 
of Gen. McClellan and Gen. Halleck. The testi- 
mony of Gen. McClellan ia ns follows: ' 

"Question. What position did you occupy after you* ar- i 
rival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which 
bad been under your command to the assistance of Gen. 
Pope? 

" Answer. I was for some Httle time— one or two days, 
two or three days, perhaps— without any position j merely at 
my camp, without any command. On Monday, thfe Ist of 
September, I received verbal instructions from Gen. Halleck 
to take command of the defenses of Washington. I was, , 
however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming ; 
any control over tha troops under Gen. Pope. I think it waa i 
onthe next day after that that I was instructed verbally by; 
the President and Gen. Halleck to go out and meet the army i 
which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it 
approached the position which I considered it ought to occu- 
py for defensive purposes, and to post it properly. 

M'CLELLAN FORGETS. 

" Question. How long did yon remain in command of the 
defenses of Washiniton, and what orders did you next re- 
ceive, and from whom ? 

" Answer. I do not think that order, assigning the defenses 
of Washington, was ever rescinded, or any other one issued In 
its place. I had only verbal communications with Gen. Hal- 
leck before I started on the Antietam eampaiitn. And it waf 
never definitely decided, np to the time that I left, as to 
whether I was to go or cot. I asked the question two or thrde 
times of Gen. Halleck, whether 1 was to command the trooni 
In the field, and ho said it bad not been determined. And I do 
not think that it ever was. / thiTik that wa$ on« of thote thingt 
that grew into shape itself. When the timecame tuent out," 

The following is the testimony of Gen. Halleck 
upon that point : 

" Question. By whose orders was Gen. McClellan placed ia ] 
command of tho army that left Washington to operate iaj 
Maryland ; and were these orders verbal or in writing 1 

"Answer. As I stated the other day, the order viat givtn \ 
verhally to Gen. McClellan by the President, at Gen. Model- '. 
lan's house, about 9 o'clock in the morning, pretioits to Ostk MO' I 
cieUan leaving the city for Rockville. i 

" I will add that Gen. McClellan, in virtue of hii beiBC 
placed in command of the fortifications of Washington and 
the troops for defense within them, was really in command of , 
all the troops here at that time. The question was discussed 
by the President for two or three days as to who should take 
command of the troops that were to go into the field. TA« 
decision mas made by himself, and announced to Gen. McCld- 
Ian in my presence. I did not know what the decision wu 
until I heard it thus announced." 

M'CLELLAN FORGETS AGAIN. 

In regard to the instiuctions given to Gen. McClel- 
lan his testimony is as follows: » 

" Question. Did you have any Interview with the President 
In relation to taking command of tho troops for the Maryland 
eampaign, or receive any instructions from him oo that 
point 1 

"Answer. I do not think he gave me any instructions after 
that morning, when I was told to take command of the army 
In front of rt'ashington. I do not think he gave me any in- 
structions about tha Maryland campaign. 

" After you commenced tho movement, did you receive any 
Instrnctiona from any one 1 

"Answer. I received some telegrams, that might he looked 
vponin th« nalura of instructions, from Gen. Halleck and 
from the Presider.'t. Tho general tenor of Halleck's dis- 
patches was that iu-as comnijCtin^ an error in going so far 
cway from WashiLgton ; that I icas going rather too fast. 
He had tno impression that the main force of tha enemy was 
ontliasouth sidoof the Potomac, and that they had only a 
small fc'-catn front of me to draw me on, and then tliey 
would come into NV'oshington in rear. As late as the 13th of 
Sept -mber, I recollect B telegram of Gen. Halleck in which 
bo pressed that same idea, and told me that I was wrong IB 
going EO far away." j 



IS 



Tlie testimony of Gtn. Halleck upon fliat point is 
as followa: • 

" Qnestion. What inshTctions, if any, were g'.von io Oen ,' 
McClellaa in rcsird Id tUo conduct ot' t:;6 campaig:! ia Mary, 
land ? 

"Answer. Tiia d-'ij the Fresider.t save Cen. McClellxnAU 
rcctionjtutakocomiuaaUof t^ieforceji.i tin Cel J, wo had a 
longconvrrsatioaiarojirJ tothocampaiiiuii Jlary^ani. It 
wssajreeJ betu'ceam t'li^t tJa troopi shoiill niova np thi 
Potoj^ac, en ', if prrsib'e, Brp?.:a'a ti a', porlioii cf Cen. Lee'3 
army wUic i li^ 1 ciosre 1 tho i'otoma?/ l.o ;i 1 Lo rem'>iader oa 
tha \'irj:u''i6li!(«. Tbcro ivero to dollaito iLstruction?, far- 
ther tlian tliat uudeistaQ(lii;g betweea U3, as to tlio general 
plan of tio cimpjifn. 

"lEnbmitl'ercwithcorlcs of d5=pafche?to anil from Gton. 
McCk'ilcn, a'tcrhalcft Wcsliington t5 tnko cotnWiLd of ot-- 
erationa ialilLirvlasd, to t!;j tinib th-thowai reacveJ from 
comm:n\ 'jL'Iiesap^pencomprUo a 1 ti:o di^pafchea ecct to 
anJre^tir'edfr i;iGp:i. MoClcllan, so f?ra3 Iluiow, cxcrjt a 
letter d:.tPi October 13, adJresipJto lii:;i bythi PresidfUt, 
aui wl ic 1 Wi.3El!0wn to rajjj;t ai t!so i'reskViit wcs abcnt 
tod:3pitc;iit lo 0°a. ricC'eUiii, and Oen. McClolliu'j reply, 
da'ei October 17." [Tho latter tf t'lo Presidcn', witb tuo 
rep;yof Cm. McClelbn, 13 incorporated ia anothsr part of 
this re JO' t J 

" /;» jeirt/d to Gen. McCleVan's going too fast or too far 
fr^r.i IVt 3hir.it :in,^hcre ea.i ha found no suc'i te'.C'xravi from 
metih.m. J_:o Lainiiit';!:?.! tI:o lutatJinj ofti'j tJegrama I 
«8<;t i.irrj. IlHltgiflp^ieJhim thn howai giin^ too far, not 
from V/eBhlusto), b. t from thg Potomac, leiviaj Geu. Lea 
tba opp'ri'.nii y 1 como dowa tho Potomac end get between 
■ bini BU .1 Wa-lilraton. I thought Con. JMcClellau ehouldkeep 
mcro upo.i lira Potoi:iao, auJ preasfotw.-.rj liis left rather than 
hi^rl'.lii EOas tI;oiaoia readily to rtUeya Uarper's Ferry, 
wbicli *a3 (l!3 point theni i mctt immediate d'^nser; that he 
was pucl.:.-!'; fcrwaiJ h:3 right too last relatively to tho move- 
mer;'"3ofh:3lofi— not that the army was moviug tco fast or 
too far frora VVashinstoa." 

The ktter of Gen. Halleck of Sept. 13, referred to 
by Gen. McClellaD.ia as follows: 
" Sent 10:45 a. m. 

" VVau Departmest, \ 

" WAs^l^'GTON, D. C, Sept. 13, 1862. 5 

" Majok-Ges. McClellan: Youra of 5 ;3J p. m., yester- 
day, ia just received. Oen. Uanks cannot tafely sparo eight 
new resimentg from hero. You iDust remember that very 
few trcops aro nov/ received from the North, nearly all being 
ftopred to Ki;ard the railroad. Four rcgiueutj v/eie ordered 
to Gen. Dii to replace PecVa division. Porter took aicay 
yesterday over 20,CU3. Until yon know moro ceitainlytha 
enemy's forco south of tho Potomaoyou aro wron.^ia thus 
occoveiing tho capital. lam cf opinicn that tbo enemy will 
8{nd a sn;all coluran to Peunsylvtnii, so aa to drav/- your 
forces in that direction, then suddenly movo o:i Washington 
with th« forces south of the Potomac, aud those he may cross 
eyer, 

" In yonr letter of the 11th yoa attac'i too little importance 
to tho capital. I assure yoa that you a; a wrong. The capture 
of thia place will throw U3 back sis mont;;3,"if it should not 
destroy us. Eewaro of tho evils I noiv point cut to you. You 
saw them whoa here, but yoa seam to forget them in the dis- 
taaco. No mora troops can be sent from hero till we have 
fresh arrivals from the Aorth." 

M'CLELLAN PROPOSES TO SACRIFICE WASH- 
INGTON^. 

The letfor from Gen. McCIellan, of the lltli, to 
which Gen. Ilaileck here refers, contains the fol- 
lowing: 

'• 1 believe this army fully appreciates tho importance of a 
Tictorj' at this time, ar.d will fight well; but the result of a 
general battle, with such cdcla aa tho enemy now appears to 
h'jvo against u^', might, to say tho least, bo doubtful; and, if 
wa should be defaitcd, tho consequences to tho country 
would bo disastrou3 iii tho extreme. Under these circum- 
itance?, I would recommend th„t one cr t'.vo of the three 
army corps now on the Potomac, opposito Washington, be at 
OECO v.jij.draWD, and sett to rc-ealcrcothi3 army. 1 would 
also adviso that tho force cf Col. Milei at Harper's Ferry, 
wfcero it cjn bo of little use, ai:d i3 continually exposed to bo 
cut off by t:o enemy, bo lamtdiately ordered hero. This 
wonldadia out2j,0j0oldcrocp3 to our present force, and 
would grt.a ly strorgtuen us. 

"If tnera ero any Ilebcl forces remaining on the other side 
of the Pototr.nc, they uiustbeso fev.r that tho troops left in 
tho I'orti", alter tao tv.-o corps sha 1 havo been withdra^vn, will 
bo Buliicientto checii them; and wiih tho largo cavalry forco 
now oaihat side, iiejJt well out ia frout to g-.vo w.irniug of 
tho distant approaiu of any very largo army, apart cf this 
army might bo Bcni bickwichia tho iuirenciiuieu'o to os'iist 
in rcpelLng an attaolt. Lrit even if Washinot^n t'lould be taken 
while the.o armies aro confroniiug each other, this would not, 
in myjudgmtuf, bear cna;arisonwi;hthe luiu ar.,1 disasters 
which would follow a s^ng'.o defeat of thi inrmy. 1 ( we should 
bosucCe'Blul in couqueuLg tho gigantio .''nbcl army beCorn xti, 
wo wou'.d hivo no diliiculty iar. cove.iugit. Oathooiher 
hand, ehould their foico prove eufficieutly po-ire-f d lo dt .'eat 
ns, could all tho forces now around \'> a3hing ou iioeufficient 
to prevent such a viotciious army from carrying tho woik.i on 
this side of the Potomao after thoy are uncovered by our 
anoyl I think not." 



Tonr Cornicittee having gone so fully into tba dd» 
tails of tho PeaicGula campaifjn, do net deem it 
necessary to dcvoto eo mach space tj tbocat.ipaign 
m Maryland. Tho samo mind that controlled the 
ir!0ven;ent3 npcn tbo Peninsula controlled t hose iu 
Mary hue), end the eamo f;eneral features cbaracter- 
iz3 tbo oco canjpiti.'^a that characterized tho other. 
Ill each nay to teen t';6 enmonnreadinesato move 
promptly and act vitjorously; tho eamo deciro for 
moro troops tel'oro advauciU;'j; and t'jo Eamo refer- 
ences to tho grer.t superiority _ of numbers oa tha 
part of the ene:Dy. Your Committee, therefore, con- 
teat thcmselvcT with referring briefly to the leading 
operations of the campaign. 

IIAnPER'S FERRY. 

In relation to tho Burrendcr of Harper's Ferry, 
yonr Committeo Lavo net deemed it necessary to 
tako much testitnony apon tliat Bu'oject. Tao mili- 
tary commission which'was convened ia this city in 
October last f ally investigated that subject, end their 
report Las been given to tho public. Attention is 
called merely to two telegrams of Sept. 11, whicli 
passed between Gen. McClellan and Gen. Halleck, 
and which aro aa follows: | 

" IlocKvitLiB!, Sept. 11—0:45 a. m. 
_" Col. Miles is Et or near Harper's Ferry, I undrrstand, 
with 9,003 troops. Ho csn di nothing where hois, bi:t could 
beof great Borvico if ordered to join rue. I Bigsest that he be 
ordered at once to join mo by tho mo'it practicablo routo. 
" GKO. B. McCLEi^L.\N, 

" Jlajor-GeneralCommandinj. I 

" BlBJor-Gen. H. W. Hailecs, Oei;eral-iE.-Chief." 1 

" Wah Depaktmext, ) ' 

" Washinotos, D. C, Sept. 11, 18j;— Seut2:2J p.m. > | 

" Thero is no way far Col. Miles to jo'n you at present. 

The only chance ia to defend his work3 unfl you caa open • I 

comraunicatioa with him. Wheayoudi so, ha will be sub- 

jeot to your orders. H. W. HALLECK. '| 

" Geneiai-in-Chlet i 

" Major-Gcn. McClellan, Rockviile." 

SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 
On the 14th of September tto battle of South 
Mountain was fought — tho troops at Tomer's Gap a 
being under command of Gen. Burnside, and those \ 
at Crampton's Gap being under tho command of - 
Gen. Franklin — reaultiag in tho enemy retiring to 
the vicinity of Shep.erdstown. 

ANTIETAM. 

On the 17th of September tho battle of Antietam 
was fousht. It was commenced by Gen. Hooker on 
the right, at dawn, our troops driving tho ejemy 
before them, and gaining an important position. 
When Gen. Hooker was wounded and taken from 
the field, Gen. Sumner took command of our right. 
Gen. Sumner had Leen ordered to bold his corps in 
readiness to advanco aa hour before daylighn, but 
did not receive the order to advanco natil 7:20 in 
tho morcing. Gen. Mansfield, who had corns up to 
tho support of Gen. Hooker, bad been killed. Oar 
troops, eeeing their leaders fall, and being very 
heavily pressed by tho enemy, wero forced buck for 
Eomo distanca from tha advtmceil positioa Gen. 
Hooker had rsached; but finally, w th tho assistanco 
01 tbo troops brought up by Gen. Sumner, cbecHed 
tho enemy's progress and maintained t-eir position. 

Oa tho left, Gen. Earnside, about 10 o'clock, waa 
ordarcd to attack tho enemy at the bridgo acroES tho 
Antietam in bis front, and to effect a crossing there. 
Tho advanco of Gen. Burnside was met by a most 
obstinate resistance on the part of tbo enemy, and it 
was not until 1 J o'clock that tho bri Jgo was.carried. 
By 3 o'clock Gon. Burnside's whola command had 
crossed B'ad taken position on soma elevated ground 
just abova tUo bridge. He waa then ordered to tako 
the bights commat:Ging tbo town of Shopherdstown, 
wbicii waa done after desperate fighting. By that 
time the enemy on oar left bad been re-eaforced by J 
withdrawicg some cf their troops from opposite our I 
right, where our advanco had been checked, and ■ 
G<;n. Burnside was coaipelled to give up some of 
tho ground ho hid succeeded ia occupying. Ho bad 
Bent to Gen, JTcClellaa for re-enfercements, but re- 
ceived in reply that there wero nona to be had, but 
ho must hold tbo bridge at all hazards. 



19 



The corps of Gen. Fitz John Porter, m the center, 
wasDot bronshtintoactionatall. Gen. Hookerteoti- 
fiee that he had been given to understaud that there 
were to be at ticks made t-iQiultaneouely on the risnl, 
center, and left of our array. He attacked at dawn; 
but Gen. Banisido on the left T;va8 not orJered to at 
tack until 10 o'clock, and there was no attack made 
in the center by Gea. Porter. 

M'CLELLAN ATTACKS BY DRIBLETS. 

In regard to the manner of conductmg the attack 
at Antietani, Gen. Sumner testifies: 

"I have always believed that, instead "T 89"f'''S '^f » 
troops into that attim. in dn'/e's a, they '"'^' »"f' >f 0«°- 
MoClellan ba 1 antho.izel .ue to «="ch hese 43,om. men on 
♦v./. i^rt fl .Ilk <>t t'lH pui'tiiv. we CDulu uo". nave uiiea to lurow 
L'i li;t bacLVX.' t" Vthe other divisiou_s of our army on 

Taifwe wcntl, divishn afur divhion, nuui even ooe of my 

^ " oi'iostion. And aU escape for the enemy would have been 
ImpoEBible? 
"Answer. I think bo." 

The battle closed at dark, onr army haviog gained 
eome little advantages, at a heavy loss, but nothmg 
decisive. The attack was not renewed the "est 
day, the two armies occupy ins tl^e positionB held by 
them at the close of the yesterday's battle. 

WHY THE ATTACK WAS NOT KEXE^YED. 
In relation to iha policy of renewing the attack 
on the day after the hattle. Gen. McClellan testifies: 
"The nest rooming (the IStli) I found that our Iobs had 
beeiiBoctcat. ondtlie e was bo much dis.,rgi-jiziti'jniu some 
of the coAuni-ii-is. that I did not c ...siJer it proper to reuevr 
tlie attack t:iat daj , especial y as I w.s sure of tl.o nrnyaithat 
day of two fre-h dnioi'iis. aa^ouut.iig lo about l.>,Ot)l) mon. 
As an inituncoo! the condition of aoiiie of the troips time 
oioruing, I happened to lecoUect '*'e^''t"'l.'^°f '?„«., ^'^^ 
Corps— Jen. Ilookcf's— umde tae moruing ot the 18.li, by 
which tDe:e were about 3,tUU mea reiioited present far duty. 
Four daye after that the returns of the same corpa ahowed 
13,500. 

THE REBELS m^UDE M'CLELL.'VN. 
" I hod arraiceJ, however, to renew tlio a:tack at daybreak 
on the IStii. but 1 l.-artied some liru^duria" the m-lit or early 
inthe niornius, that the enemy liAd ejaud)iied Imposition. 
ISafe-warJ proved tliat he moved \vi;h great rapidity, and, 
not bciug iocumbcrea by wa-om, v^as enabled to get hia 
troops across ttie tiver bcfjro v.e coald d > hiui auy lenous la- 
iurv X toijk tha',, taking iulo cousideratiou wliat tae troops 
Lad gouo throujh, v.-o got m laoch out of them in this iVnlie- 
tarn cainpaiga as hatnau eudurauoe would bear. 
WHAT BURNSIDE THOUGHT. 
The testimonv of Gen. Barpside, on the subject 
of renewiO;^' the atfick upon the enemy the day 
after the battle, is as lollow6: 

" Question. Did von express any opiuion to Gea. MoClel- 
lan ortoanyor.ea"tbeedaja:ters, ia rela'.lon to renewing the 
attack the nest d iv ; a::d if ta, wiia', opinion did yon expresB? 
"Answer. Ididtxpiess uu cpiuion to Gen. McClel.au on 
the subject. After u-y com^wani was all in P,'s-;'0'i-say 8* 
o'clock at tiglU-I went over t.OiU. Mctlclbu's headquar- 
ters, at Cadysville, and exf.resiei llie opinion t j Cren. Maroy, 
Ills chief of stall', thit tJe attack ousut tjbe renewed the next 
morning at 5 o'clock. 1 also ex.messed the tame opmioE to 
other u.euibers of Uon. UcCle.Ui.'8 staff. IJcn.Warcy told 
me that l.usht to eeo Uea. tlcJl^Haa and tell hiaa what 1 
thought of tae matter. 1 wont i^lo Ceo. McCi=U:i s tent, 
andiatheourse of the convirea im I expressed tao same 
opinion to him, and told Uim that It I coud hav.io.COJ fresh 
troops to pass iu advance cf mii e I would be «i li;».- to Cjim- 
mence the attack on Iho next moruing. He s id that he had 
been thiukiDg the matt rover Ecd would make up hia mind 
during the i,lght, an 1 ii I would send a stall olhcer to hi» 
headqaaiteis, to umaiu there over mglit, he would Ecud ine 
ordeis ( afty in t'ao in.irnii.g ; Lnd if he conciuded to renew the 
attack, bo would s.-nd i.is tin necessary uv.'U. 1 did send the 
staff ciBcer over, but Gen. McCleUan concluded not to renow 
the attack the next day. . , 

"Question. Would t.iere have been any difUcnlty in fur- 
nisbiuz the r..000 fresh troops which you desired, as the corps 
ofGeu. ri:z-Johai'oiter, Bjm6lJ,00i» or 20,0iiU men, had not 
been engaged 1 ,._, ,, , - ,. 

" Auoxvor. There would have been no diraculty la fumiBb- 

Ine the 5,11.0 f.csh troops. In fact. Oen. HcGlellan did send 

Gen. JMorell'd division, of quite that ttreug.h, to report to me, 

but uot with orders to me to renew tha aliick.' 

FRANKLIN'S OPINION. 

Gen. Franklin teslifieB: 

'• Question. AVere yon consulted in relsUon to ronowiog 
the attack the next day ? 



"Answer. When Gen. AfcClellan visited tha right in tha 
afternoon. I showed him a position on the rijlit of tliia wood 
1 liave already iiieiMioned. in which was the Datiki r Church, 
which 1 thought commanded t!ie wond. and th it ifln could be 
taken, we coi.ld drive tlie cn>my f.om the wood by merely 
holding this point. I advised lli&t we should m ike the attack . 
on that pi ice the next morning, from Gen. Sauiiier'a position. ' 
1 lliought there was no doubt about our being able to carry iL 
A\'e had plenty of artillery bearing upon it. "SVediove the 
enemy from there tliat arteriioon, and I had no diubttnat we 
could take tliat place tha next morning, Rud 1 thought that 
would uncover the whole left of tlie enemy. 

"Question. If ihit liadboen made, and that point had been 
carried, v hat would have been the effect upou the enemy 1 

" Answer. It v.ould have been very di.-astrous to them. 

"Question. What reasons were given for uot making the 
attack the next uioming 7 

"Answer. 1 cid not hear the direct re^flin of t'le General 
Commanding, but I havu uuder-stood that t:ie reaio i was, that 
he expected so aie Clteea lh>a-iiuu new tiootia— .7(^8« tofti'cA 
iOJttld make t'le thing a certain tiling — aud he preferred to 
wait to make this attapk ou the right, until these new troops 
came. 

" Qupstion. And that delay gave the enemy an opportunity 
to escape f 

"Answer. I think it did." 

On the night of the IStb of Septemher the enemy 
ahaudoDcd iiieir position and retired across tbe Poto- 
mac into Virginia, without, molestaiiou. Our army 
slowly followed, aud took up apoaiiioaalonj? the 
Potomac, o:i the MarylautlKit'.e.occuijyiag Maryland 
Ui^'hta on ihe 20ih, aud liarper's Ferry on the 23d. 
LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES. 

Gen. McCIiilan, on the 2Jth of Septemher, re- 
ports our bsees at South Mouutaiu at 2,3 J5j at An- 
tietam, 12, 4GJ— total losses in both baltbs, 14,794. 
In rehitiou to tbe bsses of the enemy iu bo'.h those 
battles, in killed, wounded, prisoners and stiagglers, 
Gen. McClellau says: 

" It may be safely concluded, therefore, thit the Rebel 
army lost at lea^t 3').000 of their best troops iu their brief cam- 
paign in Maryland." 
M'CLELLAN WANTS MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS. 

After the battle of Antietam Gen. McClellan 
called for re-enforcemcnts, and announced Ids deter- 
mination to fortify Maryland Ilights, makiL'gare- 
Ciui.4lion on Gen. Wadswortb, tben in W isuiiigton, 
lor 2,000 contrabands lor t jat purpose. On the 27th 
of September he writes to Gen. Halleck: 

AND PROPOSES TO FORM A SHLITARY SCHOOL. 

" My preeent purpose is to hold the army about as it now 
is leuJe.iiii I lurpei's Ferry secure, aud waichiug the river 
closely, inlendingtn attack the enemy aliould lie attempt to 
cross to this si.. e. Ourpossesaiu of Darper's Ferry gives ns 
t loereutttdViutageof as-curo (/e^ioKcAj; but we ciuuot avail 
oirselves of it until the railrojd bridge is finished, bee juse we 
cinuct otherwise Bnpiilyo greater number cf troops than we 
DOW have on the Vuginia tide at that point. W heu l.ie river 
rises to that tuo enemy caonotcrossiu force, 1 purposacon- 
coutratiug the army somewhere near Uarpe.'s Fer.-y, onJthen 
acting ixcoiding to circumstances, viz: Moving ou Winohoft- 
ter it fiom the position and attitude of the enemy, we are 
likely to Eatn a 6' eat advantage tiy doing so; or the devoting 
areasoUBbio time to t.ie ir.;aniza:ion of the urmy aad instruc- 
tion of tha new troops prepara.ory to an advajca on what- 
ever line mav be determ.njd. In any event, I regirdltas 
absolutely necessary to send now regiments at once to the old 
corpi for purposes of initruetion. and thit the old regiments 
be tilleJ at once. * « » 

" JIv own vie T of the proper policy to bo pursue J is to re- 
tain in Wushington merely the f >rco necessary to girrison it, 
oud to send eviryihiujclio available to rt-ei force this army, 
'i'ho railroads give us the means cf prcminly re-enforcing 
Washington, thould it bu necessary. If I a.u ro-eutorce J oa I 
ask. aud tiina'louedtotikomy own course, I wiU hold my- 
self respoDBiblo for tho safety of Washington." 

M'CLELLAN KEEPS HIS MEN IN CAMP. 
On the 7th of October Gen. llalleck replies. Af- 
ter referring to the draft; expected in some of the 
Northern Spates he says: 

" But •« ou cannot delay the operations of the army for these 
drafts It mnt move, and tho oid regiments mut remain in 
their crippled cooaitiou. 'xhe convalescents, hovever, will 
helpali.tle. 'i'na com. try la becoming very impa'ient at the 
want of v.ctivity in jour urmy, aud we must pir^h it on. 

"1 am Bititlied that the eaemy uie faLing back toward Ricn- 
niond. We must foUo.v them ana Beet to puni h them 
There is a decided want of /f;/« in our troops. 'Jhey have V 
lanchiiaaao'jility, utid v.« must try to remedy t :e dofecV-. 
reduction of bajr.-o-:© and baggage-trains will clb ct someUf'«> 
but tti3 real d.fii^uhy iJ they uro uot suffijieutly oxuio/ 
mnchiugi they lio Eli. lin camp loo long. /lrln» 

"After a UorJ match cue day is time enough to ry' ^ » 
still beyond that tiaie dooo not rest the men. Ifw*" '^" 



20 



the arerftgo dl«l»nco roare^ed per month ty our troops for 
the lust year with that of the Rebels, or with European 
annies in the field, vre will see why our troops march no bet- 
ter. They are not auffioieutly exercised to make them good 
and efficient soldieri." 

Oa the let of October Gen. McClellaa aeted for 
authority to build a double-track Buspeneion bridge 
and a permanent wagon bridi^e acrosa the Potomac 
at Harper'a Ferry, which Gen. Halleck declined to 
give. About that time the President visited the 
army. After hia return to Washington the follow- 
ing order was aent to Gen. McClellan by Gen. Hal- 
leck: 

M'CLELLAN ORDERED TO MOVE. 
^ " War Department, ? 

] " WAsniNGTON, D. C, Oct 6. 1862. J 

"lam Instrtioted to telegrauh yon as follows: The Presi- 
dent directs that yon cross the Potomac and give battle to the 
•nemy or drive him South. Your army must move now 
while the roads are good. 

" If you cross the river between the enemy and vVaehing- 
ton, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can 
be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley 
of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent 
to you. The President advises the interior line between 
Wasliington and the enemy, but does not orderit. o^U 
very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. Yon 
will immediately report what time you adopt, and where you 
intend to cross the river ; also, to what point the re-enforce- 
menta are to be «ent. It is necessary that a plan of your 
operations be positively determined on before orders are given 
for buLding bridges or repairing railroads. 

"lam directed to add that the Secretary of War and the 
General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these 
InstmctionB. 

" W. H. HAliLECK, General-in-Chief. 

" Maj.-Oen. McClbllan." 

To this Gen. McClellan replies on the same day: 

" It is important, in making my decision regarding the 
route to be taken by the army, that I should know, first, 
what description of troops 1 am to be re-enforced with npou 
the Shenandoah route, and also upon the other route between 
tbo enemy and Washington ; whether they are to be old or 
new troops, or what proportion of each. Ifpossible, I should 
ba glad to have Feck's division sent to me, if it can begot here 
within a reasonable time. 

' ' Second. Will you Inform me what the present condition 
of the Alexandria and Leesburg Eaiiroad is; also the Manassas 
Gap Railroad; and what time it would require to pnt them in 
working order T It is believed that the Harper's Ferry and 
W^chester Railroad is not materially injured." 

To this Gen. Halleck replies on the 7th: 
" The Manassas Gap Road can be repaired in a few days. 
The Leesburg Koad is much more injured. You can reach 
the former in less time than would be required to repair the 
latter. The troops to be sent yon will ba partly new and 
partly old— mostly new." 

HIS PLANS AND FEARS. 
On the same day Gen. McClellan telegraphs: 
"After a fnll oonsnltation with the corps commanders In my 
vicinity, I have determined to adopt the line of the Shenan- 
doah ^r immediate operations against the enemy now near 
Winchester. On no other Una north of Washington can the 
army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and 
Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the month 
of the Shuuandoab, we would leave it in the power of the en- 
emy to recross into Maryland, and thns check the movements. 
In the same case we would voluntarily give him the advantage 
of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could 
be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point 
of strategical valne to be gained or sought for by a movement 
between the Shenandoah and Washington. 

"I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of 
the Shenandoah Valley as important for ulterior objects. It ia 
important only so long as the enemy remains near Winches- 
ter. And we cannot follow that line far beyond that point, 
■imply because the country is destitute of supplies, and wo 
have not sufficient means of tranaporvatlon to enable us to ad- 
vance more than 20 or 35 miles beyond a railroad or canal ter- 
minus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon 
Staunton, it will be impossible for us to ;>iirsue him by that 
route, and we must then take a new line of operations based 
upon water or railway commuulcution. 

" The only possible object to be gained by an advance from 
this vicinity is to iiijlit the enemy near Winchester. If they 
retreat, we bavo uothiui; to gain by pursuing them, and, in 
fact, cannot do BO to auy great distance. The objects I pro- 
posed to myself are— to light the enemy, if they remain near 
Winchester ; or, failing iu that, to force them to abandon the 
Valley of the Sheua^iduah, tliere to adopt a new and decisive 
line of operations whicli shall strike at t lie heart of the Rebellion 
"I have taken a. 1 possible measures to insure the most 
rompt eqiilpment of the troops. But, from all that I can 
,m, it will be at least three daysbeforo the iirst, lifth, and 
S".'i corps are in readinoEs to move from their present camps. 
•*■ '' need shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, 
?*^J as shelter teuta, i.c. I beg to assure you that not an 
"" all be lost in carrying your instructions into eii'ect. 



"Please send the re-enfbrcements to Harper's Ferry. I 
would prefer that the new resimeuts be sent as regiments, not 
brigaded, unlpss already done so with old troop.j. I would 
again ask for Peck's division, and, if pcsil)!*, Heintzelman's 
corps. If the enemy give fight near Winchester, it will be a 
desperate aiTair, requiring all our resources. 1 hope that no 
time will be lost in sending forward the re-enforcements, that 
I may get them iu hand as soon as possible." 

STUART'S CAVALRY RAID. 

On the 10th of October the Ilebcl General, Stuart, 
made Lis raid into Pennsylvania, returning into Vir- 
ginia, having made the entire circuit of our army. 
On the 13tb Gen. McClellan reported to Gen. Hal- 
leck the result of the raid, and ascribed its success to 
the deficiency of our cavalry, and urged "the imper- 
ative necessity of at once supplying this army, in- 
cluding the command of Gen. Banks, with a suffi- 
cient number of horses to remount every dismounted 
cavalry soldier within the shortest possible time. If 
this is not done we shall be constantly exposed to 
Eebel cavalry raids." 

To this Gen. Halleck replies: "Tour telegram of 
7 p. m. yesterday is just received. As I have already 
informed you, the Government has been and is mak- 
ing every possible efFort to increase the cavalry 
force, liemounts are sent to you as rapidly as they 
can be procured. The President has read your tel- 
egram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy 
had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry 
■would not be so likely to make raids north of it." 

THE PRESIDENT TO M'CLELLAN. 

On the I3th of October the President wrote to 
Gen. McClellan concerning the operations of the 
army. And on the 17th of October Gen. McClellan 
wrote in reply. The letter of the President and the 
reply of Gen. McClellan are as follows; 

" Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 13, 1862. 

" My Dear (Sir: You remember my speaking to 
you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are 
you not overcautious when you assume that you 
cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? 
Should yoa not claim to be at least his equal in 
prowess, and act upon the claim ? 

" As I understand, you telegraphed Gen. Halleck 
that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, 
unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to tkat 
point be put in working order. But the enemy 
does now subsist his army at Winchester at a dis- 
tance nearly twice as great from railroad transporta- 
tion as you would have to do without the railroad 
last named. He now wagons from Culpepper 
Court-House, which is just about twice as far aa 
you would have to do from Harper's Perry. Ha is 
certainly not mora than half as well provided with 
wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased 
for you to have the advantage of the railroad from 
Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes alt 
the remainder of Autumn to give it to you, and in 
fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and 
must not be ignored. 

" Again, one of the standard maxims of war, aa 
you know, is, * to operate upon the enemy's commu- 
nications as much as possible without expo^ng your 
own.' You seem to act as if this applies against 
you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change posi- 
tions with the enemy, and think you not he would 
break your communication with liichmond within 
the next twenty-four hours 7 You dread his going 
into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, 
he gives up his communications to you absolutely, 
and you have nothiog to do but to follow and ruin 
him J if he does so with less tnan full force, fall upon 
and beat what is left behind all the easier. 

" Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer 
Eichmond than the enemy is by the route that you 
can and he must take. Why can j-ou not reach 
ihcre before him. unless you admit that lie is mora 
than your equal on a march 1 His route is the aro 
of a circle, wliile yours ia the chord. The roads aro 
as good ou yours as on his. 

" You know I desired, but did not order, you to 
cross the Potomac b3low instead of above the Shen- 
andoah and Blue Ividge. My idea was, that this 



21 



would at oncfr ineuace the enemy's communications, 
wbich I would seize if be ■woold permit. If he 
■hould move northward, I would follow him closely, 
holding hia co'Jimunications. If he should prevent 
oar seizing his communications, and move toward 
Eichmond, I would press cloaely to him, fight him if 
a favorable opportunity should present, and at least 
try to'beat him to liichmond on the inside track. I 
say 'try;' if we never try, we shall never succeed. 
If he make a i tand at Winchester, moving neither 
north nor south, I would iight him there, on the idea 
that if we can not beat him when he bears the wast- 
age of coming to ns, we never can when we bear the 
wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple 
truth, and is ti)o important to be lost sight of for a 
moment. la ooming to us, he tenders us an advan- 
tage which we should not waive. We should not so 
operate as to merely drive him away. As we must 
beat him somewhere, or fail linaily, we can do it, if 
at all, easier near to us than far away. If we can- 
not beat the enemy where be now ia, we never can, 
be again being within the intrenchments of Eich- 
mond. 

" Eecurring to the idea of going to Eichmond on 
the inside track, the facility of supplying from the 
side, away from the enemy, is remarkable, as it 
were by the different spokes of a wheel, extending 
from the hub toward the lim, and this, whether you 
move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, 
hugging the Blue Eidge more closely. The chord- 
line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket 
and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, 
railroads, andtmally the Potomac, by Acquia Creek, 
meet you at aid points from Washington. The 
same, only the lines len?;thened a little, if you press 
closer to the Blue Eidge part of the way. The 
gaps through the Blue Eidge I understand to be 
about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, 
to wit: Vestal's, live miles; Gregory's, thirteen; 
Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Man- 
assas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five, and Thorn- 
ton's, fiity-three. I should think it preferable to 
take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to 
make an important move without your knowledge, 
and cornpelling him to keep hia forces together for 
dread or you. The gaps would enable you to attack 
if you should wish. For a great part of the way 
you would be practically between the enemy and 
both Washington and Eichmond, enabling us to 
spare you the greatest number of troops from here. 
When, at length, tunning for Eichmond ahead of 
him enables him to move this way ; if he does bo, 
turn and attack him in the rear. ' But I think ho 
should be engaged long before such poirt is reached. 
It is all easy if our troops march as well as the ene- 
my^ and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. 
This letter is in no sense an order. 

"Yours, truly, " A. LINCOLN. 

" Msj.-Oeil. McCLELIiAJ!." 

" HBASQrrABTBRs Akmt of thb Potomac, ) 

•' Camp ik Pleasant Valley, Oct. 17, 1862. ) 

"Sir; Tour letter of the 13th inst. reached me yesterday 
momiflg, by the hands of Col. Peikins. 

" I had Bent oat strong reconuoissances, early in the morn- 
ing, in the direction of Charlestovm, Leetown* &o., and^ as 
sharp artillery firing wa<i heard, I felt it incumbent to go to 
the front. I did not leave Charlestown until dark, eo that I 
haye been unable to give to your Excellency's letter that fuU 
and re'pectful consideration wliich it merits at my hands. 

" I do not wish to detain Col. Perkins beyond this morn- 
ing's train. I tberefore think it best to send him back with 
this simplo acknowledgment of tha recei^Jt of your Eicel- 
lency's letter. I am not wedded to any particular plan of 
operations. I hope to have, to-day, reliable information as 
to the position of the enemy, whom I still believe to bo be- 
tween Bunker HUl and Wiuchester. I promise you that I 
will give to your views the fullest and most unprejudiced 
consideration, and that it ia my intention to advance the mo- 
ment my men are shod, and my cavalry are sufficiently reno- 
vated to be available. ■ 

" Your Excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a 
conree which differs at all from your views, without lirst 
fully expliiiiing my reasons, and giving y°^ time to issuo 
•och Instructious as may seem best to you. 

•' I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant. 

•■GEO. B. iMcCLELLAN, 
" Slajor-General United States Army. 

" Hii £zcellouc7 the Fbesiuest." 



MORE RE-EXPORCEMENTS WANTED. 
Gen. McClellan continued to ask for ro-enforce- 
meuts — for horses — saying that the issue to his army 
was only 150 per week; and for clothing, stating 
that his army needed shoes and other articles' of 
clothing, and " bad for some time past been suffering 
for tbe want of it," and that ho was "constrained to 
believe that it was in a great degree owing to the 
want of proper action on the part of the Quartermas- 
ter's Department." The subject was referred to the 
Quartermaster-General, and he was called upon for 
a statement in regard to the matter. There was 
much correspondence upon the subject between Gen. 
Halleck, Gen. McClellan, and Gen. Meigs. The re- 
sult of the examination is fully stated in the follow- 
ing communication of the Secretairy of War, of the 
27th of October, and the reply of Gen. Halleck, of 
the 28th of October: 

m'clellan's misrepresentations. 

" Wab Dfpaktmest, ) 

" AVashington City, Oct. 27, 18C2. } 

"Obnbsal: It has been publicly stated that the arm; 
under Gen. McClellan has been unable to move, during the 
fine weather of this Fall, for want of shoes, clothing, and other 
supplies. You will please report to this Department upon 
the followmg points: 

" First : To whom, and in what manner, the requisitions for 
supplies to the army under Gen. McClellan have been made 
since you assumed command as Ceneral-in-Chief; and whether 
any requisition for supplies of any kind has since that time 
been made upon the Secretary uf War, or communicatiou had 
with him, except through you ? 

" Secovd ! If you, as General-in-Chief, have taken pains to 
ascertain the condition of tbe army in respect to the supplies 
of shoes, clothing, arms, and other necessaries ; and whether 
there has been any neglect or delay, by any Department or 
Bureau, in filling the requisitions ior supplies; and what has 
been, and is, the condition of that army, as compared with 
other armies. In respect to supplies 1 

"Third: At what date, after the battle of Antletam, the 
orders to advance against the enemy were given to Gen. Mc- 
Clellan, and how otten have they been repeated? 

"Fourth: Whether, in your opiuion, there has been any 
want in the army under Gen. McClellan of shoes, clothing, 
arms, or other equipments or supplies, that ought to have pre- 
vented its advance against the enemy when tho order was 
given t 
_ " Fifth : How long was It after the orders to advance were 
given to Oen. McClellan bsfore be Informed you that any 
shoes or clothing were wanted in his army, and what are his 
means of promptly communicating the wants of the army to 
you, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department? 
" EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Seciotary of War. j 

"Maj.-Gea. Haixxck, Oeneral-in-Cbief." ; 

" Washinqtoit. Oct. 28, 1862. ■ 

"Srs: In reply to the several Interrogatories contained is 
your letter of yesterday, I have to report: 

"First: That requisitions for supplies to lh« army under 
Gen. McClellan are made by bis staff-officers on the chiefs of 
bureaus here; that is, for Quartermaster's supplies by hia 
Chief Quartermaster on the Quartermaster-General ; for Com- 
missary supplies by his Chief Commissary ou the Commis- 
sary-GeneroJ, Uo, No such requisitions have been, to my 
knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none cpon 
the General-in-Chief. 

" Sec(md: On several occasions Gen. McClellan has tele- 
graphed to me that his army was deficient ia certain supplies. 
All theso telegrams were immediately referred to the heads of 
bureaus, with orders to report. It was ascertained that in 
every instance tlie requisitions had been immediately filled, 
exceot one, where the Quartermaster-General had been 
oblieed to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, 
tents, &.O., not haviug a full supply here. 

" There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neg- 
lect or delay In any department or bureau in iosning all sup- 
plies asked for by Gen. McClellan, or by the officers of his 
staff. Delays lave occssionaUy occurred in forwardim snp- 
plies by rail. On account of the crowded condition of the de- 
pots cr of a want oi cars; but whenever notified of this, agents ' 
have been sent out to remove tho difficulty. Under the ex- 
cellent tuperinteudcnco of Gen. ilaupt I think these delays 
have beeu less frequent and of shorter duratiou tliau i^ usual 
with freight trains. Any army of the size of that of Gen- 
McCIellan will froquen'.ly bo far somo days without tho sup- 
plies asked for, on account of no^lect in ma^;ing timely requi- 
sitions, and unavoidable delays iu farwarJiug them, and ia 
distributing them to tho diliereni brigades ead regiments. 
From oU tbe information I can obtain, 1 am cf tho opinion 
that the requisiticus from that army have been iil'eJ'more 
prompt y. and tliat ttio men, as a general rule, l;avo been. 
better supplied than our armies operating in the West. The 
latter havo operated at much greater dibtarices from the 
sourcesof supply, and have had far less facilities for transpor- 
tation. In hut', 1 btliovo that no armies in tho world, wtiilo 
in campaign, h.;vo been more promptly or better supplied 
than ours. 

" Third: Soon after tho battle of Antieiam Goa. JlcClellan 
was urged to give me information of his intended movementii 



22 



In order that, If Ls moved between the enemy and WasWng- 
toir, re-enforcements coul J be eeut Irom thii place. On the 
let of October, iimlina that he proposed ta operate from 
Earper'a Ferry, I urged Litn to cross the river at cuco aud 
givebattls to the enemy, pointing out to him ihe disadvan- 
tage of delayin;; till the autumn rains had cwollen the Poto- 
mac mi impaired the roads. On tlie Cth of Oct 'ber ho was 
peremptorily ordered ' to crosi the Potomac and give battle to 
the enemy, cr drive him Bouili. lour army ?Kas( move uow 
■while tae roads ate good.' It v-iil be cb-erved that three 
■weeks have elapsed since this order wa? given. 

"Fourth: la my opinion there has been no such want of 
■sapplieain tlie army under Guu. WcCIellau as to prevent his 
•compliance v.ith the orders to advance against tbo enemy. 
Had he moved to the eouth eido of the Potomaa he conld 
have received hi^i supplies alffiO:it as readily as, by remBimng 
inactive, on tbe north Bide. 

"Fifth: On the 7th of October, in a telegram 5n regard to 
his intended movements, Gen. McGlelian stated that it wou'd 
require at least tliree days to supply the First, Fifth and Sixth 
Corps; that they needed eboes end other indispensable 
articles of clottiing, as well as shelter tents. No complaiut 
wes made that any requisitions had not been filled ; aad it was 
inferred from his langoage tbat he was only waiting for the 
dlstribu'-ion of hia supplies. 

" On the ll:h he telegraphed that a portion of hia suppliei, 
sent by rail, hud been delayed. As already ttated, agents 
were immediately ssnt from here to investigate this complaint ; 
and they reported that everything had gone forward. On the 
same date (ihe nth) he cpi-ke of many of his horses having 
broken down by fatigue. On the 12th he complaiDalhat the 
rate of supply was only 150 horses per weekfor the entire 
army, there end in front of Washington, I immediately di- 
tscted the Qjartermaiter-General to inquire into this matter, 
and to report why a larger ijumber was tot furnished. Gen. 
Meigs reported on the 14th that the average issue of horses to 
Gen. I.lculellin's army, in the field and ia front of Wa6.iing- 
ton. for tbe previous bis v.'eefes, had been 1,453 per weei, or 
8,754 ill all; in addition, that a large number of mi.Ieshadbeeu 
supplied; aud that tie cumber of aoiaials with Gen. McClel- 
lan's army, on the Upper i'otomao, was over 31,000. He a!so 
reported that he was then sending to the army all the horses 
he cojid procure. 

"On ibe ISth Gen. McClelian Etates, in regard to Gen. 
Meigs's report, (hat he had filled every rtquiaition for eaoea 
and clothing: ' Gen. Meigs may have ordered those articles to 
be forwarded, but they have not reached cur depors ; tud un- 
less greater effort to insure promi-t tiansmissio:) ismade by 
the departmentcf whichGen. lileigj istho head, they might 
CBWellremsiu in New-York or I'hiladelphia, bo far as this 
army is conccrnsd.' I immediately called Gen. Meigs's atten- 
tion t J this cppareut neglect of Lis department. On the 25tti 
he reported, as the result of his investigation, that 43,tOJ pairs 
of boits end shois had been received by the quartermaster of 
Oen. licClellan's erniy at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and 
Hajerstovvn; that 20,(J09 pairs were at Ilarper's lerry depot 
on the 21st; that 10,€U0 more were on their way; end lo.OOO 
mora ordered. Col. I galls, aide-de-camp end chief quarter- 
master to Gen. lUcClellan, telegr&phf d on the 25th : ' Toe suf- 
fariag for want of clothing is exiggerated 1 think; and cer- 
tainly might have been avoided by timely lequisitioas of regi- 
mental end brigade qjarieimasters.' On tuo 21th he tele- 
graphed to the quartermaster-goneral that: 'the clothing was 
notdetainedia the cars at tae depots; Buch compli.nts are 

froaadless. Ihefacti-, the clothing arrives and is issued ; 
nt more is stilt needed. I have oideied more than would 
seem usees ary from any d .ta farnished me ; end I beg to re- 
mind you that you Lave elHraysvcry jr-.mptly met all ruy 
requisitions as far as clothing is coiiceiued. Our derartment 
isnot atfault. It provides as soon as due notice is givoo. 1 
foresee r:o time when an army of over 100, COO men will not 
call for clothing aad other articles.' 

"In regard to Gen; IvlcCIellan's means of promptly commn- 
cicating the wants of Iris army to mo, or to the p-oj^er bureaus 
of the \Var Departmaut, I repeat that, in addition to the ordi- 
nary mails, he has been in hourly communication with Wash- 
ington by telegraplv 

"It is due to Gen. Meigs that I ehouiasu'bmit herewith a 
copy of a telocram received by him from Gen. l^icCieUm. 
(See documeuls.] 

" \ ery lespeclfally, your oliedient servant, 

" H. \V. UALLKGK, General-in-Chief. 

" Hon. Edwitt M. Staston, Stcretiry of War." 
M'CLELLAN STlLh DCLAYS. 

On Oct. 21, Gen. McClsllan iaforms Gen. flalleck 
that he has nearly accomplished eunplying his army 
with the clothiDg absolutely necassary'l'oi' mirching. 
He complains, however, of his want of cavalry, and 
concludes: 

" Without more cavalry horsss cnr commnnica'.icns, fram 
themomcnt we march, vroulJ be at the mercy cf tuo large 
cavalry fore J of the enemy, audit would not bo pos^iule for 
ui to cover our flanks propsr'y, or to obtain the necessary in- 
formation of the position end moveme::t3 of the cuemy iu 
each away as to insure success. My experience Lisshos-n 
the necessity of a large aud tCicIect cavalry foice. Under the 
foregoing circumstances, 1 be^- leave to ask whether the Presi- 
dent Ucoires me to march on the tnemy at once cr to await 
the reception of the new horses, every possible stop having 
been taken to insure their prompt anival." 

, To this Gon. Hnlleck replies on tlio same day, at 
13:30 p.m.: 



" Your telesram of 12 m. has been enbmilted to the Preri 
dent. He direcisme to Bay thathe has iioc,hangB to makelu 
his order of the (ithiu^t. If yoo have not b rtn, andaienoi 
now, in condition to obey it, jou will be able to b'io*- such 
want of ability. 'Ihe Piesidei.t does not expect impossibili- 
ties, but is veryanxicBs that all taia good , weather should 
not be wasted iu inactivity." 

On the 22d of October Gen. McClelian telegraphs: 

" Alter full consultation, I have decided to move upon the 
Jineindicatedby the President in his letter of the IShinst., 
and have accordingly taken steps to execute the movement. 
1 will inform you, from time to tiaie, of thu occupatioa of 
Leesburg, Uihsborough, Suickersviilo, tc. I shall need all 
the CLvalry and other re-enforcements yon cau send me from 
VVashicgion." 

On the 23d Gen. Halleck replies: 

" Should you move as proposed in your te'legram of yester- 
day, I can send about 20,000 men from Washington to re-en- 
force you." 

ABOUT CAVALRY. 

On the 25fh of October Gen. McClelian transmite 
to Gen. Halleck a report of Col. Robert Williams, 
commanding a detachment of cavalry, in which it is 
stated that nearly half his horses are unsound, from 
" Bore tongue, gre::Be, and coneequoDt lamenesaand 
core backs," and that "the horses which are still 
sound are absolutely broken down from fatigue and 
want of flesh." 

To this the President replies to Gen. McClelian 
on tbe same day: 

_ " 1 have just read year dispatch about sore tongue and fa- 
tigued horses. Will jou i^ardon me for asking what the 
hortea of your aimy have <lone since the battle of Antietam 

that fatigues auy thing?" 

Gen. McClelian replies on the same day: 
" In reply to your telegram of this c'ate, I have the honor to 
Btate, from the tim3 this army leit Washiigtoj, outhe7thof 
September, luy c.valxy lias beta constoully em plaj-ed in mak- 
ing recoanoijEaiices, scouting Bud picketing, hiiuce the battle 
of Antietam sis regiments have made a trip cfrOO miles, march- 
ins 55 milts iu one day, while endeavoring to reach fctuarl'8 cav- 
alry. Gen. riaasancoo, ia his official repoit, etates that he, 
with theremaicder of cur aviilible cavalry, -ivhiieon Stuart's 
track, marched 73 wiles its 24 Kours. Beside these two re- 
markable expeditions, our cavalry has been tugaged in picket- 
ing a:id tcouting 150 miles of river front since the battle of 
Aniietam, audhis ma^e repeated reconuois^ances eincethat 
time, engaging the enemy on every occasion, and, indeed, it 
has performed InrJor teivice tiuce the battle than before. I 
beg that you will also consider that this eame cavalry was 
brought from the peniasul', where it encuateredm'ost la- 
hotio as service, aid wa3,fttho commencemeMt of this cam- 
paign, in low coudiiion, and from that lime to the preeeuthas 
£adrioiim3to recruit. If any instance can be fou id where 
overworked cavalry has perlormed more labor than mine 
Bincj the battle of Antle'am I am uot conscious of it." 
The following is the reply of the Preeident: 
" Yours, in leply ti mine, about horees, received. Of 
couric, joa know the facts bf Iter than I. titiil, twoconiidera 
tions remain: Stuart's cavalry cuiuiarchcd ours, havini» cer- 
taiuly done moie marked eerviee on the peninbula atd every- 
where tince. Secondly, rrill iiot a n.ovemtnt of our army 
be a relief to the cavalry, compelling the enemy to concen- 
trate instead of 'foragiug' ia fcquuds everywhere?" 

MORE BI£N AVANTED. 

On the 27th of October, Gen. McClsllan tele- 
graphed to the President : 

•' Your excellency is aware of the very great redaction of 
numbers that has ta^cn place inmost of the old regiments of 
this command, end how i.eceEsary it is to fid up these skele- 
tons beiore taking them cguin into action, I have the^ionor, 
thercloro, to request that tho order to fill up the old regiments 
with diafced ftieu may at once be issued." 

To this the President replies as follows on the 
same day: 

" Y'our'dispa'ch of 3 p. m. of to-day. in regard to filling np 
oldrcgiments with dratted men, is received, and tae request 
tliere.n shall Le complied with as far as praciicable. 

"Audnowlas^ adistinct answer to taeqnes.iun: Is it yonr 
pmrpose liot t) go into action agiin uatil the tLeu now being 
dratied iu the States are iacorpoiated iu the old legimenta}" 

The follawiog is Gen. McClcllan's reply — after re- 
ferring to provioua commuuicatijns iuroialion to fill- 
ing r.p the old regiments, he e::Ts: 

" Iu tha press of business, I then called an aide, 
and tc ling him 1 had conver,3cd with you upon the 
Bubject, I directed Lim to write for me a, dispatch, 
asking your excellency to Lave tbe ijecsseary order 
given. 'l regret to say that this officer, afcer writing 
the dispatch, finding iae ttill engaged, tent it to the 
telegraph office witiout first tubmittmgit to me, 
under the impreeaioa that be had coxumtmicated my 



23 



viewsi He, however, unfortariately added, ' before 
taking them into action again.' Thisptiraso was not 
autbonzedor intended Lyme. It baa conveyed al- 
together an erroneous impression as to my plans and 
intentions. To yourexcelltiucy'B qiiestioa I answer 
distinctly that 1 have not Lad any idea of postponing 
the advanco until tba old regiments are filled^ by 
drafted men. I commenced crossing tho army into 
Virginia yesterday, and shall pusli forward as rap- 
idly aa poesiblo to endeavor^ meet the enemy." 

Your Committee would say tliat, in their opinion, 
a staff officer who could, from negligence or other 
cause, add to a dispatch from the General command- 
ing an army to the President, that which " "was not 
authorized or intended," should at least ba assigned 
to some other duty. 

m'clellas takes four weeks to cross the 
potojiac. 

The movement of the army across the river, which 
was commenced upon the 2t)th of October, continued 
elowly, until on the 5th of November Gen. McClel- 
Ian announced to the President that the last corps 
of his aamy finished crossing on the 3d of Novem- 
ber, ^'wsi/oMr weeks from the time the order to cross 
was given. 

In the letter to tbo President, of the 17tli of Oc- 
tober, Gen. McClellan writes: 

" Your Excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a 
course whicli diflerg at all from your views witbout first fully 
eipluiniog my reasons aad giving you time to issue inch in- 
itruotious a3 may eeem best to yoa." 

THE END OP M'CLELLAX. 

Gen. McClellan was relieved from the command 
of tne Army of the Potomac, in pursuance of tie 
following orders: 

"Hbadquarters of the Armt, J 

" Washington, D. C. Nov. 5. 1863. J 
" Geitbsal: On receipt of the order cf the PresiJent, sent 
herewith, you will imme lately tura over your coinmaod to 
Major-CJen. Burnside, and repair tJ Trenton, Mtjw-Jersey, 
repotting on your arrival at that place by teli'grapU forfuithcr 
orders. Very respecti'ully. your obedient fervaut, 

'• H. W. HALLECK;, Gei,eral-in-Chief. 
" Major-Gen. McCtBLLAN, Commandicz, iic, tc." 

"Wae Depautment, Adjutjut-General's Ofpicb, l 

" Washikgto^j, Mov. 5, 1862. 5 

" General Orders, No. Vi2. — iSy diteciion of the Pret^i- 

dent of the United States, it is ordered that Maicr-Ooc. 

McClellan be relieved Irom the commaisd of the Army cf tie 

Potomac, and that Major-Gen. Burnside take ihe command of 

that army. 

" By order of the Secretary of War. 

" E. D. TOWNSEl^U, Assistant Adjutant-General." 

OPERATIONS UNDER GEN. BUUNSIDE. 

Upon assuming command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, Gen. Burnside at once determined to follow 
tho line of operations which ho had previoasly en^- 
gested to Gen. McClellan ; that is, to make Fred- 
ericksburg th3 base of bia operations. He assumed 
commandon the 7,h or 8ih of November, and on tho 
9lk forwarded to Washmsjtou bid proposed plan of 
operations. On the 12th cf November Gen. Ualleck 
came to Warrenton, and, with Gen. Meigs, had a 
conversatioji with Gen. Btu-aeido upoa tlae future 
movements of the army. 

Gen. Burnside stated that his plan was "to con- . 
centrate the army in the neighborhood of Warren- 
ton; to make a small movement across th6 Rappa- 
hannock, aa a feint, wiih a view to divert ibo 
attention of the enemy, end lead them to believe 
that we were going to move in the direction of Gor- 
donsville, and then to mako a ra^id movement of tho 
who!e army to rredciitksburg;" for th6 reason 
that " we would all the timo be a^ near Was'ingti.u 
as would the enemy, and alter ai-riving at Fredi r- 
ioksburg we would bo at a point nearer to Kich- 
mond than we would bo even if we should tuko 
Gordocsvilie." 

THE PONTOONS — WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THEIR DELAY? 

Gen. Burnside des.red to have provisions and 
forage, together wich pontoons to enable tho army 
to cross tbe IJappahanuock. Gen. Mci'^a testihca 
that while at Warrenton ho wrote an order to Gen. 
Woodbury, in Washington, to call ou tbo Quarter- 
master at Washington for transpoitalica for the 



poutoous to Acqnia Creek, which order Gen. Ilalleck 
signed, and it was sent off to the telegraph otlicc. 
WOODBURY S.\Y3 HE WAS NOT. 
Gen. Woodbury states that be received tiat order 
on the morning of tho 13th of Nov. He testifiee : 

"Gen. ITallecVs order ti me of the 13th maJjit epi irent 
that the army was preparing to march to Krederick-'ii' ;. As 
to the tiaie when tiiu moviujei.t wonl I ba made I n.r re- 
ceived ai y inform, tior. Fedrinj, hovVever, Ibit tLiLjove- 
mout wo lul b jprnciijititc Iwe ttj Goa. riall<?c^;' j o/ilce, 
an 1 urged hii:i to delay tlia movorae'.:t B'Jiu^j fivod<ys, i.j ordtr 
that Ilia necessary in'P'.ritions mi^Lt bd made ti iusurd 
succes'. To thii he roytieJ ihit ho woiiU d» no hiu.{ to 
dtUy f.ir a:» iustart tho uJvii ce of thj eruiy on K-ch- 
moud. I r(j^i^eJ tkat m/ sugsestioi was in.t inteadedto 
cause dolny, but rather to pn-veiiti'. In rnakiug thisfti^ses- 
tioD I hat reference utt only to the pontoon trffin, but the 
landings etill to bo created for the Quorttrmastei aiiJ Coa.- 
missoiy Departments." 

HALLECK SAYS HE WAS NOT. 

Gen. Ualleck testiiies: 

"I will state that all tho troops in Wa^hin^ton and its vi- 
cinity were under tie command of Gen. jVlcCle'lan whaa he 
was relievec", and lo issued his oiders directly to the com- 
mandicg otScer of Washington, with ona siiiglortistr ction: 
that no trcops should be mored from tho comojaaJ cf Wash- 
ington until I was notihtj, by Gen. McClella'i or the com- 
manding officer hero. In all other respeeti they were lU nn- 
der hia direction. Gen, Burnsi e, when ho relieved him, >vaj 
told that tbey remained precisely tio Bamoai Ijffore. O.i my 
visit to Gen. Burnside, at Wairenton, on tho 12th cf Novem- 
ber, in speaking about tho boats a.id thini^s that ho required 
from here. I repeated to him that they were all subj-etto bis 
orders with tliat s-ugle exception. To prevent the necessity 
cf the comniaudiBg oflicrr hero reporting the order lor the 
boats here, the order was drawn up upon Lii table, andbigned 
by me, directly to Get. Woodbury, on tl;o eVcniigof the 
12th, I think — iho eveuieg that 1 was there. I bj'V Gen. 
Woodbury on my return, and ha told me ho had recsived the 
crder. I coldbim that in oil these matters he w^s under Gen. 
Burnside's direction, I had nothing further to give hiai, ex- 
cept to C3mmunicate that order to him. la conversition with 
him and Gen. Meigs, it was proposed that tlie train of pon- 
toons should go down by laud, as they could be gotten down 
sooner in that way, without iLterleriiig with the sipcliea 
which had to be sent to Acquia Creek. 1 give no other order 
or direction iu relation to the matter than that aU other mat- 
ters were ucder Gen. BurnBide's directlcu. iJe al=o iufcrmed 
me, while at Warrenton, tbat Capt. Duaiie, Chief of tho Engi- 
neers, had uUo sent an order to Harper's Ferry for tho pon- 
toon train there to go down. The oidtr had been i.?sued. 
They being under Gen. Burnside's iuimediato and direct com- 
mand, I did nut iiiteilere at ail in relation to them. 

" Question. Do jou ku^w whether there was any delay in 
starting them, or iu their progress there 1 

"Answer. I heard tbttihero was a delay from tbe steam- 
ers getting aground with the pontoons ; and there was a delay, 
as I understood, in tho train guitig down by hud, oa account 
of the ditliciiUy of the road?, and tbo incijieiience, perhaps, 
of the oihceis in comn)ai:d, and it had to be laken by water 
part of the way ; it could Ett g< t get throug'r by liud. I con- 
sidered, from the reijotts I rectived, that these delaj a resulted 
mainly from aCL-ident and the elements, that no mail had any 
COiitr. 1 over. Gt^ii. BurusiJo teltgrayhed to me iu relation to 
Gen. Woodbury. tLiukinj that ho had not used due diliijtuce ; 
but afterward lol 1 m) ha was perloctl/ tatisUed with what 
Gou. VVooubiiry had done, aud tli^tho did net know but what 
tho commanding oliicer of tho train that went down had dene 
his duty also; that to v/as disjioied to malio no further ia- 
vestigaticn cf that matter ; that ho was pretty well butietied. 

" Question. W&s there any lequest for you to delay tbo 
advance cf the mcu uutU tho boats arrived, or anything cf 
that kind 1 „ ^, , 

"An=wer. No, Sir. I remember thi->, tbat Gen. Wood- 
bury, in conversation with me, said tiiat Gen. Curnside could 
net get down fur several days alter I told him, and that ha 
could not land the boats unt.l Gei!. Bu.nside arrived; 1 think 
I remarked to hiia that I did not know tiactly tho day w hen 
Gen. Bujnsldo would move; but 1 iculd uttttllliim, as the 
General did not know liiajstr'. \Vl;ilo I was at Wanea'.onha 
proposed this movement, and bo was directed to niika ail 
preparations for it, but not lo becii it until tho President 
w.'s coasukcd. I returiied.cn tiio\fternocu of tlio 13th, and, 
1 tLirk, on tLo morninjif tho 14ih, I had a i iiite.view with 
tl.o I'leiiJpnt, ia which ho consented lo Gen. LiiruEide's 
plan», audli umeJiately telegvapbedto him togi ahead as ho 
had proposed. I u'.;der»tooJ that there was con^iderablo 
deiay in getting the hosts from Acq;iia djwu totbo Kappa- 
hanuock Ilivtr, on account of tho bad rjads, d.tficulty of 
transportation, ioc, but no other delay thnn that wliic J witdd 
iiatuia ly occur tvtr a roujh country li..e that; aud acci- 
dental delay iulajiig il'-o b.idges was leportrd ta mo, from 
the inexperieute cf tho pouionieri wuo laid tho upper 
bridges; there was con iderabla delay in that. N.'ocoalJuot 
oomoienca the lejiair cf tho riiiroad until Gi-n. Turn. iJetook 
possession of it. asit wasall in the possetsicnof thoenemy. 
'Xhat was unJerotocd between him and Geu. L-iatipt, ia my 
pietonce. Gen. lJauj;t webtout with mo tou-ako the ar- 
rangement for repiiriug the roads as early as posbible. I re- 
member the conversation ; he could n.t land anything, but 
would have everytlilog dcwn riaoy aa soon ci he could, am£. 



24 



when he found Gen. Baineldo wna in poBseEsion, be wc^ild 
commence." 

BURNSIDE EVIDENTLY WAS NOT. 

Gen. Bumside testifies in relation to the forward- 
ing of the pontoons: 

"• I understood that Gen. Halleck was to give the necessary 
orders, and then the oiScers who should receive those orders 
were the ones respoasible for the pontoons coming here 
(Fredericksbura). IcoulJhave carried out that part of the 
plan through oflieers of my own; hut, having juBt taken the 
command of an army with which I waa but little acquainted, 
it waaeviJent that it wai as much as I could attend to, with 
the assistance of all my cfQcers, to change its position from 
Warrenton to Fredericksburg; and I felt, indeed I expected, 
that all the parts of tlie plan which were to he executed In 
■VVashiugton would be attended to by the officers at that 
place, under the direction of the difterent departments to 
which those parts of the plan appertained. 

"Question. Did you or not understand that you yourself 
were to be responsible for seeing that those orders were car- 
ried out ? 

"Answer. I did not. I never imagined for a moment that 
I had to carry out anything that required to be done in Wash- 
ington." 

On the l€th of November Gen. Bamside started 
the columns of his army from Warrenton to Freder- 
icksburg, not having hsard anything of the delay of 
the pontoons from Washington. The telegram an- 
nouncing the delay did not reach Gen. Bumside 
ontil the 19th of November. The corps of Gen. 
Sumner was in the advance, and it was the intention 
that he should cross over to Fredericksburg and take 
possession of the place. But the non-arrival of the 
pontoons in time prevented the movement which 
had been contemplated, and necessitated the adop- 
tion of other measures. 

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 

Gen. Bumside then began to make preparations 
for another movement, bringing up the pontoons as 
rapidly as possible, to enable his forces to cross the 
river] 

The plan determined npon was to cross the river 
at two points; the right wing to cross opposite Fred- 
ericksburg, and the left wins: to cross from three to 
four miles below the city. The left wing was com- 
posed of the Left Grand Division, with a corps from 
the Center Grand Division, making a force of from 
50,000 to 60,000 men, the whole being under com- 
mand of Maj.-Gen. Franklin. The crossing was 
made successfully at both points, but with much o^- 
position from sharpshooters on the right. 
PLAN OF BATTLE. 

Gen. Bumside states the following in regard to 
hisplan of attack: 

" The enemy had cut & road along in the rear of the line of 

tights where we made our attack, by means of which they 

connected the two wings of their army, and avoided along 

detour around through a bad country. I obtained from a 

colored man, from the other tide of the town, Information in 

regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted 

to obtain possession of that new roid, and that was my reason 

for making an attack on the extreme left I did not intend 

to make the attack on the right until that position had 

been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, 

cutting their line in two ; and then 1 proposed to make a 

direct attack on their front and drive them out of their works." 

ORDERS TO FRANKLm. 

' The following is the order to Gen. Franklin, who 

I -commanded the left : 

" Headquakteks Army op the Potomac, ) 
" December X3, 6:55 a. m. i 

" Gen. Hardie will carry this dispatch to yon and remain 
with you during the day. The general commanding directs 
that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid 
movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send 
out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to 
Beize,if possible, the hights near Capt. Hamilton's, on this 
Bide of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported, 
audits line of retreat open. He has ordered another column 
of a division or more to be moved from Gen. Sumner's com- 
mand up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph 
road, where they will divide, with a view to sei2ing the 
hiahts on both of those roads. Holding these hights, with the 
hights near Capt. Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy 
to evacuate the whole ridse between these points. He makes 
these moves by columns, distant from each other, with a 
view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own 
forces, which might occur in a general movement during the 
fog. Two of Gen. Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the 
bridges-, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instmc- 
tions to Ge-,19. Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to yon 
by an orderlv very soon. You will keep your whole com- 
mand in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. 
The watchword which, if possible, should be given to every 
eompany, will be ' Scott.' 



" I hftve the honor to be. General, very respectfully, your 
obedient servant, •• JOHN G. PAKKE, Chief ot Staff. 

•' Major-Gen. Fkankiin', Commanding Department, Grand 
Division Army of Potomac." 

FRANKLIN'S INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. 

Gen._ Franklin states, when last examined, that 
he received the above order at about 7:30 a. ni., and 
that he at once tookmeasurgs to carry out what he • 
considered to be the meaning of the order, that is, 
" an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy 
was." In his testimony, given when your Commit- 
tee were at Falmouth, he says: ''I put in all the 
troops that I thought it proper and prudent to put in. 
I fought the whole strengtli of my command, as far 
as I could, and at the same time keep my connection 
with the river open." 

FRANKLIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFEAT. 

From the testimony it would appear that the at- 
tack was in reality made by one of the smalleBt di- 
visions in Gen. Franklin's command — the division 
of Gen. Meade, numbering about 4,500 men. This 
division was supported cnits right by Gen. Gibbon's 
Division of about 5,0S0 men. On the left was Gen. 
Doubleday's Division, forming the extreme left of 
our line, nearly at right angles with Gert. Meade's 
Division, and extending to the river. Just as Gen. 
Meade's Division advanced to the attack. Gen. Bir- 
ney's Division, of Gen. Stoneman'e corps, numbering 
about 7,0u0, came up and took position immediately 
in rear of Gen. Meade. 

GEN. BIRNEY FAILS TO SUPPORT MEADE'S AT- 
TACK. 

The division of Gen. Meade succeeded in piercing 
the lirst line of the enemy, and gaining the crest of 
the hill. Gen. Gibbon, seeing Gen. Meade advanc- 
ing to the attack, ordered his division forward. Af- 
ter his last brigade had advanced, driving the enemy 
with the bayonet, and he was preparing his batter- 
ies to open upon a Rebel regiment that made their 
appearance on his left, Gen. Gibbon was wounded 
and taken from the field. Gen. Meade's division 
havingreached the crest of the hill, formed them- 
selves in the presence of the reserves of the enemy, 
who opened iire upon them in front, and they also re- 
ceived a fire npon" their flank. The superiority of 
the enemy was so overwhelming that Meade's divis- 
ion was forced back, as was also Gibbon's division. 
The enemy pursued until checked by Birney's divis- 
ion. Our forces continued to hold their position, 
without renewing the attack, until they were or- 
dered to withdraw across the river. 

The losses sustained in the attack, in killed, 
wounded, and missing, were as foLows: Meade's 
division, 1,760; Gibbon's division, 1,249; Birney'a 
division, 961. 

;^RANKLIN DISOBEYS A DIRECT ORDER TO 
ATTACK. 

Gen.- Bumside, npon hearing of the small force 
ordered to' attack the enemy, sent an order to Gen. 
Franklin to make a vigorous attack with his whole 
force. Several of the witnesses testify that had the 
attack been renewed with all the available force 
nnder Gen. Franklin's command it would have been 
Buccessful. Gen. Franklin testifies that it was not 
an order, but a request, and that when he received it 
it was too late to renew the attack, and therefore he 
did not do it. 

Gen. Franklin testifies as follows: 

" The order nnder which 1 was acting directed that the line 
of retreat should be kept open. It also directed that I should 
hold my trcopain positicn for arapiduiarcli down the Rich- 
mond road. I never dreamed that this was considered ana 
stroi;g attack at all, until since the battle took jlace. At that 
time X had no idea that it was the main attacli, but supposed 
it was an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy 
was. * * * * * * I was 

strensthened in this opinion by the staff officer who brought 
it, (the order). ******* 

''Question. Did yon not understand, from this order, that 
you were to use all the troops necessary to seize and hold the 
hights near Capt. fiamUton's, and that the General command- 
ing considered that that was necessary to be done in order to 
secure success? 

" Answer. No; I did not. I should suppose that the order 
would not have limited me to ' at least a division,' as the word- 
ing of it shown, had such been his intention ; and, besides, he 
directs me to keep my whole command in position to mora 



25 



along the old Richmond road. If ho had intended me to n^a 
my v.'hole force, if necessary, to hold thi;t bill, he hardly 
woald have coupled it with the condition to keep luy com- 
mandtn readiiifesa for this other moveaient. 

" QuostioQ. Was the other movement feaeible until after the 
poBseesion of thoso hights by our troops $ 

'•Answer. I think tbatthe other movement, if it had been 
ordered with my whole force, would have necessarily involved 
theposaession oif those bights. Had! been ordered to move my 
• whole force along the Richmond road, I should have been com- 
pelled to take all that would be found in the road, and those 
nights would hiva been in the road. 

"Question. As it was indiapenBable that we should have 
possession of tao»e bights in order to move down the old 
RichnKjmi road, and as you were ordered to send out at least 
one division to pass below Smithficld aod seize, if possible, 
those bights, did you not deem that tho order required of you 
that vou should, when repulsed in the firat attempt, renew 
the attack 1 

"Answer. I think it did ; but by the time tho Rebels were 
driven back into the woods by Bimey's division and Sickles'a 
division, it was past 3 o'clocE. It was dark, at that time, by 
6 o'clock, and it ^v as too late then to make each an attempt 
with the slightest hope of auocess." 

The testimony of all the witnesses before your 
Committee proves most conclusively t/iat, had the 
attack been made upon the left with all the force 
which Gen. Franklin, could have used for that pur' 
pose, the plan of Gen. Burnside would have been 
completely^ successful, and our army would have 
achieved a most brilliant victory. 

After the attack on Saturday, our army remained 
in position until Monday night, when it was with- 
drawn 8croB8 the river without loss. 

Your Committee have not coEsidered it essential 
to report upon the operations of the right wing of 
our army in this battle, for the reason that the suc- 
cess of the movement evidently depended to a very 
great extent upon the successful operation of the 
left. Although our troops on the right fought most 
gallantly, making repeated attacks, the strength of 
the enemy's position was such that our forces were 
compelled to retire. 

AFTER FREDERICKSBURG. 

On Jan. 26, 1863, tho following resolution was 
adopted by tho Senate, and referred to your Com- 
mittee: 

" liesolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
be instructed to inquire whether Major-Gen. A. E. Burnside 
has, since the battle of Fredericksburg, formed any plans for 
the movement of the Army of the Potomac, or any portion of 
the same; and if so, wnetUer any subordioate Generals of said 
army have written to or visited Washington, to oppose or 
Interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether 
such proposed mov«meat3 have been arrested or interfered 
with, and if so, by what authority." 

Under that resolution, your Committee proceeded 
to take the testimony of Major-Gens. A. E. Burn- 
aide and John G. Parke, and Brig. -Gens. John New- 
ton, John Cochrane, and William W. Averill. That 
testimony brines to Lght the iollowiug facts: 
'^BURNSIDE'S PLANS. 

Shortly after the battle ot Fredericksburg, Gen. 
Burnside devised a plan for attacking the enemy in 
hia front. The main army was to cross at a place 
Bome six or seven miles below Fredericksburg. The 
positions for the artillery to protect tho crossing 
•were aU selected, the roads were all surveyed, and 
the corduroy was cut for preparing the roads. At 
the same time a feint of crossing was to be made 
some distance above Falmouth, which feint could 
be turned into a positive attack should the enemy 
discover the movement below; otherwise the main 
attack was to be made below. 

A GRAND CAVALRY EXPEDITION. 

In connection vrith this movement of the main 
army, a cavah-y expedition was organized, consist- 
ing of 2,5u0of the best cavalry in the Army of the Po- 
tomac, 1,000 of whom were picked men. The plan 
of that expedition was as foUowa : Accompanied by 
a brigade of infantry detailed to protect the crossing 
of the Kappahannock, it was to proceed up to 
Kelly's Ford; there the 1,000 picked men were to 
cross, and to proceed to the Eapidan and cross that 
river at liaccoon Ford; then to go onward and cross 
the Virginia Central Kailroad at Louisa Court- 
Hcuse; the James Kiver at Goochland or Carter's, 
blowing up the locks of the James Kiver Canal at 
the place of crossing; cross the Kichmond and 
Lynmbxirg Kailroad at a point south of there, blow- 



id^ up tho iron-bridge at the place of crossing j croBj 
tho Kichmond. Petersburg and Weldon fiiilroad 
where it croisad the Nottoway River, destroying the 
railroad bridge there; and then proceed on by Gen. 
Pryor'd command, and effect a junction with Gen. 
Peck, at Suffolk, where steamers were to be in wait- 
ing to take them to Ac quia Creek. 

•To distract tue attention of the enemy, and de- 
ceive them in regard to which body of cavalry waa 
the attacking column, at the time tho thousand 
picked men crossed the Rappahaunock, a portion of 
tho remaining 1,500 was to proceed toward Warren- 
ton; another portion toward Culpepper Court- 
House ; and the remainder were to accompany the 
thousand picked men as far as Raccoon Ford, and 
then return. While this country expedition was in 
progress, the general movement was to be made 
across the river. 

On the 26th of December, an order was issued for 
the entire command to prepare three days' cooked 
rations; to have their wagons filled with ten days' 
small rations, if possible; to have from ten to twelve 
days' supply of beef cattle with them; to take 
forage for their teams and their artillery and cavalry 
horses, and the requisite amount of ammunition — ia 
fact, to be in a condition to move at twelve houra' 
notice. 

GENS. COCHRANE AND NEWTON TRY TO PRE- 
JUDICE THE PRESIDENT AGAINST BURN- 
SIDE. 

Shortly after that order waa issued Gen. John 
Newton and Gen. John Cochrane — the one com- 
manding a division and the other a brigade in the 
left Grand Division, under Gen. Wm. B. Franklin 
came up to Washington on leave of absence. Pre- 
vious to obtaining leave of absence from Gen. 
Franklin, they informed him and Gen. Wm. F. 
Smith that when they came to Washington they 
should take the opportunity to represeni to some 
one in authority here the dispirited condition of the 
army, and the danger there was in attempting any 
movement against the enemy at that time. 

When they reached Washington, Gen. Cochrane, 
as ha states, endeavored to find certain members of 
Congress, to whom to make the desired communica- 
tion. Failing to tind them, he determined to seek 
an interview with the President for the purpose of 
making tho communication directly to him. On 
proceeding to the President's bouse, be there met 
Secretary Seward, to whom he explained the object 
of his being there and the general purport of bia pro- 
posed communication to the President, and requested 
him to procure an interview for them, which Mr. 
Seward promised to do, and which ho did do. 
THE GENERALS PREVARICATE. 
That day the interview took place, and Grcn. 
Newton opened tho subject to the President. At 
first tho President, as Gen. Newton expresses it, 
"very naturally conceived that they had come there 
for the purpose of injuring Gen. Burnside, and sug- 
gesting some other person to fill his place." Gen. 
Newton states, that while ho firmly believed that 
the principal cause of the dispirited condition of the 
army was the want of confidence in tho mUitary ca- 
pacity of Gen. Burnside, bo deemed it improper to 
say so to the President " right square out," and 
therefore endeavored to convey the same idea indi- 
rectly. When asked if he considered it any less im- 
proper to do such a thing indirectly than it waa to 
do it directly, he qualified hia previous assartion by 
saying that his object was to inform the President of 
what he considered to be the condition of tho army, 
in the hope that the President would make inquiry 
and learn tho true cr.u .j lor himnelf. Upon perceiv- 
ing this impression upon the mind of the President, 
Gens. Newton and Cochrane state that they hast- 
ened to assure tho President that he wds entirely 
inistaken, and so far succeeded that at the close of 
the interview the President said to them ho was 
glad they had called upon him, and that he hoped 
that good would result from the interview. 
THE PRESIDENT INTERFERES. 

To letum to Geu. Banuddo. Tho cavalry ezp«» 



2G 



dition bad started I the brigade of infantry detailed 
to accompany it Lad croBsed the E.api)abaiinock at 
Richard's Ford and returned by way of Ellis's Ford, 
leaving the way clear for the cavalry to cross at 
Kelly's Ford. T be day they bad arranged to make 
the crossing Gea. Burn'side received from the Presi-, 
dent the following telegram: 

" I iiare good ri-^ason for baying that you must cot make a 
general movement witbuut letting me know of it " 

Gen. Barijtido sta'.es that lie could not imagine, at 
the time, what reaBou the President could Lave for 
sendiny him such a telegram. None of the officers 
of Lis command, except one or two of bis staif who 
bad remained la camp, bad been told anything of 
bis plan beyond the eimple fact that a movement 
was to be made. Ho could only suppose that the 
dispatch relaied in some way to 'important military 
movements in other parts ol the cauntry, in which it 
WHS necessary to have cooperation. 

THE CAVALRY HALTING. 

Upon tha receipt of that telegram, steps were im- 
mediately taken to bait the cavalry expedition 
where it then was (at Kelly's Ford) until further 
orders. A iJortiou of it was shortly afterward sent 
ofFtointercept Stuart, who bad just made a raid to 
Dumfries and the ceishborbood of Fairfax Court- 
Honse, which it failed to do. 

BURNSIDE COMES TO WASHINGTON. 

Gen. Barnaide came to Washington to aseertaia 
from the President the true state of the case. He 
was informed by the President that some general 
officers from the Army of tho Ir'otomac, whose numes 
be declined totjice, bad called upon bim and repre- 
sented that Gen. Burusids contemplated soon mak- 
ing a movem«mt, and that the army was so dispirited 
and demoralized that any attempt to make a move- 
ment at that lime must result ia disaster; that no 
prominent officers in the Army of tho Posomac were 
la favor of raiy movement at that time. 

Geu. Burns; ie iaformed the President that none 
of Lis ofiiccrs lad been informed what bis plan was, 
and then proceeded to explain it in detail to the 
President. Ha urged uywa the President to grant 
bim permission to carry it out, but the President de- 
clined to do 60 at that time. Gen. Halleck and Sec- 
retary iStanton were esnt for, and then learned, for 
the first time, of the President's actioa ia stopping 
the movement; although G.n. Halleck was pre- 
viously aware (hat a movement was contemplated 
by Gen. Burneide, Gen. Halleck, with Geu. Burn- 
side, held that the oincers who had made those repre- 
sentations to the President Ehould be at once dis- 
misoed the service. Gen. Burnside remained here 
at that time for two days, but uo conclusion was 
reached upon tho subject. 

HIS PLAXS KECOilE KNOWN TO THE REBELS. 

When he returned to bis camp be learned that 
many of the details of the general movement, 
and the details of the cavalry expedition, bad 
become known to the liebel sympathizers in Wash- 
ington, thereby rendeiing that plaa impracticable. 
Wlien asked to wkom he had communicated his 
plans, he stated that lie had told no one in Wash- 
ington, except the President, Secretary Stanton, 
and Goi. Halleck; aiid in his camp none knew of it, 
except one or two of his staff cjjicers, toko remained 
in camp all ike time. He prolessed himself unable 
to tell bow Lis plans Lad become known to the 
enemy. 

HE ASKS FOR ORDERS CUT GETS NONE. 

A correspondence then took place between the 
President, Gen. Halleck and Gen. Burnside. Gen. 
BurnsiJe desired distinct authority from Gen. Hal- 
leck, or Eomo one authorized to give it, to make a 
movement across the river. While urging the im- 
portance and necessity for such a movenient, he can- 
didfy admitted that there was hardly a general officer 
la Lis command wuo approved of it. While wilUng 
to take upon himself fill the responsibihty of the 
movement, and promising to keep in view the Presi- 
dent's caution concerning any risk of destroying ihe 
army of the Potomac, Le desired to Lave at least 
Gen. Halleck'a sanction or permiasioa to raake the 
moycment. Gen. Halleck replied that whib he had 



always favored a forward movement, he could not 
take ihe responsibility of giving any directions as to 
how and when it sl^uld be made. 

HE TAKES THE RESPONSIBILITY. ' 

Gen. Burneide then determined to make a move • 
ment without any further correspondence on the ^ 
subject. He was unaWe to devi^e'any as promising * 
as the one juet thwarted by this interference of his 
subordinate offivjers, which interference gave the ene- 
my t/ie time, if not the means, to ascertain what he 
had •proposed to do. He, however, devised u plan 
of movement, and proceeded to put it in executioa. 
As ia well known, it was rendered abortive in con- 
eequence of the esvere storm which took place 
shortly after the movemsnt began. 

Gen. Burnside states that, besides the inclemency 
of the weather, there was another powerful reason 
forabaniiouiag the movement, viz: the almost ai>i- 
versal feeling among bis general officers against it. 
Some of those officers freely gave veat to their feel- 
ings in the presence of their inferiors. 
GENERAL ORDER NO. 8. 

In conssquence of this, and also whatjiad taken 
p^ace dunng the battle of Fredericksburg, &.c.. Gen. 
Burnside directed an order to be issued, which he 
Btyled general order No. 8. 

That order dismisssd BJme officers from the ser- 
vice, subject to the approval of the President, re- 
lieved others from duty with the army of the Poto- 
mac, and also pronounced sentence of death upon 
some deserters who had been tried and convictea. 

Gen. Burnside states tiat he had become satisfied 
that it was absolutely necessary that some such ex- 
amples should 1)6 made, ia order to enable him to 
maintain the proper authority over the army uuler 
his command. Tne order was duly signed and ia- 
£ued, and only waited publication. 

Two or three of his most trusted staff officers rep- 
resented to Gen. Burnside that ehould be then pub- 
lish that order, be would force upon the President 
the necessity of at once eanctioniug it, or, by refas- 
ing his approval, assume an attitude of hostility, to 
Gen. Burnsid >. The publication of the order was 
accordingly delayed for tho time. 

THE PRESIDENT REFUSES TO SUSTAIN BURN- 
SIDE. 

Gen. Burnside came to Washington and laid the 
order before the President, with the distinct assur- 
ance that iu no other way could he exercise a proper 
commajid over the Army of the Potomac; and he 
asked the President to sanction the order, or accept 
Lis resi.^'nation as major-general. The President 
acknowledged that Gen. Burnside was right, but 
declined to decide without consulting with some of 
his advisers. To this Gen. Burnside replied that, if 
the President took tine for consultation, he would 
not be allowtd to publish that order, and therefore 
asked to Lave Lis resignation accepted at once. 
This the President declined to do. 

HOW BURNSIDE CAME TO BE RELIEVED. 

Gen. Burnside returned to his camp and came 
again to Washingtoa that night at' the request of 
the President, and the next morning called upon the 
President for his decision. He wai. informed that 
the President declined to approve Lis order No. 8, 
but had coacluded to relieve him from the command 
of the Army of the Potomac, and to appoint Gen. 
Hooker in Lis place. Thereupon Gen. Barnside 
again insisted that his resignation bo accepted. This 
the President declined to do; end, after some urgf- 
ing. Gen. Barnside consented to take a leave of ab- 
Bcuce for thirty days, with the understanding that 
at the end cf that time Le ehould be assigned to 
duty, as he deemed it improper to hold a commissioa 
as major-general and receive his pay without ren- 
dering earvice therefor. Gen. Burnside objectedto 
the wording of the order which relieved him from 
his command, and which stated that it was " at his 
own request," as being unjust to him and unfound- 
ed in fact; but upon ike representation that any 
other order would do injury to the cause, he con- 
sented to let it remain as it then read. 

Tho f jregoiug etatement of the facta proved, to 



27 



gether with tho testimony herewith Bubmitted, bo 
lolly and directly meet ibe req[uirenient8 of the 
resolution referred to them, that your_ Committee 
deem any comment by them to be entirely unne- 
cesaary. 

CONCLUSION. 

Yonr committee think it better to submit the leoti- 
mony wbich tliey have taken in relation to the con- 
duct of the war, without criticiam to any coneider- 
able extent of military plans or movements, leaving 
each reader to form his own conclaeions from the 
testimoDy, and such opinions of competent military 
men as h may contain. 

Aa they look back over the struggle of the past 
two years, tbev feel that although we have not ac- 
compliehed alltuat we hoped and expected within 
the time, b ill the great progress made gives us full 
assurance of final succeee. 

When the Government took its first active steps 
towai d resisting tbe Rebellion the Rebels had been 
for more than five months actively and openly 
making preparations to resist its authority and defy 
its jurisdiction. They bad usurped the control of 
the machinery of one State government after another, 
and thus overawed the loyal people of those States. 
They had even so far control of the Federal Govern- 
ment itself as to make it not only acquiesce, for the 
time being, iu measures for its own destruction, but 
contribute to that end. They had seized and taken 
into their porsession the arms and mvmitions of war 
of the government. They had scattered and 
demoralized the army, and sent the navy to the 
most distant parts of the world. 

There was treason in the Executive mansion, 
treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and 
the House of Representatives, treason in the army 
and navy, treason in every department, bureau and 
ofiBce connected with the Government. When the 
new Admimstratioa came into power it was neces- 
•arily obliged to adopt its measures wi.h toe greatest 
caution, searcely knowiug friend from foa. An army 
and navy bud to be created. There was scarcely a 
battidion of loyal national troops to protect the capi- 
tal; and the first sense of secuiity felt in the capital 
was wben the volunteer troops entered it, summoned 
from tbeir homes for its protection. At the same 
lime It was with great difficulty that the loyal peo- 
ple could make themselves believe that any serious 
reeistauce to tne authority of tbe Government ^ould 
be Bttemped. There were not wanting those who 
confidently asserted that it was but an outburst of 
disappointed partisan spirit, which they predicted 
would yield to aa exhib.tion of force, and a deter- 
mined and united spirit on tbe part of the people of 
the loyal States to suppress it. lustead of sucb an 
easy suppression, we have spent two years, almost, 
inwai'tare. We have thrown into tbe field a mil* 
lion of men. We have poured out our resources 
like water, and we find ourselves still engaged in 
the fearful struirgle. 

But the nation il cause is not tbe only one for 
which false anticipations were formed — lor which 
the present couditiou of thia:^8 presents a striking 
contrast with the early vicious of its supporters. 
Those who beard, in Cougress and elsewhere, the 
extravagances of tha coiibpirutors will know what 
were their hopes, wbat their expectations. 

A speedy march upon the capital; a epeedy over- 
throw of the legal Government; a speedy submia- 
sion of a people too pusillanimous ta miiiutain their 
lights; and a epeedy subjection of the whole country 
to tbe assumptions "of t!ia South, wertj the prominent 
features of tUeir delusion. 

Tbe conspirators taught their people to believe 
that if war came it would not be on tueir soil. As 
yet, the boa ile foot bus scarcely trod the soil of a 
ireo State, and ic is upon the stil of the States in 
open rebel iioa that the cOiitest has mainly been 
I waged. 

The Eebe's found themselves, almost without 
resistance, in possession of every fort and harbor on 
the sea-coast of the revolted States, except F«rt 
Pickens, Persacjla harbor, and the isolated fortiUca- 
jtlona and harbors of Tortugas and Key West. 



Tbey were, for the time beingr, maatera of tho terri- 
tory of the revolted States, of the depots, arsenabi 
and: fortifications of the Government, and had high 
hopes that all the slaveholding Border Statee 
would soon be united with them. The fact that so 
many of these Statea hold tu-day their true and 
loyal position in the Government clemonstratei that 
true patriotism and loyalty ia not confined to any 
section of the country, and gives full assurance 
that the Government will be maintained, its juris- 
diction over every foot of our territory established, 
and our nationality vindicated. 

The events of the past two years are too fresh in- 
the memories of all to require recapitulation. 

WHAT THE WAR HAS ACCOMPLISHED. 

Tour Committee will, however, briefly call 
attention to the fact that, from tbe commencement 
of active military and naval operations in the 
Winter and Spring of 1862, almost uninterrupted 
success for eight months attended all our operations, 
resulting in vast conquests. The triumphs of the 
navy at Hatteras, Port Royal and Fort Ilenry, 
were followed by the victories and conquest's of the 
army at Mill Spiiog, Port Donelson and Roanoke 
Island. Missouri was wrenched from the Rebel 
grasp, and tbe Rebel armies driven into Arkansas, 
where they were defeated in a pitched battle at Pea 
Ridge. 

By the capture of Fort Donelson Kentucky was 
permanently redeemed, the capital of one of the 
largest revolted States seized, her great rivers laid 
open to our floillas, and tbs war carried to the bor- 
ders of the Gulf States. Tbe Rebel stronghold on 
the Mississippi. Coltimbns, Island No. 10, Fort Pil- 
low, together with Mempbie, the mo^t important 
commercial city of the State, fell into our hands. 

Tbe autumn of 1861 had witue-sed the important 
capture of Hatieras and Port Royal by the navy. 
These successes were followed through tne combined 
Operations of the army and navy, in the Winter and 
Spring of 18G2, by the capture of Roanoke Island 
and Newbern, Beaufort and Fort Macon, and by 
the reduction of the important fort, Pulaski, con- 
trolling the entrance to tbe Savannah river; of Fort 
CUuch, controlling I he harbor an'l railroad depot of 
Fernaudiua; of Fort Marion, at St. Augustine. By 
the first-named operations we acquired control of the 
spacious inland waters of North Caiolina (Albemarle 
and Pamhco sounds), and their adjacent shores, and 
of one of her two important seaports — Beaufort. 
By the last, we made ourselves masters of the rich 
Beu iclauds and imporiaut harbors extending along 
the coast from Charleston to St. Johu's; le tving in 
the possession of the Rebels, on tlie Atlantic coast, 
but two harbors, Charestou and Wilojiogton. 

But the brilliant triumphs of our army and navy 
elsewhere were surpassed by the capture of the 
great city of the Gulf, the depot of the great Valley 
of the Mississippi — New-Orleans; an achiivement 
which, estimated by tbe importance of the conquest 
and the noble daring of its execution, is scarcely sur- 
passed in history. By this important conquest we 
obtained control of a large portion of Louisiana, and 
accoLLiplished the moit ituponant and diflicult step 
toward obtaining tbe entire contr.d of the Missis- 
aippi River, and caused the surrender of the harbor 
of Pensacola, with the forts yet held by the 
Rebels. 

In tbese hastily sketched military and naval ope- 
rations, extending in tt)e West through the States of 
Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee and Kentucky, and 
on the Atlantic seaboard from Hatteras to Florida, 
and on the Gulf from Pensacola to the mouths of the 
Mississippi, we really made conquests aa va^t as it 
often fails to tbe lot of the most powornil and war- 
like nations to maka in so short a period tf time. 
NVe pushed our conquests by land through Missoori, 
Kentucky and Tennessee to tbe very boundaries of 
tho Gulf Siates; obtai led control of tho Miasisrippi 
River, except about 20 J miles; occupitd the coasts of 
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia— ft' 
large portioa of Louisiana; seized every important 
fort and harbor in tho Rebel territory, save three 
(VVilojiugton, Charleston ad Mobile.) "n dutii'.g to a 



28 



corresponding extent the labors of the blockading 
Bijaadron; captured fourteen permanent sea-coast 
forts, among which were the largest on the South- 
ern coast, Buch as Pulaski, Barrancag, McRae, Jack- 
eon, and St. Philip. Following these conquests was 
the reduction of Torktown and the evacuation of 
Norfolk, by which the waters of the Jamea and 
York Eivera were laid open to our fleets, and the 
Hebels deprived of the facUities furnished by a great 
navy-yard, and compelledto destroy their only means 
of menacing our fleets in Hampton Eoads— the Mer- 
rimac. 

WHAT IVnGHT HAVE BEEN. 

) Had the success of the Army of the Potomac dur- 

l ing this period corresponded with the success of our 

"* arms in other parts of the country, there is reason 

to beheve that the termination of the campaign of 

1862 would have seen the Kebellion weU-nigh, if 

not entirely, overthrown. 

Had Norfolk been captured during the Winter of 

j 1861-62, and the Merrimac taken possession of or 

, destroyed, the way to Kichmoud, by means of the 

I James Kiver, would have been open, and the fatal 

I delays of the Peninsula avoided ; or had the enemy, 

i when at Manassas, some time during the Autumn of 

I 1861 or Wiater of 1861-62, have been compelled to 

come out from his iatrenchments and give us 

I battle, as he might have been, by threatening or 

I actually interrupting his commnnicaiion between 

i Eichmond and Mauaesas, on which he wholly de- 

j pended_ for supplies — a line so long and difficult to 

j maintain that we subsequently did not deem it 

I practicable for us — we could have met him with an 

j army greater than it was ever proposed to take 

! against llichmond, and either have opened the way 

' to Che £ebel capital or made it unnecessary to go 

there. 

In military movements delay is generally bad — in- 
decision is almost always fatal. In our movements 
we seem to have too olten forgotten that momentum 
is made up of weight andvdoatj/ ; that the force of 
the blow may depend as much upon the celerity of 
the movement as upon the weight of tee body moved. 
The world's history shows" that the successful 
General has met his enemy the day before he was 
expected — not the week' or month after. Some of 
our points of attack have been so clearly indicated 
to the enemy beforehand, and our movements made 
•with so much delay and hesitation, that he has been 
able not only to fortify his positions and concentrate 
his forces, but even to call into the field new armieB 
to meet us. At such points we have failed. 

It is particularly worthy of note that, in the re- 
verseB which followed the failure of the Peninsula 
campaign, at the time when the army of the IlebelB 
had reached its greatest strengch and its highest state 
of enthusiasm, they did not permanently regain any 
territory or recapture and hold any of the important 
or controlling points before held by us on Rebel soiL 
Their marches upon Washington, Maryland, and 
also Louisville, were little more than raids, from 
■which they were obliged to retire before our oppos- 
ing forces. This fact clearly shows that while it ia 
impobsible for us to constantly retain military pos- 
eession of all the vast Kebel territory over which we 
may be called upon to pass in our operations against 
their armies, still the territory once held or occupied 
by U3 cannoc be permanently regained by them — a 
sure indication ol our ultimate success. 

The past, notwithstandiug its errors and reverses, 
is full of encouragement, and gives full assurance of 
final success. No great war was ever conducted by. 

anjr people or Government without great mistakes 

giving to tho critics of the time and those of euc- 
ceeding generations a wide and ample field for their 
labors. No people on earth were ever called sud- 
denly into a great war more totally unprepared than 
were thp loyal people of this Government. We felt 
60 well assured of our position among the powers of 
the world that we had almost concluded we had 
fought our last battle, and our army and navy had 
come to be regarded by many as useless appendages 
to the Government. We had concluded that, doing 
justice to the nations of the world, we should re- 
ceive justice in return; and tho loyal portion of the 



people were devoting all their energies and powers 
to the arts of peace, the advancement of civiliza- 
tion, the development of the rich and varied re- 
sources of ournew and great country; and in these 
every man found full occupation for his talents and 
a wide field for bis ambition — no man ever dreaming 
that the parricidal arm would ever be raised against 
a Government so mild in its sway, so benignant La 
its influence over all its subjects. 

It was indeed difficult for a people thus engrossed, 
suddenly and almost without warning, to turn its 
attention to war. The Ethels believed us to be bo 
entirely devoted to the pursuits of peace that we 
should yield to their demands rather than be di- 
verted from them; and hence their nefarious at- 
tempt to overthrow this fair Government, and 
erect on its ruins that horrid deformity, a free Gov- 
ernment with human Slavery for its corner-stone. 
How terribly they Lave been mistaken, the past has 
already shown ; and yet the energies and powers 
and resources of the loyal people have hardly be- 
gun to be applied to the suppression of the Re- 
bellion. They must meet and contend in battle 
with that strength and power and intelligence 
which has built factories and workshops, railroads 
and steamboats, covered the ocean witti ships, and 
filled the markets of the world with the product of 
its brain and hands ; and they will find these no less 
powerful for destruction than for production, when 
once fully applied in that direction. 

All the great industrial intsrests of the loyal 
States were never more active, more prosperous, 
than at this time. All that has been lost by the 
supply of men to the army has been made up by in- 
creased activity and enei-gy, and the adaptation of 
machinery to woik heretofore done by the human 
hand. There is only this marked difierence: here- 
tofore all these great forces have been applied for 
the benefit of the arts of peace; now they all look 
primarily to the prosecution of war; and years 
would have lO elapse — far more than would be re- 
quired to crush out the Rebellion — before we should 
develop our full strength for war. 

Within less than two years we have thrown into 
and sustained in the field an army of a million of 
men. We hav« created a navy with which we have 
bio shaded a coast greater in extent than was ever 
attempted by any Government before, and by oar 
inventions and improvements so completely revolu- 
tionized naval warfare as to render the navies and 
eea-coast defenses of the world well nigh useless. 

The efficiency of this blockade is attested not only 
by the destitution of the Eebels in every article of 
foreign production, but by the cry that comes to us 
every day from all parts of the world, in any degree 
dependent upon the products of the blockaded terri- 
tory, stimuldting us to still greater exertion to crush 
out thi3 Rebellion, that the blockaded ports may be 
thrown open to the legitimate commerce of the 
world. 

And while, in our efforts to maintain our Govern- 
ment and vindicate free institutions, we neither 
asked nor desired the aid of any foreign nation or 
Government, we did at least expect of the leading 
Powers of Europe that they should refrain from ex- 
tending aid and encouragement to a Rebellion against 
a friendly Government, thereby prolonging a strug- 
gle which can only bring misery and suflering upon 
the whole civilized world, and may in the end lead 
to a war between our Government and some of 
those Powers, the full efi'ects of which the future 
alone can disclose. 

OUR RESOURCES. 

We have carried on. shall carry on and conclude 
this war, without touching one dollar of the accumu* 
lated capital of the country. We are already aston- 
ished at the revenue now being raised from the tax- 
ation of our daily productions, and yet we do not be- 
gin to realize the amount to be yielded by the syS" 
tem already adopted, or the extent to Wiiicli that 
system may be enlarged, without imposinar any 
grievous burdens upon the people— any burden to 
which they will not chserfally submit to accomplish 
the object intended, 

2^0 Government can long carry on a war which 



29 



must be suBtained by tbo accumulated capital of the 
country, and there ia Bcarcely a limit to the time war 
may be prosecuted by a. Government whose credit 
is Bustaiiied by the revenues derived from the accu- 
mulating wealth of the country. 

REBEL DEFICIENCIES. 

Every dollar the Rebels have espended or 
can expend i\ this Eebellion has been and 
must continue to be drawn from their accumu- 
lated capital. Their intercourse with foreign nations 
has been almost wholly suspended, all their indus- 
trial interests have been paralyzed, and there is no 
eource from which they can derive revenue or means 
tor the maintenauce of the war, except by depriving 
the people of their property, day after day, and 
year alter year, so long as the war shall continue, 
thus reducing them to poverty and want. This is 
a truth which tbe people in the revolted States are 
already beginning to realize. They bad been made 
to believd that an export duty on cotton, which the 
world would be obLged to pay, would yield them 
the ricbest revenue ever realized by a'.iy Go"vern- 
xuent, and that if the Federal Goveiuiucnt should 
attempt interference witli its exportation, they 
could command the armies and navies of Europe to 
iight their battles for ihem. How bitter must be 
their disappointment as thsy apply with their own 
hands the torch whicli consigns it to ashes, and then 
are compelled to supply to their leaders, from their 
other property, the means to sustain the Rebellion ! 
Their currency has almost ceased to be regarded, 
even by themselves, as the representative of value. 

Conscription has exhausted their people, and the 
wealth which long years of uninterrupted prosperity 
under the best government the world ever saw, had • 
placed in their hands, has already bean expended, 
and trey are now struggling on with the vain hope 
that distiensions among ourselves, or foreign interven- 
tion, may 6ave_ them from that ruin which they see 
clearly impending over them. Every day must show 
them mora and more clearly that on neither of these 
sources can they rely for help. The uttei- scorn and 
contempt with whicti every man in the l)j&l States 
who proposes any adjustment of this contest except 
the absolute, uuqualiliea, and unconditional subju- 
gation cf every Rebel in the land to the Constitution 
and the laws, is held by every officer and soldier in 
our army, and every loyal man in the country, UMist 
banish from thsir minds the last ray of hope from 
that source. The reactionwbich followed the recent 
slight manifestations of a wiilmgness on the part of 
a few Secession sympathizers to offer terms of com- 
promise must convince them that they have no allies 
in the loyal States on whom they can rely; and the 
present condition of aflaira in Europe must forever 
crush t^jat false and delusive hope which they have 
heretofore entertained, that the intervention of 
European powers might enable them to accomplish 
what" they know full well they can never attain un- 
aided. 

THE TASK BEFORE US. 

We now see clearly what we have to do. _ We 
must obtain uninterrupted control of the Missis- 
eippi. Wo must reach those great railroad arteries 
— the one bordering the Atlantic seaboard, the other 
etretchiiig through the Virginia and Tennessee val- 
leys to the went and south. We must, as soon as 
possible, take the few fortified seaports remaining 
in posstseion of the Rebels, cut it off from all ex- 
ternal sources of food and arms, and have surround- 
ed it by forces which can press upon it from any 
quarter, at the samo time severing mto isolated por- 
tions tUo Re eel territory and destroying their means 
of intercommunication, by which a'oue they Lave 
hitherto been enabled to meet us in force wherever 
we have presented ourselves, and by which alonei 
they have been able to feed and supply their armies. 

By poflseasing ourselves of, and keeping open, the 
great natural highways alone (and a posseesion of a 
navy by us should have early suggested this), we 
sever parts of their territory mutually dependent, 
and, while crippling thorn', enable ourselves to 
speedily concentrate our forces »t any point wher© 
it may be advicable to strike. 



These decisive measures we are actually execut- 
ing or preparing to execute. The Euccessea and con- 
quests we Lave alreadv described have carried ua 
through the preliminary stages, and the blows we 
now strike — each one of them that succeeds — will 
reach the very vitals of the Iltl:ellion. Let any one 
cast Lis eye upon tUe map, and these truths will be 
apoarent. 

It may be iu the future, as in the past, we shall 
meet with reverses: they are the inevitable inci- 
dents of a great war extending over so vast a terri- 
tory, and requiring great armies at so widely sepaj; 
rated points. Wo Lave already seen that ic is noi- 
our true j)olicy to attempt an actuil military occu' 
paiion of tbo Rebel territory, except at a few anc 
important controlling points. Wa must destroj 
their armies, and to do t'lis we must concentrate, 
not scatter, our forces. It ia better to operate suc- 
cessfully against ona stronghold or one army than to 
attempt three and lail. Tue indicaticus now clearly 
are that, both in the East and West, the campaign of 
1863 will give us bril iaut achievements — decisive 
victories. Our Generals now in the field havo the 
full confidence of the soldiers and the people, and 
the armies will t;o forth, knowing that their rsinks 
are to bo made full; that every day that passes will 
add to, not diminish, their strength or numbers. 
Never before did the woild see such an army in the 
field ; never before did Gencralj lead such men to 
battle. Each man goes forth feeling, not only that 
he has a soldier's reputation to muintain, but also 
that he has a country to defend iawfiiclibis inter- 
est is as great as that of the highest ofiicer in the 
land. Such an army, with its energy, pa»ver, intel- 
ligence and will, properly directed, must be invin- 
cible. The past has already demonstrated that the true 
American soldier can be relied upon, to dare, do, 
and endure all that human power can attempt, ac- 
complish, or sustain. 

Let no men be placed or kept in command of such 
men who have not the ability to command and the 
will to do; thus the errors and mistakes of the past 
will be avoided in the future, the fond hopes and 
anticipations of a true and loyal people realized, the 
Government vindicated and rebellion speedily aud 
forever crushed. 

We know that this contest has cost ua and will 
cost us treasuies and blood — the best blood ever shed 
by any people in maintenance of their Government 
and iu d.ifense of free institutions — the blood of the 
flower of our land. Let ua not make their lives a 
vain olfeiing, by for a moment entertaining the idea 
of a partition of our territory, which would forever 
involve us in anarchy and border wars, or by any 
base compromise with Rebels. 

We owe it to the noble dead who have shed their 
blood in fovmding and defending this Government; 
we owe it to ourselves; we owe it to the countless 
millions who are to come after us, to maintain this 
Government and the institutions we have inherited 
from our fathers — the richest legacy ever bequeathed 
by one generation to another — and to transmit them 
to our posterity, if not irilproved, certainly unim- 
paired. 

In conclusion, your Committee will only say, that 
all the men who hold high positions in the army and" 
navy, and have rendered valuable services to the 
country, with whom they have held intercourse, 
unite in the opinion that fi.yrhting, and cnli/ fighting, 
can end this Rebellion ; that every traitor in the 
land must and shall be made to acknowledge and 
yield absolute, unqualified and unconditional obe- 
dience to the Constitution and laws. 

And your Committee believe this to be the senti- 
mentj not only of the army and navy, but of every 
man m the country — traitors and cowards alone ex* 
cepted. 

B. F. WADE, 
Z. C. CHANDLER, 
On the part oi the Senat*. 

D. W. GOOCH, 
JOHN CUVODE, 
O. W. JULIAN, 
M. F. ODELL, 
Ou the part of the Hgaie. 



30 



LORD LYONS TO EARL RUSSELL. 



The British Envoy at "Washington has hitherto had credit for a forbearance and impartiality with 
regard to our internal quarrel whereof Earl Russell has seen fit suddenly to disrobe him. The foUow- 
ing dispatch, written by Lord Lyons to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 17th of last Novem- 
ber, gives an edifying account of a visit by Lord L. to this city on the 8th, and of certain remarkable 
conferences had by him here with certain persons whom he characterizes as " the conservative 
leaders. " 



Washington, Nov. 17, 1862. 

Mr Lord: In his dispatches of the 17th and 24th 
nltimo, and of the 7th instant, Mr. Stuart reported 
to your Lordship the results of the elections for 
members of Con'grees and State officers which have 
recently taken place in several of the most important 
States of the Union. Witbout repeating the details, 
it will be sufficient for me to observe that the succeES 
of the Democratic or (asit now Btylesitself) the Con- 
servative party, has been so great as to manifest a 
change in public feeling among the most rapid and 
the most complete that h-js ever been witnessed, even 
in this country. 

On my, arrival at New- York on the 8th instant I 
found th« Conservative leaders exulting in the crown- 
ing Buccesa achieved by the party in that State. 
They appeared to rejoice, above all, in the conviction 
that persoual liberty and freedom of speech had been 
secured for the principal State of the Union. They 
beUeved that the Government must at once desist 
from exercising in the State of Ne w-Yoik the extra- 
ordinary (and as they regarded them) illegal and un- 
constitutional powers wiiich it had assumed. They 
were coufident ■ that .at all events after ttielstof 
January next, on which day the newly-elected 
Governor would come into office, the suspension of 
thowrit of habeas corpus could net be practically 
maintained. They seemed to be persuaded tiiat the 
result of the elections would be accepted by the 
President as a declaration of the wUl of the people; 
that he would increase the moderate and conserva- 
tive element in the Cabinet; that he would seek to 
terminate the war, not to push it to extremity ; that 
be would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with 
the people of the South, and renounce the idea of 
subjugaluig or exterminating them. 

On the following morniuir, however, intelligence 
arrived from Wtisbington which dashed the rising 
hopes of the Conservatives. Ic was announced that 
Gen. McClellan had been dismissed from the com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to 
repair to bis home; that he bad, in fact been re- 
moved altogether Irom active service. _ The General 
had been regarded as the representative of Conser- 
vative principles in the army. Support of Lim had 
heen made one of tbe articles of the Conservative 
electoral jirogramme. Ilia dismissal was taken as a 
sign that ihe President had thrown himself entirely 
into the arics of the extreme Ivadical i arty, and that 
the atteupt. to cany out the policy of that 
party would be persisted ia. The irntation of the 
Conservatives ht New- York was certainly very 
great; it seemed, however, to be not unmixed with 
conttemalioQ and despondency. 

Several of the leaders of the Democratic party 
Bougbl interviews Willi me, both tefore and alter 
the arrival of the intelligence of Gen. McClellan'a 
dismissal. The snbjtct uppermost in their minds 
whilo ihey were epealdng to me was uaturally that 
of fureijiu mediation between the North and South. 
Many of them teemed to think that thi3mei.ia,ion 
jnuei come at last,* but they appeared to bo very 



much afraid of its coming too soon. It was evident 
that they apprehended that a premature proposal of 
foreign intervention would afford the Radical party 
a means of reviving tha violent war spirit, and of 
thus defeating the peaceful plans of the Conserva- 
tives. They appeared to regard the present moment 
as peculiarly unfavorable for such an offer, and, in- , 
deed, to hold thatitwoidd ba essential to the sac- I 
cess of any proposal from abroad that it should be ! 
deferred until the control of tbe Executive Govern- 
ment should be in the hands of the Convervative , 
party. 

I gave no opinion on the subject. I did not say | 
wnelher or not I myself thouglit foreign interven- (I 
tionprobabla or advisable; but I listened withat- i 
teation to the accoanta given ma of the plans and " 
hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom I 
thought I peiceiv^id a desire to pa', an end to the 
war, even at tbe rijk of losin;? tbe Southern States i 
altogetber; but it was p ain that it was not thought i 
prudent to avow this desire. Indeed, some bints of ' 
it, dropped before the elections, were so ill raceived 
that a strong deJaratioa iu tbe contrary s^nse was- 
deemed necessary by the Democratic leadi fj. 

At the present moment, therefore, the chiefsof the- 
Conservative party call loudly for a more vigorous , 
prosecution of the war. and reproach the Government ] 
with slackness as well as with want of success iu its- ) 
military measures. But tbey rdpudiato all idea of | 
interfering with the institutions of tbe Southern peo- | 
pie, or of waging a war of subjugation or extermina- J 
tion. They maiatain that the object of the military ] 
operations e'jould be to place the North in a positioa i 
to demand an armistice with honor and with effect* | 
The armistice should (they hold) be followed by a 
Convention, in which such changes of tbe Constitu- 
tion should be proposed as would give the South i 
ample security on the subject of its slave property^ 
and would enable tha North and the South to reunite 
and to live together iu peace and hai-mony. The. 
Conservatives profess to think that tbe South might 
be induced lo take part in such a Convention, and- 
that a restoration of ine Union would be the result. I 
The more Bigacious members of the p'^rty must,. I 
however, look upon the proposal of a Convention 
merely as a last experiment to test the possibility of ■ 
reuLion. They are no doubt well aware i bat the- 
more probable coneeqntnco of an armistica woulJ be 
the cstablisbment of Southern iacependence; but 
they perceive that if the South ia to utterly alienated..' 
that no possible concssdous will iiidace it to retara 
voluntavily to the Union, it is wiser to agree to 
separation than to prosecute a cruel and hopeless 
war. ^ I 

It is with reference to such an armistice as they ' 
desire to attain that the leaders of the (.^onsarvaiive 
party regard the qaeitioa of forei^^n mediation. Ther 
think that the olicr of uiciliaiion, if made, t j a Ilao- 
ical Adn.iaistralion, would bo rLJected; tnat if made 
at an unpropidoua moment it ujight iacrease the 
virulence with which tire war is prosecuted. If 
thbir own party were m power, or virtually cou- 



31 



trolled tho Adminislration, Ih^y wculi ra:l er, if 
possible, obtain an arinis'ije ■without tlie aid of for- 
eiirn Givermnenlp; hat t ey wouli b9 dispDSsd to 
accept an orF-Tof i.iedi'itioi if it appeirr.d to bo tbe 
only uipana of piitiog a etop to loBtilitie?. Tlaey 
•would deoire that tbe off-r sliould come from tbe 
frreat Powers of Europe cosjoiut^y, and in pariicnlar 
that 88 little ]!rorainence as posiible e joald be given 
to Grent Britain. 

At Wa?liington I bnve had fewer opportUTiities 
than I bad at^Ne^-Tork of ascertaining the present 
viavrs cf the cbie 8 of (he political parties. At the 
interview which I had with Mr. Seward, ono day 
after ir.y arrival, l:e showed no disposition to enter 
upon political mavtere. He did not npp'?ar to expect 
or to desire to receive from me anyB,iecial coaimuni- 
cation fron ber Majesty's Government. The Pres- 
ident, -when I waited upon bim, talk'td to mo ouly 
oa ordinary topics. I, for my part, gladly Ebunned 
all allusioa to forei^ intervention, my principal ob- 
ject being to avoid saying anyhiujf wliich mi^ht 
embarrass me ia cirryini^outanyia-traotioDS on the 
eubject which I may receive from your lordship. 

All things considered, my own opinion cartainly is 
that the present moment is not a favorable one for 
makincT an offer of mediation.^ It migbt embarrass 
the fCiice party, aui even oblicre tbem, ia ojider to 
maintain their ]'opularity, to make BOTie publio de- 
"clarations against it, and tbi:* mi^fht make iS dilficalt 
fortbem to accept a BinilaroIFenit a more propitious 
time. It would in all probability be rejected by tbe 
President, who appears to have thrown bioiself into 
tlie arms of tbe extreme radical party. Tho views 
of that party are cl ;ar and definite. Tliey docl iro that 
there is no booe of reconciliation with the Southern 
people; that the war niuit bo pursued, per fas aut 
iicfas, until tbe disloyal men of the South are ruined 
and Bu'/JQgated, if iiOj exterminated; that not an 
inch of the old territory of the Republic must be 
given up; that foreign iatervention, in any bhape, 
must be rejected and rejentsd.^ Th's party would 
desire to tarn an off^r of mediation to account, foi' 
thepurpoBeofinllaming tbe war spirit and produc- 
ing a react'on against the Conservatives. 

Id 18 probable, too, that the Govcrnaient would 
urge, in answer to an offer of mediation, t'lat itj has 
by no means abandoned the Lope of putting down*« 
tbe Rebellion wiihin a reasonable time; that, at all 
' - nta, this is not a moment at which it can reason- 
• 1.0 called upon to put a_ Bi;op to hostilities. It 
iid observe that tbo_ armies of the Uoiced Statel 
are everywhere advancing, and that expeditions are 
prepared against Te::ia3, as well as a,;^aiust Charles- 
ton, Mobile, and other points oa the coast. It would 
point out that i: had cquippsd a considerable num- 
ber of war vessels, iron-cl.id as well as others, at a 
\ vast expense; that tbo Bsason baljuat arrived when 
' the Autumn rains would render the rivers uavi,7ab'ef 
by armed vessels, and when the Southern coast 
. TToald bo free froni epidemic disease. It might even 
i represent an advance of tha Army of the Potomae 
\ to Uichmond as a probable event. The expeiieaca 
', of tbe past is certain-y not calculated to inspire any 
'' great confidence ia tho roiults of these warlike 
- '"parations ; bat in tbe political interests of the 
yiiow in power render a continuance of the 
r a necessity to it. Its only chance of regiiuiag 
it;3 1 >st popular! y lies in euccessfi'.l railitarv opera- 
lions. Unless it cm obtain n much bigljer place ia 
public csimation than it now occupies, not only will 
its tenure cf power become extremely precarious, 
v&nt 60014 of its leading members may be called to a 



6-ve''e account for their extra l97al proceedinars. 

During tho session of Coiff'-esa wbi h be^rina next 
mon'h, tho present Ad!nini>tratioa has indeed reason 
to expert ati nncomprumi'*i'ig support from a ma- 
joiityof both Homes of Cor.T'Jss. Baton tbo4h 
of BI irch next the existing Houseof Eepresentatives 
is dissolved by the terms of the Constitution, and at 
the Bime time several of the present' Senators r'o ont 
of office. Tho majority of the members chosen^; 1 1 ha 
rpctntt lections for the new IIoiso ofrRepresc ;i- 
tives are of the Dcnocratio or Conservative parv, 
and in Foaie States Senators of that party will 
be returned ia tbe room of those whose terms 
of ofli^'-e expire next March. The new Congress 
is in fact lik Iv to be hostile to the Administration 
and tot h9 radical party; and, although it will not, 
in the ordinary course of things, assemble until the ) 
last month of next year, the President will liardlv ' 
be able to persist in l is present policy and in bis as- ^ 
sumption of extraordinary powers, unless be can, ia 
virtue of military puccesse', obtain a reputation 
wi h the people which wiU sustain him in a contest 
wi^h the Legislature. 

It would seem, then, to be vain to make an offer 
of m3:liation to tiie present Govern-nent, ia their 
present mood, with any EO'.ion that it would be ac- 
cepted. A change oJF mood mav, however, take 
place after the 4th of March, if no great milttan 
Buccesses occur ia tbe interval. Such a change may 
possibly be prod iced sooner by military reverses. A 
proposal, however, to mediate, made oven under 
present circumstances, by three or more of tbe 
Great Powers of Europe 'conjointly, might not pro- 
duce any great inconvenience. 

^ It is, indesd, urged by some people t'lat mediation 
Bliould be offered, not bo much with a vie w to its ba- 
ing accepted, as to is clearing tlie way for a recog- 
niiion of tho Southern Coufederacv. And, indeed, 
if it were determined that tbe time bad come for re- 
cognizing that Confederacy, no doubt an offer of 
mediation would be a BuitaMe prelimiuarv. But I 
do not charly understand what alvantige'is expect- 
ed to resuls from a eioaple recogni ion of the South- 
ern Government; and I presume that the European 
Powers do not contemplate breaking up the block- 
ade by force of arm', or engaging ia hostilities with 
the United States in support of tae independence of 
tho South. .^,, 

I have, indeed, heard it maintaine 1 that Great 
Britain thould recognize the independence of the 
South as soon as possible, wii;h a view to impede the 
Buccass of tlie efforts of the Conservative party to 
reconstruct the Union. The advocates of this opin- 
i jn coDsiddr a reunion a probable event, and appre- 
hend that the first result of it would be that tbe 
combined forces of the North and South would be 
lit loose upon Cmada. I cartaialy donot at pres 
eat share these apprehensions. All hops of the ra- 
couslructim of the Union appears to befadingaway, 
even from the minds of those who most ardently de- 
sire it. But if the reconstruction be still possible, 1 
do not tbiak that v.'e need couclada that it would 
lead to an iavaaion of Canada, or to any consequen- 
ces injurious to Greit Bri!;ain. At any rate, dangers 
of this kind are reniote. The iimediite and obvious 
interest of Great Britain, as wall us the rest of Eu- 
rope, is that peace and prosperity b'iouIJ be restored 
to taij country as coon m poosiiole. The point 
chiefly worthy cf con -i Jeratio-^ appears to be wheth- 
er separation or reunion be the more likely to ell set 
this objaot. I have, &;c , Lyons. 



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